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INTRODUCTION
On

April 15, 1599, Sir Robert Devereux, Second Earl

of Essex, arrived in Dublin to assume his new position as
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, having been charged by Elizabeth I with the task
once and for all.

o~

subduing that restless island

Outwardly confident, bolstered by the

popular acclaim which followed his triumphant expedition
to Cadiz in 1596, and leading the largest force hitherto
maintained in Ireland, the Earl was determined to subdue
the Gaelic rebels thoroughly and, above all, quickly.
Five months later he was back in England, having left
behind an army decimated by disease, exhausted by difficult marches across the treacherous Irish countryside, and
morally crushed by fear and despair.

His own illustrious

military reputation was shattered, and shortly after his
return to England he was imprisoned, officially charged
with disobedience to orders and unofficially suspected of
treason.
Castigation of Essex began while his campaign was
still in progress and has continued to the present day.
Letters from Elizabeth to the Earl in Ireland contain
scathing denunciations of his inefficiency, disobedience,
lack of resolution, and, most seriously, the assertion
that Essex had no excuse for failure, because, as the
l

2

Queen wrote, "you had your asking, you had choice of
times, you had power and authority more ample than ever
any had, or ever shall have. 111 Succeeding historians
have echoed Elizabeth's charges and continued to place
the blame solely on Essex.
Cyril Falls, author.of Elizabeth's Irish Wars and
Mountjoy states that Essex "began with every advantage, 112
and "no army ever established in Ireland had better prospects of being adequately maintained."3

Regarding the

Earl's strategy, Falls writes that Essex, rather than
striking at Ulster, the root of the rebellion, "chose the
easier course" and moved south, where he wore out his best
troops while accomplishing nothing. 4 The author of The
Second Cecil, Phyllis M. Handover, attributes failure to
the defeatism of Essex and to the fact that the Earl found
guerrilla warfare "so contemptible according to his standards that he had not bothered to devise a means of countering the insidious etiolation of his army."5

Ewan Butler,

in hisJ:>ook The Cecils, curtly dismisses the campaign by
1 c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 152.
2 cyril Falls, Mountjoy (London: Odhams Press Unlimited, 1955), 108.
3cyril Fallst Elizabeth's Irish Wars (London: Methuen
and Company, 1950;, 232.
4 Ibid., 231 •.
5Phyllis M. Handover, The Second Cecil (London: Eyre
and Spottiswoode, 1959), 19 •

saying that Essex "seemed unable to come to grips with
Tyrone. 116
The Earl of Essex always maintained that the expedition was sabotaged by his numerous enemies in England, but
his protestations were dismissed in 1599 and are largely
discounted now.

Handovez: states that "with nothing to dis-

tract him except his own failure, the mind of Essex became
infected and impoisoned, 11 ? while Butler concludes that
Essex's "consciousness of failure" began to "disturb his
never very well-balanced mind. 118
Articles by Reverend David Hicks (1955) and L.

w.

Henry (1959) suggested a need to reevaluate the Essex campaign; however their suggestions have been generally ignored.

In the most recent (1971) biography of the Lord

Lieutenant, Robert, Earl of Essex by Robert Lacey, the
author states that "He could not complain at the strength
or condition of the troops given him for the task";9 and
then simplistically condemns the "aimlessness"lO of Essex's movements in Ireland, without even considering the
crucial problems of logistical support on which the
6 Ewan Butler, The Cecils (London: Frederick Muller
Limited, 1964), 113.
?Handover, The Second Cecil, 194.
8 Butler, The Cecils, 113.
9Robert Lacey, Robert, Earl of Essex (New York:
Atheneum, 1971), 224.
lOibid., 222.

4

campaign depended •. Finally, Lacey chides Essex and his
subordinates for complaining that they were misunderstood
in England ~nd poorly supported by men of ill-will, 11 when
in fact the evidence supports the Earl's complaints.
To date, the campaign of Essex in Ireland has not
been studied or analyzed.in any great detail, most authors
preferring to dismiss the campaign briefly, and it is
this void in Tudor history which the author hopes to fill.
In order to place the events of 1599 in proper historical
perspective and to familiarize the reader with the Irish
situation which Essex would confront, it would be profit. able to begin by examining the catalyst which would eventually bring Essex to Ireland: the great rebellion of 1595.

11ill_<!., 233.

CHAPrER I
TYRONE'S REBELLION
On June 28, 1595, Queen Elizabeth I issued a royal
proclamation declaring the
. Irish Lord, Hugh O'Neill, Earl
of Tyrone, a traitor and rebel. 1 This action marked the
beginning of an eight-year conflict which drained the
English treasury and devastated the Irish provinces in the
last years of Elizabeth's reign.

The war began in Ulster

and remained localized, with intermittent truces, for·
first few years.

~he

Then in August, 1598, the main English

Army, under Lord Marshal Sir Henry Bagenal, was ambushed
and destroyed at the Yellow Ford while attempting an invasion of Ulster. 2 This defeat signalled a general uprising
throughout Ireland, as the indigenous population made a
determined and savage effort to drive their English overlords into the sea.
As with other major conflicts, the causes of the rebellion of 1595 were numerous and complex, involving deepseated hostilities building up over a period of years, and
immediate provocations and precipitous incidents.

The

immediate causes centered around the personality of Hugh
1 Robert Lacey, Robert, Earl of Essex (New York: Atheneum, 19?1), 224.
2

C.S.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 228.
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O'Neill, whose personal ambitions and diplomatic duplicity
provided the spark which set off the uprising.

The

long~

range causes can be attributed to the nature of English
rule in Ireland and to the attempts made to subvert Gaelic
institutions.
Sixteenth-century !Deland was a forbidding land of
mountains, forests and bogs which, despite its proximity
and historical ties to England, was surprisingly uncivilized.

English writers in the 1500's used the Irish as the

standard of savage behavior against which they compared
others.

As late as 1640 Englishmen who went to America

constantly compared Irish customs, manners, dress and even
hair styles to those of the American Indians whom they
encountered.3
The inhabitants met by the New English settlers of
the Tudor age were usually a mixture of native Irish and
the descendants of Norman conquerors who had settled in
Ireland during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

The

Normans had generally established themselves in the eastern province of Leinster, in the section known as the Pale;
however, great baronial families such as the de Burghs and

...

the Fitzgeralds had moved into the western province of
· Connaught and the southern province of Munster. 4
3David Beer Quinn, The Elizabethans and the Irish
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), 23-26.
4 John C. Beckett, A Short History of Ireland (New
York: Hutchinson's University Library, 1952), 19-24.
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The Norman descendants, or Old English, kept up a
limited connection with England, chiefly through shipping
between Dublin and the southeastern ports of Ireland, and
the English ports of Bristol, Milford and Chester.

How-

ever, this uncertain contact was not enough to preserve
the Norman identity in a.Gaelic environment, and by the
sixteenth century the Normans had lost virtually all
traces of their ancestry.5

By the 1500's the Old English

families had adopted Irish customs, institutions and language to the point where there seemed to be no difference
between the two groups. 6 Additionally, the Old .English
solidified their position by ties of marriage and friendship with the local Irish chiefs.?

With the exception of

the northern province of Ulster, where the native Irish
were still supreme, all the Irish chieftains of importance
who opposed the English were descendants of the early Norman invaders. 8
The Irish eociety of the sixteenth century was a
primitive, feudalistic society in which the local chiefs
ruled a depressed class of serfs.

The nucleus of the

society was centered around large households of men whose

5Quinn, Elizabethans and Irish, 143.
6 Ibid., 160.
?William z. Renwick (ed.), A View of the Present State
of Ireland by Edmund Spencer (London: Eric Partridge Ltd.,

1934)' 229.

8 cyril Falls, Elizabeth's Irish Wars (London: Methuen
and Company, 1950), 23-24.

main occupation was fighting.9

?
Additionally, there pre-

vailed an elaborate military hierarchy of horsemen, light
infantry and most importantly, Scots heavy infantry.

The

presence of Scots, known as Gallowglasses and Redshanks,
added to the instability of the Irish situation.
lowglasses had entered

t~e

The Gal-

country in the mid-thirteenth

century as mercenaries to the Irish and Apglo-Irish Lords,
and had remained their hereditary allies.

Settling all

over Ireland they fought as heavy infantry and soon became the backbone of the rebel Irish armies.

Under the

Tudors, a new wave of Scots mercenaries, the Redshanks,
began to enter Ireland on a seasonal basis.

Crossing from

the peninsula of Cantyre, separated from the north Irish
coast by a mere twelve miles, the Redshanks fought for
brief periods or a campaign, and then returned to Scotland. lo
The local chiefs were linked to the more powerful
Irish lords by bonds of .fealty and tribute.

The Lord had

the right to levy feudal dues which obliged the local
populace to feed the lord and his retinue whenever they
visited.

In war, a more encompassing levy, the "bonaght",

was used to gather "victuals" and money to support any
venture. 11 Throughout the sixteenth century, therefore,
9Quinn, Elizabethans and Irish, 15, 39.
lOGerard A. Hayes-McCoy, Scots Mercenary Forces in
Ireland (London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1937), 13-23.
llQuinn, Elizabethans· and Irish, 34-35, 52.

8

acy chieftain in revolt had a legal source of support at
his disposal.
One of the most troublesome aspects of sixteenthcentury Ireland was the system of succession, known as
tanistry.

Whereas the English had the system of primo-

geniture, by which the eldest son inherited an estate,
the Irish and Old English families handed down authority
and land not from father to eldest son, but from the head
of a family group to the next strongest personality.

The

successor, or tanist, was usually chosen in the ruler's
lifetime, and was always an adult, since this turbulent
society could not afford to have minors as chieftains.
However, if there were no appointed successor, the dispute
was settled by election or force of arms. 12 The system of
succession, the presence of mercenaries from Scotland, and
the martial orientation of the ruling classes, kept Ireland
in a state of continuous warfare and instability.
The legal system of Ireland did nothing to bring
order to the island.

Theoretically, Ireland was under the

English law, but in fact legal jurisdiction was ineffective outside of those areas occ~pied by the New English
settlers. 1 3 The native Irish and Old English relied on
the Brehon I.aw, a system based on Irish tradition and
12
Renwick, ~' 232.
1 3George B. O'Connor, Elizabethan Ireland (Dublin:
Sealy, Bryers and Walker, 1940), 9?.

9
custom.

The Brehons were a professional class of heredi-

tary jurists who used archaic texts and commentaries as a
basis for law.

The system did not uphold the power of

the state and was extremely unstructured.

For instance

it provided no machinery for putting law into motion against
criminals, but left it to the aggrieved person to press
charges.

Additionally the entire system provided no pun-

ishment greater than fines for any offense, including
murder. 14 Contemporary English observers like Edmund
Spenser, Secretary to Lord Deputy Grey, noted that the system invited corruption in that the Brehons could be intimidated or easily bribed by powerful Lords.

In fact the

Brehons actually made a business of gathering exorbitant
rewards in return for favorable decisions, a situation
which increased the financial position of the Brehons,
while allowing local lords to violate the law with impunity.15
Finally, the entire economic system of Ireland made
it difficult to establish an orderly and manageable society.'

The basis of Irish society was pastoral, cattle
being the chief source of wealth. 16 Most Irish were forced
to move with their herds on a regular basis, going to the
14Ibid., 99.
l5Renwick, View, 18 •
.
16nenry Morley (ed.), Ireland Under Elizabeth and
James the First, Described by Edmund Spencer, by Sir John
Davies and by Fynes Moryson (London: 1890), 418-421.

10
mountain pastures in summer, and back to the lowlands in
winter.

Consequently, Irish settlements tended to be ir-

regular rural units rather than towns and large villages. 1 7
This constant movement away from the towns at regular
intervals attracted all sorts of vagabonds, thieves and
wandering minstrels, who .attached themselves to the migrating parties.

Additionally, the process of moving .from

town to mountain wilderness. involved a more primitive
existence with its concomitant decivilizing social implications.18

The whole setup of Irish society, therefore,

hindered the establishment of an orthodox civilization on
the Continental standard.
Ireland had been virtually ignored by most English
kings, and little effort had been exerted to bring it under control.

Sir John Davies, Attorney-General for Ire-

land in 1606, observed that prior to Elizabeth's reign the
Crown of England had never sent over enough men or treasure
to defend the small territory of the Pale, let alone insure
the conquest of the whole island.

However, Henry VIII,

although he sent few troops, did establish a new administrative organization in an effort to make the island
more manageable. 1 9
In 1534, Henry VIII set up a governing system centered
l?Renwick, View, 64-65.
18

~.'

98-99.

l9Morley, Ireland Under Elizabeth, 245-246.

11
in Dublin.

At the head was the Viceroy, bearing the title

of Lord Deputy, or in exceptional cases, the higher title
of Lord Lieutenant?0 The Lord Deputy was responsible for
all of Ireland, with direct responsibility for the ad.ministration of Leinster and the Pale, while the Provinces of
Connaught and Munster were ad.ministered by a President and
Council appointed by the Lord Deputy.

The northern prov-

ince of Ulster remained virtually independent, being ruled
by various feuding tribal chieftains who maintained a
sporadic alliance with the English, communicating directly
with the Lord Deputy. 21
The Lord Deputy was assisted by an Irish Council including a Lord Chancellor, Chief Justice, Treasurer at
Wars and Marshal of the Army.

Most of these positions,

particularly that of the Lord Deputy, were filled by men
chosen in England, although Old English nobles at times
were able to hold the lesser offices. 22 The Irish Parliament was theoretically to function as the government of
Ireland, but its independence had long since been undermined.

In 1494 Sir Edward Poyning, sent by Henry VII to

bring order to Ireland, passed laws which provided that
all acts which the Irish Parliament wished to consider had
to be first certified in England and approved by the King
2 °Falls, Irish Wars, 20.
21 Renwick, View, 225-226.

22 Ibid. , 228.

12
and his Council. 2 3
The Irish Parliament was dominated by the Lord Depu'

ty, who found little use for it, since English administration was subsidized almost completely by England.

Since

the Parliament was not needed for revenue, it was only
called for some special purpose, such as to restore the
Protestant religion or to extinguish the title of some
recalcitrant noble. 24

During Elizabeth's reign the Irish

Parliament·· s most significant action was to pass several
acts of attainder against the Desmond clan on April 26,

1585, confiscating their lands as penalty for rebellion.
After this, the Irish Parliament did not meet again for
the rest of Elizabeth's reign. 2 5
In addition to reorganizing the administration in
Ireland, Henry VIII sought to assert English authority by
inaugurating the policy of "Surrender and Regrant."

From

1541 to 1543 a procession of Irish Lords came to England
and submitted to the king.

Through this method the Irish

chieftains showed their good faith by surrendering their
lands to the Crown, which gave the lands back to the chiefs
under royal patent letters.

It was stipulated that the

lands would be forfeit if the chieftains were disloya1. 26
2 3Morley, Ireland Under Elizabeth, 399.
24

Falls, Irish Wars, 21.

25Ibid., 15?.
26 Ibid., 30.

13
Furthermore the Irish Lords promised to serve the king,
give up Irish dress, and use the English language.

In

return the Lords were promised English protection and were
given English titles.

Of all the Irish who came. to Eng-

land during this period, the most important was Con O'Neill,
head of the most

powerfu~

clan in Ulster, who was awarded

the title Earl of Tyrone. 2 ?
By the above methods Henry VIII had hoped to bring
the Irish under control.

However the new administration,

along with the policies of Surrender and Regrant, were
neglected by succeeding monarchs,

Edward VI and nary

r. 28

In 1558 Elizabeth came to the throne, and after solving
her immediate problems of succession at home, turned her
attention to the restless island across St. George's
channel.
The official English position toward Ireland was expressed by Queen Elizabeth in her Proclamation for Ireland
on January 25, 1598.

In this she maintained that trouble

in Ireland was caused by "the cunning of seditious priests
and seminaries" from "foreign parts," who stirred up the
people by telling them that the English wished to conquer
them. 2 9

Elizabeth maintained that:.

2 7 Quinn , ~lizabethans and Irish, 145.
28 Falls, Irish Wars, 30.

29 C.S.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 468.

14
the very name of conquest seemeth so ridiculous
to us, as we cannot imagine upon what ground it
could enter into any man's conceit, that our
actions, tending only to reduce a simple and
barbarous rabble of misguided rebels, should
need any such title of conquest ••• 30
Despite this vehement denial of conquering designs
the English reasoned that Ireland could never be properly
administered until it was organized in English fashion,
with appointed representatives of state controlling a
stable population, unhindered by the destructive effects
of clan warfare.31 Therefore the English wished to establish a loyal landowning class which could have no special
privileges as did the Irish Chieftains of Ulster.

Fur-

thermore, stability would be insured by a central ad.ministration assisted by garrison troops and uniform systems
of taxation and legal jurisdiction.

Finally, cohesion

would be attained by creating a church whose clergy would
support the state, and by establishing English as the sole
official language.3 2 Conquest, therefore, would be the
only feasible means of facilitating the English objectives.
Under Elizabeth's rule the government increasingly
looked on colonization by New English settlers as the best
method of solving the Irish question.

Queen Mary I had

endeavored to establish New English colonies in King's and
30ibid. , 469.
31 Renwick, ~' 233.
32 Quinn, Elizabethans and Irish, 10.

l

15
Queen• s counties in· an e.f.fort to secure

t;hE:~

border of the

Pale; however, these attempts were only halfheartedly supported.33

Likewise, Elizabeth, ever conscious of finan-

ces, would never agree to complete subsidization of a new
colonial settlement, but encouraged several wealthy nobles
to carve out estates for.themselves on the promise that
the government would pay half the expenses.

As land be-

came available several nobles attempted to take advantage
of this new opportunity.34
Making land available was no serious problem since the
policy of Surrender and Regrant provided the legal means
of confiscating

ter~itory

of rebel chieftains.

Elizabeth

had reinstituted this policy by 1562 and many chieftains,
including Shane O'Neill of the Ulster clan, made their
submission to the Queen.35

Shane O'Neill revolted shortly

thereafter but was subdued in 1566.

The new Lord Deputy,

Sir Philip Sidney, decided that lasting peace would only
be assured if the O'Neill lands were parceled out to enterprising colonists.

Elizabeth supported thj.s concept when

the Lord Deputy pointed out that New English settlements
in northeastern Ulster would prevent the Scots from coming
across the channel .from their Highlands on periodic raids} 6
33rbid., 106.

34c.s.P. Ireland, 1574-85, 406.
35Falls, Irish \.Jars, 89.
36
.
C.S.P. Ireland, 1509-73, 318.
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The attempted settlement under Sir Thomas Smith was furiously contested by the Irish, who realized that they would
be thrust down to a class of depressed peasants under a
New English aristocracy.

The Smith venture, suffering

from Irish hostility and the usual skimpy financial support, collapsed altogether when Sir Thomas was killed in

1569. 37
At the same time new efforts were made further south
as New English settlers under William St. Leger attempted
to confiscate the territory of the Old English Earl of
Desmond, who had assisted the rebellious Shane O'Neill.
The Earl of Desmond was arrested and sent to London, but
his cousin, James Fitzmaurice Fitzgerald, took over leadership of the Desmond clan and led a serious revolt in 1569.
The bloody rebellion was not settled until 15?3, .and only
after Elizabeth had sent many troops and spent much treasure. 38
Still not discouraged, Elizabeth immediately supported new colonization attempts in both north and south Ireland after the Fitzmaurice rebellion.

In 1573 Elizabeth

sent Walter Devereux, first Earl of Essex, to settle the
peninsula of Antrim in the extreme northeast corner of
Ulster, in order to stop Scots• assistance.
37Ibid., 424.

38 C.S.P. Simancas, 1568-79, 694.
c

The expedition

17
failed in that bleak country and most settlers returned
home when the Earl of Essex died in 1575.39
The southern venture was more successful as many am·bitious nobles, led by Sir Walter Raleigh, seized great
tracts of Munster territory which had been confiscated
after the suppression of .Desmond's rebellion. 40 New English colonists poured into this area, and by 1589 over
l,000 New English were settled.

The colony continuously

expanded in strength up to the time of the great Irish uprising of .1598, whereupon the settlement was quickly and
completely destroyed. 41 The New English settlers consciously sought to expel the native Irish from their territory rather than integrate with them, and soon found
their colonies bordered by hordes of sullen Irish refugees.
Even those Irish not directly injured by the policy of
confiscations viewed the English policies with mistrust
and apprehension.
The manner in which the English conducted military
operations and handled resistance did much to alienate the
Irish population as a whole.

Back in England sentiments

were expressed by high-ranking officials on the importance
of building a bridge between the two societies. 42 However,
39c.S.P. Ireland, 1274-85, 89, 99.
4

oibid., 406.
41 .
C.S.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 290-292.
42 Quinn, Elizabethans and Irish, 125.

r
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in the grim realities of guerrilla warfare, such highminded sentiments were lost on the local commanders
charged with keeping order.
The exasperation invariably felt by the English officials in attempting to combat the Irish guerilla tactics,
led them to resort to famine as one sure method of dealing
with an enemy that found support among the indigenous
population.

From the beginning to the end of Elizabeth's

reign the Lord Deputies would ultimately rely on starvation to bring the rebel Irish into line.

E'ven normally

humane personalities, like Henry Harvey, Secretary to Lord
Lieutenant Essex in 1599, ultimately came to the conclusion that the rebellious Irish were "savage beasts," "rats
and similar vermin" to be rooted out and slain. 4 3 The surest method of dealing with them was famine; "famine which
eats up, not the fighting men alone, but the women and the
children too, till there be not one of them left."

The

justification, as Henry Harvey expressed it, was that "they
be one and all either rebels themselves or kin to rebels •••
they seem to have deserved no less. 1144
The policy of starving the population into submission
was perfected during the Desmond uprising of 1579-1583.
Not being able to come to grips with the Irish force, the

43
.
Dnily Lawless (ed.), With Essex in Ireland (London:
Methuen and Company, 1902), 1?9.
44

Ibid., 243.
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English attacked their source of supply by destroying any
food and beef they could find, regardless of the consequences to the civilians.

The end result of this policy

of despoliation was described by Edmund Spencer, who
visited Munster at the conclusion of the rebellion and
noted the condition of the people:
they were brought to such wretchedness, as that
any stony hearts would have rewed the same, out
of ,every Corner of the woods and glens they came
creeping forth upon their hands, for their legs
could not bear them, they looked Anatomies of
death, they spake like ghosts crying out of their
graves, they did eat of the dead Carrions, they
spared not to scrape out of their graves, and if
they found a plot of water cresses or shamrocks,
there they flocked as to a feast ••• in short space
there was none almost left and a most populous and
plentiful Country suddenly left void of man or
beast, yet sure in all that war there perished
not many by the sword, but all by the extremit~
of famine, which they themselves had wrought.45
Colonization and conquest were to be followed by a
complete transformation of Gaelic society.

Richard Stany-

hurst, a contemporary official observer, noted that a
successful conquest had to insure the incorporation of
three basic elements: law, apparel and language. 46 English legislation in the occupied areas therefore sought
to regulate these three elements of Gaelic life.

While

the new rules on legal ju.Tisdiction and apparel were
treated with indifference by the Irish, the rules pertaining to language were opposed with open hostility.
4 5Renwick, View, 135.
46Quinn, Elizabethans and Irish,

57.
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is probably the most basic manifestation of group identity,
and probably the most difficult characteristic to attempt
to regulate.

A contemporary English observer noted: "For

language, they do so despise ours, as they think themselves
the worst when they hear it. 1147
sisted these attempts to

~hange

The Irish stubbornly retheir life, particularly

in Ulster, where Con O'Neill, upon his deathbed, "left
his curse to any of his posterity, that would either learn
English, sow wheat, or.make any building in Ulster. 1148
One particular class singled out for destruction by
English legislation was the Irish poet or "bard."

The

poets formed a privileged class which either wandered
through the countryside or secured a position at an Irish
court.

In a society with such a low literacy rate, the

bard preserved Irish tradition and folk lore.

They glori-

fied in song and rhyme the Irish lords to whom they were
attached, going so far as to assert that some Lords were
descendants of Caesar, Alexander or Darius. 4 9 The bards
were the most vocal critics of English interference and
the most uncompromising advocates of preserving Irish
identity.

They particularly lauded the martial spirit of

the old Irish and incited younger Irishmen to go on robbing and cattle rustling forays in emulation of their

47 C.S.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 440.
48 Ibid.

-

4 9Renwick, View, 94.
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ancestors.

The Irish revered the bards as a source of

tradition and pride, while the Irish Lord welcomed their
praise and adulation.

To the English, however, the bard

was a disruptive influence and the Lord Deputies took
drastic measures, including execution, to eliminate the
influence of these hostil~ poets.50
Another method by which the English sought to subdue
the Irish was to take advantage of the many factions and
rivalries in Ireland, and thereby use the Irish to defeat
themselves.

The most intense Irish rivalry which the

English exploited was the long-standing feud between the
Earls of Desmond and Ormonde.

The Desmonds, descendants

of the Norman Fitzgeralds, were the acknowledged leaders
of large areas in Leinster and Munster and as the spokesman for Catholicism and independence, were the chief targets of English repression.
The Ormondes, located in and around the Pale area,
were their chief rivalSt and throughout all of Elizabeth's
reign they were led.by Thomas Butler, tenth Earl of Ormonde.

Butler was brought up as a Protestant, the first

of his lineage, although he conformed as was necessary
under the harsh Catholic reaction of Queen Mary I.

In

1562 and again in 1565 the Earl of Ormonde came to England to protest outrages committed by the Desmonds, and
50 C.S.P. Ireland, 1509-73, 514, 535.
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made a fine impression on the Queen.51
Thomas Butler, known as "Black Thomas" from his dark
hair and complexion, was a charming personality and stayed
around Elizabeth's court for long periods of time.

He

and the youthful Queen Elizabeth, who were about the same

age, developed a deep affection for each other--some said
it was love5 2 --which lasted throughout Elizabeth's reign.
With the Queen so firmly on his side Ormonde secured a
leading position in Irish politics, rallied the Protestant
Irish to the English cause, and brought in many former
rebels to fight on the Queen's side.

Throughout the long

wars, while English viceroys came and left, and even in
the lowest ebbs of English fortune, Ormonde's loyalty and
support was something on which Elizabeth could always
count; and in the end it did make a difference.
Of all the sources of conflict between English and
Irish the most significant area of disagreement was in
matters of religion.

Before the English attempted to im-

pose the Reformation on Ireland, religion in that country
was treated with a mixture of superstition and indifference.

The Catholicism of the native Irish and the· Old

English settlers, though firmly entrenched, had gradually
been allowed to lapse to the point where religion was practiced in name only.

The New English Bishop of Cork,

51 Falls, Irish Wars, 101-102.
52 :i:bid., 102.
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charged with ensuring the success of the Reformation in
his area, wrote despairingly:
I am persuaded, and do partly know the same by

experience, that a great part of this kingdom
are no better than mere infidels, having but a
bare name of Christians, without any knowledge
of Christ or light of his truth, that I myself
have examined divers of them, being sixty years
of age or upwards, a,nd have found them not able
to say the Lord's Prayer, or the articles of the
Christian faith, neither in English, Latin, nor
Irish, neither have they ever been taught the same
or examined by the priest whether they could say
the same or not.53
Additionally, the English were appalled at the moral turpitude of the native Irish.

Contemporary writers abhorred

certain practices, particularly those relating to marriage,
while the New English
were widespread.

not~d

that illegitimacy and incest

Probationary marriages for a year and a

day were common, and divorce was easily obtained, since
the Brehons supervised the proceedings.54
Under Henry VIII the first efforts were made to spread
the Reformation to Ireland, as the king dissolved the monasteries and forced the heads of the O'Neill and O'Donnell
clans to abjure the Pope.55

Under Edward VI, the begin-

nings of a religious rift became evident as England turned
to Protestantism and the Irish and Old. English clung to
the traditional faith.

However any slight progress made

53 C.S.P. Ireland, 1596-9?, 16.
54Quinn, Elizabethans and Irish, 80-81.
55Falls, Irish Wars, 18.
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under Henry VIII and Edward VI was reversed forever under
the reaction of Mary I.
in 1558

t~e

When Elizabeth came to the throne

Bishops in Ireland made statements of adher-

ence to the Reformed Church in the Irish Parliament of
1560, but still celebrated Latin masses.

However, those

bishops under the North Irish chieftains did not even
attend the Parliament.

Although Elizabeth had left the

question of doctrine rather vague to avoid confrontation,
she vigorously pursued the establishment of a church which
outwardly seemed to be united to the state.

The Englistl,

therefore, took over Church property, installed obedient
clergy and gave away monastic property to their own officials. 56
Around Dublin the process seemed to be successful,
as even the Archbishops of Dublin went over to Protestantism without reservation.

The farther one proceeded from

Dublin the more tenuous was the hold of the Reformed
Church, until it was lost altogether in the wilds of
Ulster and Connaught.

There, the native Irish and Old

English rejected any aspect of the new forms of service
or articles of faith which could be identified with the
Anglicizing process.5?
The impetus to resist was given by vigorous efforts

56 .Myles

v. Ronan, The Reformation in Ireland (London:
Longmans, Green and Company, 1930), 6-24.
5?Ibid.
~
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of the Catholic Counter-Reformation in general, and in
particular.by the efforts of James Fitzmaurice Fitzgerald.
Fitzmaurice was the first Irish layman who attempted to
connect politico-religious strings.

After taking over

leadership of the Desmond clan and leading a revolt in
1568, he sent the Archbishop of Cashel, Ma.urice Fitzgibbon,
to the courts of Philip II of Spain and the Pope in a
fervent appeal for aid.58 In the next year he sent a letter to Philip II in which he stated that the Irish wished
to have a Catholic king, na.Ilely Don Juan of

A~stria,

ap-

pointed over them in an effort to unite the country and
save them from the damning effects of Protestantism.

Fur-

thermore, Fitzmaurice asserted that if the king offered
no aid, the rebels would have to make peace with the English.59

Despite his efforts no significant aid was forth-

coming, and with the collapse of the rebellion Fitzmaurice
went into exile on the Continent. 60
In 1572, Fitzmaurice went to France, and after staying two years, journeyed to Rome where the Pope gave him
a warm reception.

Equipped with a ship, 100 men, and a

Papal proclamation depriving Elizabeth I of her possessions,
Fitzmaurice set sail for Ireland and landed at Dingle Bay
58Falls, Irish Wars, 126.
59 C.S.P. Simancas, 1568~79, 521.
6 °Falls, Irish Wars, 104.
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on July 17, i579. 61

The small force was immediately

crushed and their leader killed; however, Fitzmaurice had
set many precedents which would be later used by the Earl
of Tyrone, particularly in his diplomatic dealings with
the Spanish.

Additionally, the travels of Fitzmaurice

aroused renewed interest ,in Ireland, and from 1580 onward
Ireland was deluged by an ever-increasing number of traveling friars and missionaries, particularly Jesuits, educated in England during Mary's reign and later on in Flanders and Spain.

The new, well-educated arrivals placed

themselves at the sides of the great lords, becoming
scribes and advisors, using their influence to exhort ever
greater resistance to Protestantism and Anglicization. 62
The end result was that by the 1590's it was plain
that the Reformation had failed.

Cyril Falls, author of

Elizabeth's Irish Wars, considers the failure of the Reformation the most significant event in Irish history and
concludes that if the Reformation had succeeded Ireland
might have become as closely united with England as Scotland and \.lales. 6 3 The attempts at reformation caused religion to become such an emotional subject, with such symbolic significance, that it soon became the one universal
cause in Ireland and the rallying point for Irish nation61rbid., 126.
62
.!lli., 19.
6 3Ibid., 18.
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alism and resistance.
In a letter to the King of Spain in 1570 James Fitzmaurice lamented the fact that Ireland had no king or
natural leader, and therefore was weakened and divided
before the English. 64 From time to time leaders had
emerged for brief periods, but always they had been shortsighted individuals oriented to their own local areas
rather than towards the problems of Ireland as a whole.
To harness the national anti-English sentiment a potential
leader had to be a man of some prestige, who possessed
some background in military and diplomatic skills, and
the vision to manipulate a national strategy.

In previous

revolts the leaders had always lacked one or more

01·

the

requisite qualities; however, in the last decade of the
sixteenth century the long-sought leader emerged in the
person of Hugh, Earl of Tyrone, known to the native Irish
as "the O'Neill."
The future leader of Ireland got off to a rather inauspicious start in his career, becoming an early victim
of the Irish system of succession.

The O'Neill clan had

been under the leadership of Con O'Neill until his death
in 1559.

At his demise the province of Ulster was plunged

into chaos by a contest for succession to the English
title "Earl of Tyrone," and the more prestigious Irish
64C.S.P. Simancas,

1568-79, 521.
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title "the O'Neill."

According to English law the legal

heir was Con's eldest son, the Baron of Dungannon.

How-

ever, Shane O'Neill, a more forceful and ruthless personality, was elected tanist by the O'Neill clan, according ,
to Celtic law.

The matter was settled when Shane murdered

the Baron of Dungannon,
zabeth in 1562. 65

~nd

then wisely submitted to Eli-

In order not to provoke further vio-

lence the English took charge of the next legal heir, Hugh
O'Neill, son of the murdered Baron of Dungannon, and removed him to England out of harm's way.

Hugh O'Neill,

therefore, spent the next six years in England living the
life of a young noble attached to the household of the
Earl of Leicester. 66
While Hugh was in England Shane O'Neill rebelled and
was killed in 1567, and the tanist Turlogh Luinach was
elected chieftain of the O'Neills.

At the age of twenty-

eight, therefore, Hugh O'Neill came back to Ireland, and
although he could not take over as head of the clan while
the new tanist lived, he immediately sought to ingratiate
himself with the English.

In 1573 he supported the attempt

of the first Earl of Essex to establish the ill-fated
Antrim colony in Ulster.

As Baron of Dungannon he accom-

panied Walter Devereux, raising Irish troops and personally
65C.S.P. Ireland, 1509-73, 198, 209.
66Lacey, Essex, 223.
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securing Belfast Castle. 6 7

The Earl was so impressed with

this tmiquely cultured Irishman that he wrote to the Privy
Council that Hugh_ O'Neill was the only man to be trusted
in Ulster and that his position should be advanced. 68
With the endorsement of Essex, and with the help of
a natural charm which endeared him to the English, Hugh
O'Neill persuaded Elizabeth and her advisors to give him
ever-increasing support over the next twenty years.

From

1574 to 1594, undoubtedly certain that O'Neill could be a
great asset to them, the English assisted all his attempts
to consolidate his rule in Ulster against the rival clans.
•·

O'Neill's professions of loyalty were so convincing that

1

l

Elizabeth, normally adverse to bestowing any great titles,
confirmed O'Neill's title to the Earldom of Tyrone in

1587. 69
While Hugh O'Neill courted the English, he also sought
the deal with the many rival clans of Ulster, the most
prominent of which were the O'Donnells and the Maguires,
both distrusted by the English.

The friendship of the

O'Donnells was secured by the marriage of Hugh O'Neill to
an 0' Donnell woman, a.nd by the marriage of O'Neill' s
daughter, by his first wife, to the clan leader Hugh Roe
O'Donnell, the "Prince of Donegal."

The I"Iaguires proved

67c.s.P. Ireland, 127L~-85, 403.
68 C.S.P. Ireland, 1509-73, 525-526.
6 9Lacey, Essex, 224.
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more hostile to Hugh O'Neill's pretensions, and the Earl
of Tyrone began to look for an opportunity to eliminate
the rival leader,. Hugh Maguire.

In 1593 the Maguires

revolted and Tyrone joined forces with the English Marshal, Sir Henry Bagenal, and together they quickly destroyed the power of that.clan.?O
Although O'Neill was a master of diplomatic balancing
between EngJish officials and anti-English clansmen, his
duplicity could not endure forever, and the basic AngloIrish ri.valry eventually began to affect his position.

In

1587, his son-in-law,· Hugh O'Donnell, was imprisoned in
London on suspicion of treason.

In 1591 the Prince of Don-

egal escaped and returned to join Tyrone, whereupon he was
forced into the indelicate position of having to choose between his son-in-law at home and the Queen in England.

Al-

though he managed to delay the Queen's wrath until June,

1595, the presence of the "traitor" O'Donnell in his camp
made relations with England increasingly strained.71
After 158?, O'Neill found that his formerly good relations with English officials were deteriorating, particularly because of his marital diffi.cul ties.

In order to

establish his position Tyrone had contracted three marriages.

His first wife was divorced; the second wife was

an O'Donnell who died; and the third marriage was to an

70 C.S.P. Ireland 1292-96, 330.
2
71 Lacey, Essex, 224.
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.English woman, Mabel Bagenal, sister of the English Marshal, ·Sir Henry Bagenal.

Mabel had left her s.ister' s

house in the Pale, in August, 1591, and had eloped with
Tyrone, much to the chagrin of her brother, who deplored
the fact that his house should be mixed with the blood of
an Irishman, cultured or ,not.72
Although Sir Henry Bagenal cooperated with Tyrone in
crushing the Maguires two years later, the growing hostility can be seen from the fact that in the official report
following the Maguire revolt Bagenal omitted any tribute
to Tyrone for the latter's assistance.73
/.

Shortly there-

after, Mabel, no longer able to tolerate Tyrone's propensity for mistresses, returned broken-hearted to her brother's house, where she died in 1596.74 After her treat-

.

ment at Tyrone's hands, Sir Henry Bagenal, one of the most

·,

influential Englishmen in Ireland, was O'Neill's implacable
enemy.

Sir Henry's hostility probably had some influence

on the attitude of the English Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam,
who became increasingly more suspicious of Tyrone's intentions following the Maguire revolt.75
Another factor which adversely affected relations
between Tyrone and the English was the renewed attempt
72 C.S.P. Ireland 1288-92, 409.
2
73 C.S.P. Ireland, 1592-96, 528.
74 Falls, Irish Wars, 173·
75c.s.P. Ireland 1292-96, 210.
2
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of the latter to tighten their hold on Ireland in the last
years of the sixteenth century.

From 1585 onward, England

was at war with Spain, and the position of Ireland achieved
a new importance.

Like the Low Countries, Ireland of-

fered a friendly area in which a Spanish army could be
prepared to invade across the channels to England.

Be-

cause of strategic considerations the English could not
afford to have a hostile and unsubdued Ireland at their
back.
The English fears were well-grounded.

Although the

Great Armada was defeated in 1588, merchants from Continental ports constantly brought word of new preparations.
Indeed a Spanish invasion force, organized in 1596, was
forestalled by an English raid on the port of Cadiz, while
a second force was turned back by stormsin 159?.76 Rumors
of a great Spanish invasion panicked the English population in the summer of 1599, while an invasion force did
manage to land over 4,000 Spanish troops at Kinsale in
1601.??
Beginning with the Fitzmaurice wars of the late
1560's, Irish rebels had besought the King of Spain for
support, though with little success.

After the outbreak

of the English-Spanish conflict in 1585 the Irish leaders
?GRenwic
. k , ~'
v·
239.
??John J. Silke, Kinsale (New York: Fordham Univer•
sity Press, 1970), 7.
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began to plead for aid and alliance.

Tyrone himself, for

all his protestations of loyalty, may have been in contact
with Spain as early as 1588, shortly after he had been made
an Earl by Elizabeth.

In October of that year, Lord Dep-

uty Fitzwilliam and one of his generals, Sir Richard Bingham, both sent a series of letters expressing their distrust of Tyrone and his possible involvement with Spain.78
The crisis of 1588 passed, however, and Tyrone was
soon praised again in reports sent back to Ehgland.?9
However, in 1592 there was renewed fear of Spanish intervention and of Tyrone's hostility, and the Archbishop of
Cashel cautioned Queen Elizabeth about the discontented
state of Ireland and the possibility that many Irish, including Tyrone, would join the Spanish if they landed.BO
For the next two years events moved inexorably toward
conflict as Tyrone became more independent and the AngloIrish sources of conflict intensified.

In July, 1592,

Queen Elizabeth sent a letter of admonition to Tyrone,
condemning both his relationship with O'Donnell and the
fact that the Earl had not prevented his sons from raiding
and committing other "riotous acts. 1181
gave evidence of greater ambition.

?8c.s.P.

In 1593, Tyrone

His cousin Turlogh,

Ireland, 1588-92, 53-55.

79Ibid., 337~
SOibid., 493.
81 MSS. Salisburl, vol. 4, 218-219.
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who had been elected head of the O'Neill clan while Tyrone
was in exile, withdrew from his position as "the O'Neill."
By the law of tanistry, Hugh O'Neill was elected to succeed him.

Thus, without the approval of the Queen, Tyrone
.
.
h a d assume d a posi. t ion
of unique
power an d pres t.ige. 82
By July, 1594 English observers concluded that Tyrone
was "now standing on doubtful terms."

Furthermore, as the

Earl of Desmond had previously been "seduced" by Jesuits,
so the Earl of Tyrone had fallen under the influence of a
Spanish Cardinal who constantly urged rebellion while
promising Spanish. aid. 8 3 At the same time Hugh O'Donnell!
Tyrone's son-in-law, had openly revolted against the .English and had inflicted a series of minor but humiliating
defeats. 84
Attempts at negotiation proved useless, although given
the hostility of the chief English officials, Lord Deputy
Fitzwilliam and Sir Henry Bagenal, it is doubtful whether
such talks ever had reasonable chance of success.

Eliza-

beth apparently lost all patience, for on January

?, 1595

a letter, written by Lord Burghley on behalf of the Queen,
was sent to the Lord Deputy urging him to call Tyrone to
Dublin on pretext of negotiating and then to cast him into
82Lacey, Essex, 224.
8 3MSs. Salisbury, vol.

5, 564.

84Falls, Irish Wars, 182.
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prison as soon as he arrived. 8 5
The crafty Earl never arrived, but stayed in Ulster
strengthening his army.

The final break came in May, 1595

when Sir Henry Bagenal marched north with 1,500 men to
bring Tyrone to submission.
May 27 in which the

A brief clash occurred on

were ambushed by Tyrone's
army, and suffered serious casualties. 86 At the same
Engl~sh

time, Elizabeth received word from Thomas Richardson, a
Scot who had been in Ulster, that the King of Spain had
sent an Irish bishop back to Tyrone with word that the
Earl could expect an army of 3,000 to 4,000 Spanish soldiers in the near future, to assist in ousting the English. 87

Elizabeth could dally no longer with Tyrone.

The

time for negotiations had passed; the matter would be settled by force of arms.
In summary, the Irish Rebellion of 1595 was based on
a foundation of ever-increasing hostility and mistrust
throughout the Tudor period.

The basic problem centered

around the English attempts to make Ireland a stable and
manageable society on the English model.

This process of

Anglicization threatened the very core of Gaelic life,
affecting language, dress, law, economic structure and
8 5Mss. Salisbury, vol. 5, 80-81.
86Falls, Irish Wars, 188.
8

7~1SS. SalisburJ, vol. 5, 186.
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most importantly, religion.
;~·

The methods used by the English did much to provoke
the Irish to rebellion.

.Enterprising and ruthless New

English colonists moved into Irish areas and contemptuously ejected native Irish and Old English alike.

In the

sections under New Engli&h control, Anglicization was
forced down the Irish throats.

If the Irish resisted or

rebelled they were savagely dealt with by English officials
who resorted to any means, including mass starvation, to
subdue them.

Invariably, the rebel lands would be con-

fiscated and the process of expansion and consolidation
continued.

Weakened and divided, without an effective

leader, the Irish were usually unable to put up effective
resistance.
In the last decade of the sixteenth century the Irish
finally found a leader in Hugh O'Neill, who possessed the
diplomatic skill which the situation demanded.

Realizing

that conflict was inevitable Tyrone sought to balance between the English, Spanish and Irish leaders until he was
ready.

While the English authorities vacillated in their

policy toward Tyrone, he trained his men, reversed the
traditional O'Neill policy of feuding with neighbors,
gathered the clans of Ulster under his leadership, and
gained touch with the discontented and adventurous all
over Ireland.

As "the O'Neill," with all the prestige

that his title implied, Tyrone's cause had national appeal.

r
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The Irish chieftains, fearing the loss of their status
by the English policy of encroachment, flocked to Tyrone's

standards.

r
i.

CHAPTER II
WARFARE IN IRELAND
For the English, a campaign to Ireland involved certain monumental tasks, not the least of which was to recruit an army and deliver it to the Gaelic bogs.

Unlike

France and Spain, England did not maintain a professional
standing army.

Her only full-time soldiers consisted of

a few hundred Yeoman of the Guard, and scattered garrisons
along the Scottish border and in Ireland which, until
Tyrone's rebellion, rarely numbered more than a few thousand men. 1 This disparity between English and Continental
armies occurred primarily because there was no incentive
to keep a large standing army, the English Channel presenting a formidable barrier to invasions.

Furthermore the

economy would not easily support a large standing Army.
An army meant truces, and taxes involved calling a Parliament, something which the monarchs

preferred not to do.

For economic considerations the forces needed for any
campaign were collected directly for the purpose and demobilized upon the conclusion of hostilities.

Since the

defense of England relied heavily on the small number of
trained men available to the Tudors, the government was
1 Falls, Elizabeth's Irish Wars, 92-110; Cruickshank,
Elizabeth's Arm~, 1.
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reluctant to send these troops abroad.

The Irish campaign,

and other foreign ventures, had to rely mainly on untrained
volunteers or conscripts called into service.
Despite the haphazard state of military affairs
throughout the Tudor reign, by 1598 the organizational
structure and ranking system of the Engl.ish Army had
evolved along Continental lines.

By the latter part of

the sixteenth century the English expeditionary forces,
which usually numbered from 5,000 to 20,000 men, were organized into regimental units. The regiments were com.
2
posed of 750 to 1,000 men, organized into six or seven
companies, each composed of 150 men; the companies were
composed of sections numbering about 20 men.3
Regarding the chain of command it should be noted
that, as in most armies of the time, the key officers invariably came from the nobility.

This practice was a

hold-over from the l"Iiddle Ages, by which the army and the
Church were reserved as the two honorable professions in
which the younger sons of the nobles could, and should,
engage.

At the top of the command structure was the

general, who, during the Tudor age, was a political appointee from the highest ranks of the nobility--usually
a man of great name whose loyalty to the crown was unquestioned..

The second-in-command was the Marshal of the
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Army, whose ch:i.ef function was to supervise the management
of the· camp, and the administration of justice and discipline.

The Marshal was assisted by the Provost Marshal,

who was well-versed in military law and handled the day-to
-day administration of justice. 4
In a large army there was usually a General of the
Infantry and a General of the Horse to lead the respective
arms in action.

For overall support the most responsible

position was the Master of Ordnance, who issued weapons,
ammunition and supplies to the troops, and supervised most
of the supporting agencies such as the armorers, smiths
and carpenters.

.

To command the regiments were the Colonels,

who led the regiment in

a~tion

and who usually formed a

Council of War to advise the General.

The colonels and

the regimental system had only recently (1580) appeared
in the Elizabethan armies and thus the chief administrative and tactical position was still the Captain, the company commander.5
The Captains were the heart of the system, forming
the administrative and tactical link between the high command and the private in the field.

The captain was respon-

sible for arming, clothing, feeding, and paying his men,
as well as leading them into battle.

To take care of his

men the Captain was given a sum of money from the Privy

4Ibi£., 45-4?.
5Ibid., 54.
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Com1cil and the Treasurer at Wars, based on the number of
men iri his company.

The primitive state of the Tudor Ad-

ministrative system, and the limitations imposed by communications difficulties in the 16th century made it
possible for the captains overseas to defraud the government and their own men w~th impunity. 6
The Calendars of State Papers for Ireland are rife
with reports of alleged fraud on the part of the captains
throughout this period.

In one particularly detailed

series of charges in July 1598 the author accused the captains of the following crimes: substituting Irish (who accepted less pay) for English soldiers whom they encouraged
to run away; making·arrangements with merchants and shippers to defraud their men; and allowing their companies to
degenerate into a horde of poorly clothed, underfed paupers, concerned more with surviving from day to day than
with searching out and destroying their enemies.?
The Privy Council found it difficult to pin down these
charges, and even more difficult to rectify the situation.
In 1596 the Privy Council, which normally appointed all
captains, gave authority for appointment of captains to
the commander-in-chief in Ireland, subject to final approval by the Privy Council. 8 The appointment of captains
6 Ibid.,

55.

7c.s.P. Ireland i:z9a-99, 205-210.
2
8 C.S.P. Ireland
2 1,296-97, 59.
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was now the direct responsibility of the commander in
Ireland, and it was his responsibility to appoint men of
substance and character who could adapt to the unconventional conditions of Gaelic warfare.

This measure, how-

ever, proved ineffective and the English armies were continuously plagued by dishonest captains.
The captain, in addition to his other responsibilities,, also appointed other important individuals who made
up his company structure, namely: a lieutenant, an ensignbearer, two sergeants, two drummers, a preacher, a cannoneer, a surgeon and about six corporals.

The lieutenant

performed the duties of a modern company executive officer,
ready to take over any time the captain was absent or incapacitated.

The ensign-bearer was the equivalent of the

modern-day second lieutenant, who carried the company colors and was to be the source of inspiration to the company
in combat.

Drawn from the ranks of the gentle classes,

the ensignbearer was required to take over if the lieutenant and captain were absent.9
Regarding the other key personnel, the two sergeants
were responsible for, among other things, drilling and
marching the company properly.

The corporals were in

'
charge
of their 20-man sections and watched after all

facets of their men's lives.

Two drummers were assigned

to beat time on the march, call assembly and sound

9c~uickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 57.
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commands on the battlefield.

Throughout most of the

Irish ·wars a cannoneer was assigned to each company, although in 1600 the cannoneer in Ireland was deleted from
the organization, since his services were so seldom required. lo

In the guerilla-type warfare of Ireland the

appointment of one

preac~er

and one surgeon to each com-

pany was an ideal which was seldom attained.
At the bottom of the command and administrative system was the private, who in 1598 assumed one of three
tactical roles.

If he were a tall and husky individual

he was assigned as a pikeman to be at the front of a
company formation to keep the enem.Y from closing in on
the musketeers.

If the private were snall and nimble

he would be made a caliverman or musketeer, in which
capacity he acted as a skinmisher or protected the flanks
of the company

.formation~

dropping back behind the pike-

man if the enemy threatened to reach him before he could
reload.

Finally the halberdier, of medium build, was sta-

tioned in the center of the company .formation around the
ensign-bearer, to eliminate any enemy soldiers who penetrated the company ranks. 11
The cavalry formed a distinct element composed of the
sons of the wealthier gentry and led by the highest nobility in England.

Armed with curates, open head pieces,

109.s.P. Ireland, 1600, 275.
11 cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 60.
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long pistols, swords and sometimes lances, 12 they were the
most formidable shock unit of the English armies, and
would often save the infantry from disaster in their encounters with the rebels.
In Tudor England the administrative unit :for military
affairs was the county. ,All able-bodied men between the
ages of' 16 and 60 were liable :for service.
the

The Queen and

Privy Council decided which counties were to supply

troops and how those troops were to be armed.

Detailed

instructions were sent to the county Lord Lieutenant, or
to Justices of the Peace who sometlmes acted as the commissioners of' musters.

On paper the system seemed sound,

but in reality the caliber of individuals called to the
colors was often less than desirable.

Although the law

stipulated that all men were liable for service, special
arrangements or cash substitutes were made for Lords of
Parliament, their servants, the clergy and other privileged groups. 1 3
The county officials sometimes met their quota by
pulling ordinary workers and farmers away from home and
family; but more often they levied unemployed vagabonds
whom the local authorities were only too happy to be rid
of.

The poor quality o_f these "rogues and ploughmen" was

a constant source of complaint by the officials in
12nss. Salisbury, vol. 9, vii
1 3cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 23-24.
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Ireland. 14

The Gaelic wars rarely attracted volunteers

since ·service in that "moist, rotten" country was the most
unpopular assignment an English soldier could have in the
sixteenth century. 1 5

An impoverished and backward land by

Continental standards, Ireland offered little possibility
for. loot and profit as

d~d

campaigns in the rich Nether-

lands or expeditions against Spanish cities and ships.
Ireland offered only sickness, misery, and death.
Since Ireland was a fate to be avoided at all costs,
men on orders deserted at every opportunity.

In March

1598, for example, 900 conscripts were mustered to go to
Ireland as reinforcements.

Only 612 reached their destination, the rest having disappeared enroute. 16 The most
critical time was in the port of embarkation where a delay in shipping would give the rank and file an opportunity to abscond in droves. 1 7 Despite all the Crown's effort, desertion remained a constant problem in the sixteenth century, particularly when service to Ireland was
involved.
Absence without leave was almost as common among officers in Ireland as it was among the privates.

Captains

were leaving their companies with such regularity that in
14 .
C.S.P. Ireland, 1592-96, 386.
15 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, l.
16 C.S.P. Ireland, 1596-9?, 86.
l?cruickshank.;. Elizabe.th's Armi, 6?.
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1592 Elizabeth herself had to order that all Captains absent from their companies in Ireland should return imm:ediately .18

Her warning, and subsequent threats of discharge

did little to solve the problem, and throughout the campaigns, captains continued to remain in England, collecting pay which their

subo~dinates

sent, while their compan-

ies plundered the Irish countryside. 1 9

On

one occasion

some captains were so reluctant to return to Ireland that
when they were brought before the Privy Council they swore
that they had never commanded a company in Ireland.

How-

ever all those whom the Council could prove had served in
Ireland were sent back. 20
By the same token it was always difficult to gather
replacements or reinforcements for Ireland, and sometimes
the government reluctantly drafted from their garrisons
on the Scot border or occasionally brought companies of
veterans from the Low Countries. 21

More often, the inex-

pensive expedient relied on was to fill the depleted ranks
of the English from the friendly Protestant Irish in the

Pale.

This practice became so widespread that by 1597

Barnaby Rich in his New Description of Ir.eland could
18A.P.C., XXII, 480.
1 9c.S.P. Ire~anqi 1599-1600, 192-3; C.S.P. Ireland
1600, 2?2, 322, ZPf:'2, :;,05.
20c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 255.
21 MDS. Salisbury;, vol. 9, vi-ix.
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assert that it was a "special:' and choice company" that
did no·t have three Irish for every Englishman.

2'>
c

There

was always a danger regarding these companies that they
would go over to the enemy--which they often did--and take
their arms and English training with them. 2 3 The Privy
Council became so alarme4 by this proportion of Irishmen
that in May 1598 the Council instructed the Irish officials
to take no more Irish into the ranks. 24
Additionally, the captains of the companies often
falsified the rolls so that they could collect and keep
the pay of dead men and deserters, or part of the pay for
Irishmen who were glad to serve in the Army for less pay
than an English soldier.

This practice, known as "dead

pays," existed in nearly every company, and although it
was well known to the Privy Council, 2 5 the inefficient communications and record-keeping system made it difficult to
pin down offenders and stop the practice.

As a result of

the problems in recruiting, the English armies were invariably of poor quality and significantly below the list
strength which the Queen and Council had authorized.

In

March 159?, for example, the Queen was paying for an army
22 Barnaby Rich, A New Description of Ireland (London,

1587), 109.

23 C.S.P. Ireland 1:299-1600, 34·9.
2
24

c.S.P. Ireland 2 1598-99, 156.

25 C.S.P. Ireland 1596-97, 190-91.
2

...
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of 2,000 men in Connaught, while the actual number present
was little more than half the list figures. 26
Once a force had been recruited, and those not lucky
enough to escape had been delivered to Ireland, the next
problem was to.keep it supplied.
or France, where the

fer~ility

Unlike the Netherlands

of the land kept forces

well supplied, Ireland was a relatively barren land constantly threatened with famine.

While the Irish could sur-

vive well on beef, warm milk and butter from the cattle
they raised, the English were accustomed to a more diversified diet.

~'ven

a garrison of a few thousand men could

be sustained only by importing stores from England.

In

1595 because of TYTone's initial rebellion the English
garrison was raised from 4,000 to 7 ,OOO men.

This in·-

crease created a supply crisis in which Sir Henry Wallop,
Treasurer at \.Jars,and the officials responsible for supplying the troops in Ireland told the Privy Council that
the Army desperately required stores of meal, biscuit,
wheat, cheese, salt meat and herring to see it through the
winter. 27 The next year, Lord Deputy Sir William Russell
warned the Privy Council that the food shortage might
force him to withdraw his troops from the field. 28
The rations of the English soldiers primarily corIBis°OOd
26 Ibid.,

252.

27 C.S.P. Ireland 1592-96; 398-400.
2
28 C.S.P. Ireland
2 1596-97, 165-66.
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of bread, butter, cheese and beer.

This diet was usually

supplemented with oatmeal, peas, beans, dried codfish,
:

ling and herring, whenever they could be obtained.

By

1598 a typical daily ration consisted of a pound of
bread, three ounces of butter, six ounces of cheese,
three quarters of a pint.of oatmeal, 2 9 An.other variety
of a week's rationing in 1598 consisted of a pound of
bread daily, a half pound of butter on three days, a
pound of cheese on three days, and on the seventh day,
two pounds of salt beef, or two and a half pounds of fresh
beef .30

Accompanying either variety of rationing was beer

and whiskey, an essential item, since the water was too
unhealthy.

The liquid ration in Ireland was a quart of

beer daily, a half pint of whiskey daily, and a quarter
of a pint of aquavitae every second day.31
Of the foods available, bread and cheese had the great
advantage of not having to be ,cooked and thus could be
easily taken on a long march.

Fish on the other hand was

not very popular and one official asked the Privy Council
to send "little or no fish, for it neither keepeth well,
nor pleaseth the soldier, who by such victual hath so much
to provoke his thirst and no provision to quench it. 11 32

29A.P.C., XXIX, 272.
30ibid., 383 .

3libid., 70.

32C.S.P. Ireland, 1299-1600, 31.

50
The daily ration cost the private soldier half his daily
wage of 8d. just for the food, while the
·had to buy his own drink.33

soldier still

The English food allowance

would be adequate if it arrived in the quantity or variety specified.

However, the amount of food ordered from

England was based on.the.planned daily rations.

Thus if

food were lost or was below the quantity authorized the
soldiers would immediately suffer.
The English apparently were reluctant to order great
extra quantities of food because of the difficulty in
keeping such foodstuff from spoiling.

In the rj_cher

Netherlands and France the 'food problem for the Army was
solved by establishing permanent stores for wheat, cheese,
butter and beer.

These stores were replaced at regular

intervals to keep them from spoiling, and the excess foodstuffs were sold to private citizens, thus saving the
C;own money.34

Because of the damp Irish climate, which

made it impossible to store provisions for any length of
time, and because of the general scarcity of food, this
system was not introduced into Ireland until after the
turn of the century.
The mechanics of sending supplies from England to Ireland was as difficult as the. process of sending recruits.
Throughout Elizabeth's reign there was a gradual change

33 A.P.C., XXIX, 272.

34 c.s.P. Domestic, 1591-94, 4, 574-75.
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from an inefficient freelance "victualling" by private
merchants, to a fairly well-organized Crown-contracting
system by the end of Elizabeth's reign.35

However, it is

with the supply situation in existence at the time of Essex's campaign that we are primarily concerned.

During

the 1590's the Crown struck a bargain with some wellestablished private merchants who agreed to provide a
certain quantity of food by a certain date.

The merchant

was responsible for buying the food in England, shipping
it to Ireland, and placing it in the hands of the Queen's
representative in Ireland.

The Crown, for its part, would

assist the contractors in the buying of food, arrangment
of shipping, and the provisioning of other accessories
such as salt, casks for beer, horses and carts. 36
A contract signed in November 1598 illustrates how
the provisioning system worked.

In this instance a mer-

chant agreed to deliver sixty tons of bread or biscuits,
ten tons of butter, and eight tons of cheese and oatmeal.
The provisions were to

pe sent from Chester and Bristol to

Cork in Munster and delivered to the Army.

As a guarantee

that the merchant would meet his part of the contract, the
Crown demanded a bond of
~2000

~3000.

The Crown agreed to pay

for the supplies, and gave the merchants half the

sum to use as capital as soon as these merchants had
35cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 90.

36A.P.c., xxrx, 458-60.
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signed the contract and posted their bonds.

When the

mayors of Bristol and Chester informed the Crown that
supplies had been dispatched, the merchant would receive
the other half of the

~2000

payment.

Finally when the

supplies arrived in Ireland and were turned over to the
authorities, agents of t9e merchants in Ireland were
given receipts, which were turned in to the Crown, whereupon the merchant was given back the

~3000

posted as good

faith.37
On the surface the system seemed adequate; however,
certain provisions in the contract and failings in the
administrative chain left the system open to gross abuses.
Once the provisions were· delivered to Ireland, the keeping
and issuing of the provisions was the responsibility of
the "commissaries of victuals," officials in charge of receiving and distributing food shipments.3 8

Thus if the

distribution were unsatisfactory it would be the fault of
the "victualling commissaries," and the merchants would
be cleared.

Also, in case the supplies were lost by

shipwreck or captured

~Y

total cost of the loss.39

enemy ships the Crown bore the
Therefore it was possible for

dishonest merchants to bribe inspecting officials in
either the ports of embarkation or the ports of arrival
3?Ibid., 273.
3Bibid. , 518.
39

~. t 458-60.
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and arrange for either "lost" cargoes or false certification of the quality of existing shipments.
While food was the greatest single problem of supplies, uniforms and clothing also presented certain difficulties.

Each county was given an allowance from the
Queen to outfit the new levies. 40 The initial clothing

ideally consisted of caps, cassocks, doublets, breeches,
netherstocks, shoes and shirts, 41 and was designed to be
/

sufficient to get the troops from the county to the overseas assignment.

The full uniform was not issued in Eng-

land for fear that the levies would sell parts of it before
they went abroad.

While the troops were overseas, uni-

forms, both a summer and.winter outfit, were issued and
exchanged as appropriate.

A typical winter uniform for a

private consisted of a cassock, a doublet, cloth breeches,
a hat, two shirts, three pair of stockings and three pair
of shoes. 42
The English army of 1599 still had no official uniform, although Essex's levies of infantry were instructed
to have well-lined coats of a blue color, while the cav.;.
alry dressed in "long horseman's coats of strong cloth
of orange-tawny color with white lace and white lining
throughout. 114 3

Officers, of course, were more elaborately

40A.P.C., XXI, 306-07.
41 Mss. Salisburi, vol. 9, 474.
42 A.P.C., XX,

37.

4 3Mss. Salisburi, vol. 9, vii.
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dressed in the finest armor, in silk and lace, and all the
other trappings which their station could afford. 44
Ireland presented a special clothing problem because
of the climate and terrain, and the fact that decent billets were in short supply.

Commanders wrote to the Privy

Council that shoes and clothing sent over quickly became
"unserviceable," and that they "shrink upon any wet, and
our poor men do wade in their marches at least twice or
thrice a day. 114 5 The soldier often found himself standing
night guard in a damp uniform or sleeping in the open on
wet ground, and in these circumstances soon fell prey to
sickness.
In an overseas

c~mpaign

in the sixteenth century the

I

English troops could expect to take frightful casualties.
From 1591 to 1597 the English sent almost 20,000 men on a
series of campaigns to France, which was one of the most
healthy places to campaign.

Yet almost half the troops

sent to France died· on active service, mostly from sickness. 46

Ireland took an even greater toll.

In Shane

O'Neill's rebellion from 1562 to 156?, the entire English
garrison in Ireland never numbered more than 1500 at any
one time; 4 7 yet the rebellion took 3500 English lives from
44

g.s.P.

Ireland, 1599-1600, 3?6.

4 5Ibid., 93.
46cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 15.
4 7Falls, Elizabeth's Irish Wars, 47.
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enemy action and sicY-..ness, and the replacements barely
kept pace with the casualties. 4-8

Losses were heavier in

the Desmond war of 1579-81, while all the previous totals
were dwarfed by Tyrone's war of 1595-1603. 4 9 For the
Essex campaign the Queen agreed to send 2000 reinforcements every three months.to fill out the ranks.50

Battle

casualties would not be expected to account for anything
close to 2000 men every three months, but disease would
more than make up the difference.
The chief cause of death in Ireland was the "Irish
ague" and the "flix," which apparently were forms of dysentary and marsh fever arising from the damp climate, unclean water, and the generally unhealthy and weak physical condition of the poorly nourished troops.5 1 An official writing from Dublin in July 1598 stated that after
only two months in Ireland, an infantry company would begin losing men to the inevitable sicknesses, and that by
the third month the disintegration of the company was
usually well advanced.5 2
The disease itself was dangerous enough; however, the
primitive state of medicine and of the medical services
48 cruickshank, Elizabeth's Armz, 16.
4 9Falls, Elizabeth's Irish Wars, 47.
5°c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 28.
51 C.S.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 251.
52 Ibid., 200.
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resulted in untold numbers of unnecessary deaths.

Medicine

was just emerging from the Middle Ages, and many dreadful
practices were still employed by surgeons.

There was much

f

disagreement as to what was a viable cure, and surgeons
experimented with their own ideas, making potions composed
of such bizarre ingredients as boiled dog and earthworms
purified in white wine.

Others recommended that gunshot

wounds might be cauterized with boiling oil.53

With such

a mentality on the part of medical officers a wounded or
ill private was sometimes more ·fortunate if he were left
alone.
The medical service in the English Army had risen from
having only one surgeon for an .Army in 1346 to a point
where there was, in theory, a surgeon and an assistant for
each company of 100 men in the Elizabethan armies of
1594.54 The term "surgeon" can be misleading since the
physicians of this time came from the Company of BarberSurgeons of London, a liaison which would seem to indicate
something about the level of expertise in both professions.
Like other Englishmen, surgeons hated to be drafted to Ireland and used every opportunity to buy their way out by
bribing the company Captains, or by having themselves replaced by a fairly unskilled substitute.55
53cruickshank, Elizabeth's Armi, 177.
54Ibid., 174.
55Ibid., 175·
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What made the medical situation particularly bad in
Ireland was the total lack of medical facilities.

In the

Netherlands or France, where the country had many spacious
and well-built private homes, the Army made certain owners
responsible for looking after a number of ill men.

In

Ireland, however, the facilities were not available in
anywhere near the numbers required.5 6 Thus Captain John
Baynard, veteran of two years in Ireland, wrote to the
Privy Council •
••• there is no provision extraordinary for sick
and hurt soldiers, but that either .he dieth, or
seeketh in his misery to get away, or else continueth in the country long sick; and so generally, they are kept so weak and out of heart,
that they are not able to stand up against the
rebels, which to perform that country service,
do consist only upon strength of body. For I
myself have seen such lamentable spectacles both
of sick and hurt soldiers, that have died in open
streets, merely, for want of some succor.57
The captain went on to state that soldiers who survived
one attack of dysentery were worth three raw recruits.
For this reason alone it would be profitable to convert
churches and abbeys into hospitals and set up independent
institutions to meet the medical needs of the Army.

He

ended with the same observation that the wars in Ireland
would be ended sooner by using a few "well kept, clothed
and victualled" troops, rather than a large ill-supplied
army.58 What was needed in Ireland was a massive government

56ill.£., 180.
57c.s.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 350.

58c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 350.
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effort to provide hospital facilities.

But since this

would.involve great expenses, in a war which was already
financially disastrous, the English continued to solve

t

their casualty problem by sending home any sick men who

~

were lucky enough to reach Dublin, while allowing the

I

~1·

.

unfortunate casualties

i~

the outlying provinces to fend

'

'

..
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for themselves.
Another technical aspect of sixteenth-century warfare
in Ireland which deserves consideration is the subject ·of
weaponry.

By the time of Tyrone's rebellion, the tradi-

tional English longbow, which was still part of the standard company organization as late as 1589, had been completely replaced by firearms, halberds and pikes.

When

the Privy Council deliberated on the new tactical organization of the company it was concluded that the ideal
company should consist of 60 firearms, 30 pikes and 10
halberds.59

This proportion was generally kept throughout

the subsequent Irish campaign.
During Tyrone's war the guns used by both sides were
matchlock calivers and muskets.

The caliver was a light

weapon weighing twelve pounds, which fired a one-ounce
ball for an effective range of about 80 yards.

The mus-

ket was a twenty-pound weapon which fired a two-ounce ball
for a range of 150 yards.
a rest and was a

~airly

The musket had to be fired from

cumbersome weapon for the guerilla

59cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 114-15.
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warfare of Ireland, while the lighter caliver was more
ideally suited for the Irish area.

Consequently both sides

maintained a proportion of calivers over muskets which
sometimes approached a ratio of 5 to 1. 60 The weapons
were slow in loading and of uncertain dependability , but
these firearms had revolutionized warfare and made their
possession a necessity for any army of that time.
Ammunition, however, remained a particular problem
because of the strange and troublesome practice of having
the soldiers pay for powder and ammunition out of their
own meager wage.

Since the men had to pay for each round

they fired they were understandably reluctant to shoot up
their subsistance allowance, particularly since the Captain often cheated them out of their daily wage.

The

result was that men went to the field with very little
powder and were loath to fire it at the enemy unless they
were in imminent danger.

This practice was reputed to be
responsible for several English defeats in Ireland. 61
Weaponry, like everything else, was subject to the

general corruption and lack of tight supervision prevalent in Ireland.

When a man died or deserted his weapons

disappeared and invariably went into the hands of the
rebels.

In fact on several occasions the captain reported

that the men had sold their weapons outright to
60 G. A. Hayes-McCoy, "The Army of Ulster, 1593-1601,"
Ir. Sword, 1 (1951), 114.
61 c.S.Po Ireland, 1598-99, 251-53.
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Irishmen. 62

The captains, however, excused this behavior

by telling the Privy Council that this was the only way
the men could get money for food. 6 3
As the reader may have inferred, the discipline in
the Queen's armies of this period was haphazard at best.
The English had not yet developed that deep-seated feeling of devotion to the national state or to regimental
tradition which would later characterize the British soldier.

Instead the short-term draftees were kept on the

line, sometimes by personal loyalty to their commander,
but more often by fear.

Whenever the threat from the enemy

became more immediate than the threat of some not-soimmediate court martial, and when the officers and sergeants did not exhibit a dynamic and inspired kind of
leadership, the units were inclined to panic and break
in combat.
A campaign in Ireland was made especially challenging
by the problems encountered in marching and transporting
troops and supplies over the Irish-terrain.

The sixteenth-

century army moved slowly as it was, normally ten miles a
day, and seldom as much as fifteen a day.

The cavalry

could move more quickly, but the bulk of the army moved
at a walking pace.

Such carts as were available were used

to carry stores, equipment, and the wounded.
62 Ibid., 138.
G3Ibid., 148.
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necessarily depended upon the roads available, and in Ireland the English found a situation in marked contrast to
the well-developed communications of France and the Netherlands.
If we are to believe sixteenth-century writers it
would seem that almost the whole surface of Ireland outside the Pale was bog or wood.

Actually, the provinces of

Leinster and Munster were fairly wealthy and well-developed,
dotted with castles and towns linked by a passable road
network, 64 although local tradition at the time insisted
that a squirrel could have hopped from Killarney to Cork
by leaping from bough to bough. 6 5 The terrain, however,
seemed to be fairly open.and adaptable to the English
methods of warfare.

Consequently rebellions:in Leinster

and Munster were traditionally crushed by English armies
systematically making towns and castles submit, and crushing any Irish force which dared to meet them on the field.
In the Midlands area and Connaught across the Shannon River the country became more difficult.

Sean

O'Domhnaill estimates that perhaps one-fourth of the total
area was virgin bog, while the remainder was largely marsh,
woods and mountains. 66 There were developed areas at
64G. A. Hayes-McCoy, "Strategy and Tactics in Irish
Warfare, 1593-1601," in I.H.S., 11 (1941), 267.
6 5Margaret MacCurtain, Tudor and Stuart Ireland
(Dublin: Gill and MacMillan tTD., 1972), 92.
66sean O'Domh.naill, "Warfare in Sixteenth-century
Ireland," in I.H.S., V (1946), 40.
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Galway, Sligo, Tulsk and Limerick which could be used as
operational bases for campaigning in Connaught, although
the actual movement was difficult.
Ulster, on the other hand, was a veritable wilderness, a maze of bog, woods and bush, practically devoid
of roads in the normal sense.

Ulster was virtually

sealed off from the rest of Ireland by a line formed by
the Erne River, Lock Erne, the mountains of Slieve Gullion, and a bog area stretching toward the east coast.
So formidable and restrictive was this geographical barrier that the eastern portion of Ulster, Tyrone's area,
could be invaded only by an army coming through Mowry Pass
on the one road from Dundalk to Newry!

Even the Mowry

Pass was only a broken causeway, with bogs on either side,
and with thorned thickets lining both entrances. 6 7 The
western portion of Ulster, controlled by the O'Donnalls,
could only be invaded by an army which forded the Erne
on the short stretch of river between Balleyshannon and
Lock :Erne. 68 Even when the English forced one of the
entrances into Ulster they had no industrial area or critical stationary objective at which to focus their campaign.

Instead, they were reduced to the frustrating pat-

tern of plowing through the bush trying to force the elusive Irish to stand and fight.

The effect of the bogs was

6 7MacCurtain, Ireland, 98.
68o'Domhnaill, "Warfare in Sixteenth-Century Ireland,"
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to nullify the advantage of the Engiish cavalry whose
heavier horses could not negotiate the marshy areas.
English cannon and wheeled vehicles could operate with
only the greatest difficulty, while pursuit of the enemy
force was impossible for conventional troops ladened with
baggage and carts.
The poorly developed dirt roads and tracks, which
became almost impossible mud bogs with the rain, presented the English with a further difficulty in the use of
horses.

The lighter type of horse, called garrons, which

were found in Ireland, were not strong enough to pull the
carts and wagons of the period over any poor roads.

In-

stead the English were dependent on the powerful Englishtype carriage horses, of which only a few were available·
in Ireland, being owned by some Palesmen. 6 9 Therefore in
any sizable campaign, particularly to Ulster, the English
would have to gather and transport carriage horses to Ire- ·
land.

Without these powerful animals no army of any size

could march and sustain itself.
The terrain in Connacht and Ulster also made it impossible to ease the supply situation by establishing
garrisons and magazines at critical points.

The :English

periodically attempted to plant garrisons in Ulster, notably at the Blackwater River beyond the Mowry Pass, at
Sligo and by sea at Derry; however these garrisons soon
69Henry, "The Earl of Essex and Ireland," in Institute of Historical Research, Bulletin, XXXII (1959), ? •
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became a liability.

The country was too poor for the gar-

risons to sustain themselves, while the lines of communications were not sufficiently developed to bring up supplies easily.70

In fact, because of the terrain and Ty-

rone's army it would often take the Queen's entire mobile
army to escort supplies to the isolated garrison on the
Blackwater.

It was on one of these resupply missions in

1598 that the English relief .force was ambushed and destroyed.

Even the sea communications were uncertain and

in 1567, for example, Colonel Randol.f's garrison of 1000
men at Derry in Lough Foyle, after seven months of suffering and considerable loss of life, had to be evacuated
because shipping could not be sent through the seas with
any regularity.71 ,
Added to all the above difficulties, which had existed
for every Irish campaign, the task of Essex and his suecessor Lord Mountjoy, was made even more difficult because
Tyrone had brought the rebel armies to a peak of efficiency
never previously attained.

Before Tyrone, the Irish arm-

ies were a ragtag conglomeration of Irish cavalry, Irish
light infantry and Scots mercenaries.

Although the Irish

cavalry were traditionally the elite of the community,
composed exclusively of the ruling classes, they were not
?OO'Domhnaill,

11

\./arfare in Sixteenth-century Ireland,"

?lFalls, Elizabeth's Irish Wars, 96-97.
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a particularly effective part of the Irish Army.

They

were useful, it is true, for reconnaissance and foraging,
but because of their equipment they were never able to
stand up to the English horse.

The Irish horseman of the

sixteenth century rode without stirrups and his saddle
was merely a large pilliqn secured to the horse by a surcingle and straps around the animal's breast and hindquarters.

Consequently the Irish horseman carried his

spear aloft and sought to strike the enemy with overarm
motions.

The English however, rode with stirrups and

orthodox saddle, with their lances couched in knightly
fashion, thereby providing the maximum shock effect.
Since the Irish cavalry were never able to stand up to a
well-seated English charge, the Irish horse were limited
to harassing tactics which never proved decisive.7 2
The Scots Gallowglasses and Redshanks were heavy
infantry mercenaries, described as "picked men of great
and mightie bodies" who wore shirts of mail, usually chain
mail, and a helmet.

Their favorite weapon was a two-

handed battle axe, six feet long.73· Towards the end of
the sixteenth century some of the Gallowglasses began to
adopt the pike, a weapon extreme:;Ly popular on the Cantinent; however, their main weapon remained the axe.

The

72G. A. Hayes-McCoy, "Irish Cavalry in the Sixteenthcentury," in Ir. Sword, l (1953), 316-17.
73John Dymm.ok, "A Treatise of Ireland," in Tracts
Relating to Ireland, 11 (London: 1889), 7.
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Scots therefore were the only element of the Irish armies
before Tyrone who could meet the English on open ground
and still give a good account of themselves.
The Irish light infantry, or "Kerne," were free peasants, so poor that they were armed with only a bow or
three darts made of wood·and tipped with iron, or a sword
and a shield of wood.?4 Unlike the Scots, the Irish kerne
had no armor, but simply wore the same outfit whether
fighting or herding cattle.

The Kerne were unable to meet

the English on open ground with any prospect of success.
However, they were well-suited to Irish warfare because
they could operate on terrain where other troops dared not
venture.75
Because of the existing social system the Irish lords
were not able to make the maximum use of their manpower
resources.

In the Irish communities there was a clear

distinction between those who were free and those who
were unfree.

The latter were those peasants who tilled

the lands of the lords and who owned no land of their
own.7 6 These unfree peasants and poor workers comprised
a substantial, perhaps a majority, of the population.??

74 Ibid. , 7-8.
75Henry fforely (ed.), Ireland Under Elizabeth and
James the First (London, 1840), 92-96.
76 0 1 Domhnaill, "Warfare in Sixteenth-century Ireland,"

37.

??Hayes-McCoy, "The Army of Ulster," 108.
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Since tradition forbade the unfree from carrying arms, an
important source of manpower was lost to the Irish lords.
The Irish leaders were so reluctant to tamper with the
social system, that before Tyrone's reorganization only
one chieftain, Shane O'Neill, dared to defy custom by
arming the unfree peasants.78 Becaune of social restrictions, Irish armies throughout most of the sixteenth century were rarely very large, and the Irish writers refer
to an army of 1000 men as "a very large host."?9

Of

course, English officials and deputies invariably exaggerated the number of Irish rebels facing them, and even
the Irish themselves exaggerated their own numbers when
seeking to impress foreign princes whom they asked for
aid.

However, contemporary research has shown that before

Tyrone, Irish
sand men. 80

ar~ies

rarely numbered more than a few thou-

The prosecution of a war on the scale envisaged by
Tyrone required a great increase in the strength of the
army.

The Scots mercenaries were incapable of expansion

on a very great scale.

Additionally, the Scots were reluc-

tant to adapt themselves to the changing conditions of
warfare, notably the increased use of firearms by the

78 o•nomhnaill, "Warfare in Sixteenth-century Ireland,"

31-34.

79Ibid., 32,
BOibid., 32-36.
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latter 1500s, and were less effective than in earlier
years. 81 Furthermore, the new Scot mercenaries, who
crossed into Ireland on a seasonal basis, could not necessarily be counted on for extended support in a long war.
King James I of Scotland, who had acquiesced in allowing
his Scots subjects to crQss into Ireland to fight the
English, was becoming increasingly more concerned with
securing the throne of England when Elizabeth died.
Therefore, in his efforts to solidify good relations with
the aging Elizabeth, James I, despite his sympathy for
Tyrone, was in a position at any time to attempt to restrict the flow of mercenaries to Tyrone.

For all these

reasons, Tyrone turned away from dependence on Scottish
mercenaries, and sought to build a national army primarily
with the native Irish material available.
The problem of securing the needed numbers was solved
by following Shane O''Neill' s example and enlisting the
unfree peasants and workers into his army to such a degree
that Dr. Hayes-McCoy refers to O'Neill's army as the first
representatives of a national militia in Ireland. 82 Tyrone's most significant achievement in the reorganization
of the Irish armies was to introduce a formidable new
element in Gaelic warfare, the Irish mercenaries.

Men at

arms had been maintained by various lords to serve for pay
81 Hayes-McCoy, "The Army of Ulster," 108-09.
82

Ibid., 109.
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and. maintenance under a system known as "coyne and livery. 1183

Tyrone modernized this medieval right of a lord

to billet fighting men, and indulged in a wholesale recruitment of men from all classes to enlist in his army
for pay and maintenance. 84 Thus in February or March of
each year Tyrone's recru±·t;ers went to the churches and
other public places, announcing rates of pay and other
terms of service.

In this way soldiers were gathered for

the coming campaigning season. 8 5

By 1598, therefore, most

of the men of military age within Tyrone's confederacy
were soldiers.

The social gulf between the fighting

classes and those formerly forbidden to bear arms was
correspondingly eliminated as even churls, horseboys and
the working classes were trained in the use of weapons. 86
One of the immediate problems Tyrone faced was how to
train this new army to be able to adopt the new weapons of
warfare and to meet the Queen's army on equal footing.

To

solve the training requirements Tyrone initially relied on
the Queen's own officers!

During the time of his seeming

loyalty to the English, up to the year 1594, he secured
the services of six English captains to train six 100-man
8 3.Morley, Ireland Under Elizabeth, 70.
84Hayes-McCoy, "The Army of Ulster, 11 109-110.
85 C.S.P. Ireland, 1592-96, 215; C.S.P. Ireland, 159621, 247-48.
86 C.S.P. Ireland, 1592-96, 308-19.
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companies for action against any other northern Irish lords
who should become enemies of the Queen.

However, the Earl

rotated men through his companies as rapidly as possible,
so that far more than the envisaged six hundred men were
trained in arms by the time of his rebellion. 8 7· The English influence was so pronounced that when Tyrone took
the field in 1595 and fought his first major battle at
Clantibret, his army was divided like the English into
·
·
.
BB
companies
an d sec t ions.
b a tt a 1 J.ons,

Th e En.g 1 is
. h L or d

Deputy wrote back to Lord Burghley in shocked amazement
that Tyrone even had 300 musketeers dressed in red coats
like the Queen's soldiers. 8 9
In addition to the six captains assigned to Tyrone's

army by Queen Elizabeth the Earl also received aid from
trained men who periodically deserted from the Queen's
army.90

The queen had consistently used Irish soldiers to

supplement her English armies to such an extent that usually

mo~e

than half the Queen's army was composed of

"friendly" Irish.9l

Whenever the Queen attempted to re-

duce the stze of her army in Ireland by disbanding friendly
8 7Ibid., 322.
88

!£~~. '

319-20.

8 9Ibid.• , 322-23.

90Hayes-McCoy, "The Army of Ulster," 112.
9l0'Domhnaill, "Warfare in Sixteenth-century Ireland," 50.
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Irish companies, the English commanders invariably protested that the newly unanployed Irish soldiers would simply
join the Irish rebels.9 2
Another source of trained recruits was The Netherlands,
which in the latter part of the sixteenth century witnessed
the most intensive warfa?e in Europe as the Spanish tried
to crush the Dutch Republic.

An Englishman, Sir William

Stanley, had raised an Irish regiment in 1586 to fight on
the Protestant Dutch side against the Spanish.

However,

Stanley was a Catholic from Catholic Lancashire, and in

1587 he deserted with the majority of his regiment to join
forces with the Spanish Commander, the Duke of Parma.
Thus, from 1587 until 1610 there was an Irish regiment in
Flanders, fighting on the side of the Catholic Spanish.93
These Irish veterans from the Lowlands exerted a healthy
influence on Tyrone's forces.9 4 Finally, Tyrone was assisted by Spanish officers from the Lowlands and by survivors
of the Spanish Armada, part of which was wrecked on the
Irish coast.

The Spanj.sh apparently did not influence

Irish tactics, but were helpful in training the Irish in
the use of arms and the employment of field fortifications,

92 Cyril Falls, "The Growth of Irish military strength

in the second half of the sixteenth-century," in Ir. Sword,
(1955), 105.

II

93Brendan Jennings, O.F .. 11., "Irish Swordsmen in Flanders: Stanley's regiment," in I.H.S., X:XXVI (1947), 402-10.
94 E'alls, "Growth of Irish military strength, 11 105.
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for ~hich the Spanish had long been famous.95
Although Spain and Bngland were constantly at odds,
Spanish aid to Ireland nevef approached the volume needed
to be decisive.

At the most, Spanish soldiers helped

train the Irish armies, while Spanish gold was particularly useful for purchas~ng supplies from Scotland.9 6
However direct military intervention of any permanence
depended upon control of the sea, and this the Spanish
could never firmly

establi~h,

and the two attempts by

Spain to organize sizeable expeditions to Ireland before
1600 ended in failure.
WJ::l~le

the levying and training of troops progressed

satisfactorily, the problem of equipping and supplying
his army with arms and ammunition was a task which Tyrone
never really surmounted.

Because of 'the relatively primi-

tive state of northern Ireland, Tyrone could not supply
the guns and powder his army required.

By 1596 Tyrone

did have Scots gunsmiths in Dungannon making muskets, calivers and pistols, but not in enough quantity to meet the
needs of his army.97

The biggest problem was the manufac-

turing of gunpowder.

Of the ingredients needed, charcoal

was in ample supply, saltpetre was available in limited
quantities, but sulphur had to be imported.98 Therefore,
95Hayes-McCoy, nr.rhe Army of Ulster," 112.
96 0 . s.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 1'!~2' 190 •

97c.s.P. Ireland, 1596-97, 75,

98c.s.P.

Ireland, 1592-96, 487.

86, 362.
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Tyrone had to seek outside aid to keep his army in munitions, and this aid came .from a variety of sources.

He

received some arms from the Queen's troops deserting to
his army, and later on from arms captured from defeated
royal forces.99

Powder came from as far away as Danzig,

while the Spanish increasingly sent more supplies, once
to the extent of one thousand guns and large quantities
of lead and powder. 100 The Irish towns in the south, and
even in the Pale, sold him powder whenever they could get
away with it; 101 and occasionally enterprising merchants
from :Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham smuggled him
arms and equipment which they concealed in hogsheads and
dryfats. 102
'While the above sources were helpful, they were rather haphazard in delivery and limited in the amount they
could supply.

Tyrone's main source of supply, and the

critical factor in his being able to keep a well-gunned
army in the field, was hisrupply channels with Scotland.
The Lowland Scottish burghs sent a steady stream of powder,
match, calivers and muskets across the narrow stretch of
sea into Lough Foyle, a protected inlet able to accommodate Scottish craft and Spanish sea-going ships.
99Falls, "Growth of Irish military strength," 104.
100c.s.P. Ireland, 1600, 239.
lOlRich, New Description of Ireland, 110.
102
c.s.P. Ireland, 1596-97, 323.
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By making judicious use of all his sources, Tyrone
was able to field a well-armed army by 1595.

In that year

it was reported that his total force consisted of four
thousand "shot," one thousand pikemen, and one thousand
horse. 103

And by 1596 an English observer reported that

Tyrone was so well suppl:i,ed with guns that his Kerne had
been converted into musketeers and calivermen, while the
Gallowglasses had been formed as pikemen to protect the
musketeers in the Continental fashion. 104

But despite

his achievements, powder always remained a worry and his
supply lines from Scotland through Lough Foyle remained
in a precarious state.

As a final problem in weaponry

Tyrone never developed artillery.

No doubt artillery

would have been an encumbrance in the type of warfare tne
Irish engaged in.

However, this deficiency made it prac-

tically impossible for Tyrone to take a fortified town or
outpost, no matter how small the garrison, while English
artillery doomed any Irish castle to inevitable seizure. 105
Regarding food supplies Tyrone's army was initially
in a much better position than the English, although eventually the Irish would be subdued by famine.

Their chief

source of food supplies were herds of cows which supplied
the Irish with beef, milk and butter.

The English had

l03c.s.P. Ireland, 1592-96, 236, 299.
l04Ibid., 486.

l05c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 98.
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long understood the importance of destroying this mobile
food source which invariably accompanied every Irish army
and acted accordingly.

In 1574, for example, the Earl of

Sussex, the Queen's Lord Deputy, sought to subdue Shane
O'Neill by slaughtering 4000 of the Irish lord's cows. 106
Additionally Tyrone's for.ces also were supplied with corn
which was raised in the more remote regions of Ulster.

The

Irish leader even established mills in Dungannon to grind
the corn, and built up magazines in hidden storage areas.
Since Tyrone's army generally lived off the land, foodstuffs presented no problem as long as the land defenses
to his areas remained intact. 107
The end result of Tyrone's effort was a well-trained,
amply supplied army of 7,000 men, not up to Continental
standards, but more formidable than any force heretofore
encounte.red in Ireland.

By 1596, Sir Henry Wallop, the

Treasurer at Wars and an observer in Ireland, wrote to
Sir Robert Cecil in great alarm that Tyrone's troops could
now confront the royal armies in the open plain, instead
of as formerly only in defiles.and forest. 108 While deficiencies in cavalry and artillery, along with vulnerable
supply lines to Scotland, left Tyrone's army with crucial
defects, it was still the most potent rebel force the
106o•Domhnaill, "Warfare in Sixteenth-century Ireland," 41.
l07c.s.P. Ireland, 1596-97, 19, 365, 375, 3840
108c.s.P. Ireland, 1~92-96, 381-82.
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English had ever faced.
The improvements made by Tyrone in the organization
and equipment of the Irish armies did little to change
Irish tactics, but rather made the traditional Irish tactics more effective.

Tyrone never attacked an English

force which had halted and fully deployed for battle.
Instead he kept to the time honored tactic of ambushing
English troops on the march, and having bis skirmishers
fire at the English from the bush.

Since the Irish con-

sistently refused to close, matters seldom came to a push
of pikes or hand-to-hand combat.

Thus the English were

forced to reply in kind, and the conflict invariably degenerated into an exchange of fire by skirmishers.

In summary, the English soldier in Ireland was a
draftee, often a vagabond who found himself operating illfed and ill-supplied in an unhealthy climate.

Basic

equipment was sometimes lacking and food commodities were
frequently rancid by the time they arrived.

If the company

were stationed at an outpost, the difficulties of transportation caused.the system to break down completely,
leaving the soldiers to fend for themselves, while corruption and inefficiency in the Elizabethan administrative channels inevitably destroyed whatever morale was
left.

Without any real training the English soldier en-

countered an enemy who rarely met him face to face, but
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who knew every inch of country and could move through
forest and bog at will.

Skirmishes were infrequent, the

Irish always managing to outrnarch their adversaries and
to avoid combat except on favorable terms.

When engage-

ments did occur they were brisk, confused and merciless.
Savagery usually begets savagery and in the Irish wars
both sides discarded any rules of warfare, treating prisoners and non-combatants alike with unbridled cruelty.
In this situation, the English units were whittled away.
Unless they fell victim to a rare disaster the companies
disintegrated from fever and dysentery until they were
disbanded or reinforced with a new batch of sullen conscripts.

CHAPrER III

THE APPOINTMENT OF ESSEX
Considering the circumstances of warfare in Ireland,
one might marvel that a great lord would bring himself
to seek out and accept the comlland of an army in Ireland.
Indeed, the selection of Essex as the English Viceroy
charged with the task of suppressing the revolt was no
simple matter; on the contrary, it ·was the end result of
a complicated series of intrigues by those political factions vying for ascendancy in Elizabethan England, intrigues which can best be understood by examining the
situation in Elizabeth's court at the end of the sixteenth
century.
The style and tone of the Elizabethan court was determined by the caprices of the Monarch, whose personality Neville Williams analyzes in his impressive work
Elizabeth, the Queen,.

Elizabeth fed on admiration and

demanded the choicest flattery from the men around her.
To her courtiers she was the "Sun Queen" and all others
were expected to play the part of satellites.

Her deal-

ings with Parliament and her attitude toward most great
problems--marriage, foreien policy, succession--were unpredictable and defied description. 1
lNeville Williams, Elizabeth the First (New York:
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The Court was basically a masculine society since a
woman of her vanity would consider any sort of female competition unwelcome.

The officers of state found that at..:

tendance at court was mandatory, although they were given
peroission to visit wives and families on certain holidays. 2

Court gallantry was carried to absurdity and men

drew their swords on the slightest provocation.
Since Elizabeth was unmarried, her reign witnessed a
constant stream of suitors, many froo within the kingdom
as well as those from without.

Through most of her reign

she had not one favorite, but three or four at a time,
who rose or fell depending upon the Queen's mood.3

While

there were many courtiers, onl;y· a few gained her favor and
confidence to the point where it could be a danger to her
Crown.
The Earl of Leicester, Sir Christopher Hatton and Sir
Walter Raleigh all gained ascendancy over rival courtiers
at one time or another.

But none had any sort of mass

support which would permit him to fo11ow a course independent of his monarch's wishes.

Leicester was a Puritan,

and relatively unpopular with the masses, who ruined himself in 1578 by marrying Lettice Knollys without the

E. P. Dutton and Company, 1968), 214.
2

Ibid., 216.

3Ibid.

.....
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Queen's knowledge or consent. 4

Hatton was a young lawyer

who never allied with any court faction, while Raleigh
was feared and distrusted by populace and Court alike.5
Elizabeth, therefore, remained in control of her favorites for most of her reign.

Those with a mind toward

independent action had neither the power nor the support
to oppose her.
Along with her courtiers whom Elizabeth keJtaround
for her personal edification, she recognized the need for
capable administrators to see to ·the ver·:l complex task of
governing a rising national state.

.

She found her most

faithful and trusted servant in the person of Sir William
Cecil, Lord Burghley.

Their relationship stretched back

before the Queen's accession to the throne.

In 1550, when

Elizabeth's future was often in jeopardy, Sir William Cecil
administered her estates and became her financial advisor. 6
In the early days of her reign Elizabeth weathered
many plots by Catholics, Pope Pius V and northern lords
to place :Mary, Queen of Scots, on her throne.

In the Nor-

thern Rebellion of 1569, many of her nobles were involved
in the conspiracy.

She felt she could only trust Lord

Burghley implicitly and turned more and more to him.?
4

Ibi<!·, 185.

5Ibid. , 188.

6_;r:pid., 29.
?Ibid., 175·
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addition to being her "Spirit," as Elizabeth called him,
he was a capable administrator who made his position as
Principal Secretary the most important post in the realm.
As he grew older, Lord Burghley began to turn the
responsibilities over to his no less capable son, Sir
Robert Cecil.

Sir Robert was an unprepossessing person,

a hunchback from birth, and an introvert who had no hope
of competing with the more flamboyant courtiers surrounding the Queen.

Instead, closely schooled by his father,

Robert Cecil made himself an indispensable administrative
assistant--the only logical successor to his father's
responsibilities when the latter would pass on in 1598.
Like his father, Robert Cecil was a man of keen perception, shrewd ambition and sure political insight.

Toge-

ther they formed a formidable faction, maintained in an
almost unassailable position next to the person of the
Queen.

The opposition, always present in the Tudor courts,

formed no serious threat until a young nobleman made his
first appearance at court in 1587.
When Robert Devereux came to London he brought with
him a. disti.nguished Norman surname and a:,n ancient lineage.
His ancestors originally resided in the vicinity of Everux in Normandy.

In 1066, the Count of Rosmar and Man-

telake sent two sons, Edward and Robert D'Evereux, with
William, Duke of Normandy, to assist in the conquest of
England.

Edward settled in Wiltshire and took the surname
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de Salisburie, from Salisbury where his principal manor
was located. -Robert secured estates in the Marches of
Wales and retained the family name.

The Devereux were

constantly at the side of kings, receiving titles and
honors from King John and Edward IV.

In Tudor times

they rose steadily to prominence in national affairs securing further holdings in Staffordshire and Ireland,
and fighting under Henry VIII in his Continental wars. 8
Robert's father, Walter Devereux, married Lettice
Knollys, second cousin to Elizabeth,9 daughter of Sir
Francis Knollys, a firm supporter of Protestantism in
En.gland.

Walter was exiled during Queen Mary's reign,

but he returned in greater stature under Elizabeth, who
elevated him to the earldom of Essex in 1572 for his support in suppressing the rebellion of the Catholic earls
of the north.

For the next few years, Walter sought to

establish his fortune by colonizing eastern Ulster, but
10
his colony failed and his health was broken.
In 1576
he died in Ireland leaving the Devereux titles, honors
and estates to his nine-year-old son and heir. 11
The day before Walter Devereux died he wrote to the

8 vernon F. Snow, Essex the Rebel (Lincoln, Nebraska:
University of Nebraska Press, 1970), 1.
9conyers Read, Lord Bur~hle~ and Queen Elizabeth
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1966 , ij ?.
lOLacey, Essex, 11-12.
11 snow, Essex the Rebel, 2-3.
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Queen's Secretary, Lord Burghley, asking him to be the
guard1an of his son, and to bring Essex up in his household.12

Since Lord Burghley held the title of Master of

the Wards, he had legal control over the estates of all
minors, such as Essex, who had come into their j_nheri tance
before their majority.

~ut

Lord Burghley took a special

interest in Essex, who subsequently spent considerable
time in Cecil's household. 1 3

While under Lord Burghley's

protection Essex began his long acquaintance with Burghley' s son, Robert Cecil, who was three years older than
young Essex.
Although the young earl was under Burghley's influence, the dominating force ·on his life seemed to be his
widowed mother Lettice.
ful and flirtatious,
took several lovers.

11

She was a beautiful woman,

11

:force-

who married Walter Devereux and then
Robert Lacey, Essex's latest bio-

grapher, evaluated Lettice as a "wilful and impetuous"
woman, insistent on always having her own way, who dominated her son in his youth and then dogged his footsteps in
court.

In 1578 she charmed Robert Dudley, Earl of Leices-

ter, the Queen's favorite courtier, into marrying her; and
thereafter her relationship with Elizabeth was understandd • 14
.
a bl y s t raine
12nead, Lord Burghley, 467.

l3Lacey, Essex, 17.
14 Ibid. , 15.
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Essex received the best possible education, attending
Trinity College, Cambridge at the age of ten and taking his
Master of Arts' degree in 1581 at the age of fourteen.

He

plowed through a curriculum of theology, civil law, the
philosophy of Aristotle and Plato, mathematics, geometry,
astronomy, rhetoric, Greek, French, Latin and Hebrew.

The

only book on his reading list in the English language was
an edition of Holinshed's Chronicles. 1 5

Essex was particu-

larly well-versed in Latin and his subsequent writings
are liberally punctuated with Latin phrases.
After graduating from Cambridge in 1584, Essex was
groomed for court life by his stepfather, the Earl of Leicester.

In 1587 Leicester resigned as Master of the Horse,

a position in close attendance upon the Queen, so that the
eighteen-year-old Essex could take his place. 16 The next
year the Earl of Leicester died and Essex was accepted as
the leader of the Leicesterians, a faction whose support
came from the Puritans and young soldiers at Court.

Es-

sex did not cultivate Leicester's Puritan ties, although
he still had their support, but he did eagerly take charge
of the Earl's military foL\.owing. 1 7
Handsome, dashing and dramatic, Essex was the idol
of the adventurous you..11ger sons who looked on warfare as a
l5Ibid., 20.
16Read, Lord Burghley, 46?.
l?Ibid., 468.
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glorious profession.

He made a spectacular military debut

by distinguishing himself in a brief campaign to the Netherlands where he was knighted in late 1587. 18 The Queen
was no less impressed than the younger.nobles, and she
took to

Essex immediately.

Since the death of her cousin

Mary, Queen of Scots, whose execution Elizabeth had ordered, the Queen had been in a state of acute depression.
Only Essex could cheer her, and they would often stay up
together playing cards until dawn. 1 9
Although there are many romantic legends concerning
Essex and Elizabeth, the fact is that in 1587 Essex was
only twenty years old, while Elizabeth was fifty-four, a
very advanced age in the sixteenth century.

Indeed, not

even in his most extravagant boastings did Essex ever suggest that his relationship with Elizabeth was anything
more than platonic.

The reality of the situation seems to

be that Elizabeth used Essex, as the personification of
English charm and masculinity, to bolster her own insatiable ego, while Essex sought to use his influence with
Elizabeth to enhance his prestige and financial position.
Upon his arrival at Court in 1587 Essex already had
accumulated some ~23,000 worth of debts. 20 The great nobles of England lived, and indeed were expected to live,
0
l8r
,
Th e oecon
d Ceel.. 1 ,, /~2_.
.tanuover,

l9Williams, Elizabeth, 294.
20La.cey, Essex, 72.

r
86

extravagant lives.

Great sums were spent in maintaining

and improving estates, gambling, making gifts to the Queen
or outfitting expeditions as the need arose.

Since those

who adventured to rise to the top in Elizabeth's eyes had
to spend lavishly, Essex was constantly immersed in debtf 1
His motives were

fa~rly

evident from the beginning.

In May 1587, his servant Anthony Bagot wrote to his father: "When she is abroad, nobody near her but my Lord Essex, and at night, my Lord is -at cards, or one game or
another with her, that he cometh not to his lodging till
birds sing in the morning."

And.while he played cards the

Earl was advancing his own fortune.

His servant contin-

ued: "he told me with his own mouth that he looked to be
Master of the Horse within these ten days. 1122

And indeed,

on June 18, 1587, Essex received the appointment, which
brought with it a sum of Yt,500 a year. 2 3
Essex achieved his greatest financial triumph in

1590, when Elizabeth awarded him the "Farm on Sweet Wines."
This granting of a monopoly--a common practice in Tudor
England--allowed Essex to levy all duties in sugary wines
imported from the

~editerranean,

and represented a substan-

tial portion of the national tax office.
21

The "Farm" was

.

Ibid., 72-75.

22 walter P. Devereux, Lives and Letters of the Devereux, Earls of Essex (London: 1853), I, 185.
2 3Lacey, Essex, 23.
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the basis of Essex's financial ascendancy, and in 1597 it
was producing sufficient revenue to eliminate an estimated.
~10,000 of the Earl's debt. 24 The only ominous note in
Elizabeth's generous grant on sweet wines was that the
lease was made payable for a ten-year period beginning in

1590.

In 1600 therefore .it would once again be the

Queen's privilege to terminate or renew the lease as she
saw fit. 2 5
Although Essex greatly impressed the fifty-four-yearold Elizabeth, he immediately began to alienate other
court members.

In the cut-throat atmosphere of Tudor-

Stuart hngland, once enemies were created, reconciliation
was seldom possible.

Grudges were borne an interminable

length of time, and the desire for vengeance was particularly strong.

Offended parties would wait years, if neces-

sary, for the opportunity to settle the score for real or
imagined grievances.
The first of many enemies Essex created was Sir Walter Raleigh.

This renowned adventurer, soldier, poet and

philosopher had become a great court favorite by 1587,
and was considered one of the most promising personalities
in Englund.

But Devereux, fifteen years his junior, imme-

diately replaced him in the Queen's favor, and by so doing embarked on a feud which would last until Essex's
24

MSS. Salisbury, vol.

25 Lacey,

Es~,

76-7?.

7, 283.
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death. 26
Raleigh was in a position to recover his lost role
in 1590 when Essex secretly married Frances Walsine;ham,
since Elizabeth took it as a personal affront.

The storm
passed quickly and Essex did not lose much ground. 2 7 Raleigh had had an excellent opportunity at the time of Essex's marriage, but he ruined it by seducing Bess Throgmorton, a maid of honor to the Queen.

Such indelicate

behavior sent Raleigh and his maid to the Tower for three
months' confinement.

Sir Walter never again came back to

full favor and thereafter allied himself with Sir Robert
Ceel.·1 • 28

Essex was soon back in his element, leading an expedition to France in July 1591, as Lord General, in which
the fortress of Rouen was captured. 2 9

He celebrated the

capture by conferring knighthood on twenty-four of his
followers, a practice usually reserved for heads of state.
Lord Burghley warned him in a letter that he would be incurring the Queen's wrath.30

Indeed Elizabeth, like all

the Tudors, was frugal with money and titles alike.
26 Handover, The Second Cecil, 52.

2 7williams, Elizabeth, 315-16.
28 Ibid., 319.
29George B. Harrison (ed.), The Elizabethan Journals
(New York: Doubleday and Company, 1965), I, 49.
30Read, Lord Burghlel, 477.
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Throughout her reign she restored or recognized only eighteen titles, and from 1572 on she created only three earldoms.

Even after the defeat of the Armada, she consi-

dered bestowing six earldoms, but soon reconsidered and
belatedly ennobled only the .English commander, Lord Howard. 3l

Therefore it was.a bit perplexing to have titles

and honors created wholesale by one of her generals.

But

Essex, headstrong and stubborn, desirous of popularity,
would persist in creating honors for his friends at every
opportunity throughout his career.
In Tudor-Stuart England, strength

and influence de-

pended upon being physically present at the royal Court.
A courtier who absented himself too long would come back
to find his reputation damaged by slanderous tales and his
position undermined.

Honors and positions were generally

acquired when a rival was away.

Essex was taught this

lesson in 1591, when he left for France.

One week after

his departure, Sir Robert Cecil, already an antagonist,
was sworn in to the Privy Council.3 2
But Essex recovered quickly by way of his military
exploits over the next two years and was himself admitted
to the Council in February 1593.33

In that year also, the

first of many books was written, dedicated to the young
3lwilliams, Elizabeth, 330.
32Read, Lord Burghley, 477.
33Harrison, Elizabethan Journals, I, 163.
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Earl.

Doctor Matthew Sutcliffe wrote The Practice, Pro-

ceedings and Laws of Arms, which discussed the great military leaders of ancient and modern times.

The Epistle

noted that all men's eyes were on Essex, who had acquitted
himself so well in the Low Gountries, Portugal and France~ 4
As Essex rose in popularity, numerous persons sought
to attach themselves to his star.

Such a person was Fran-

cis Bacon, a brilliant young lawyer in poor financial condition, whose father had been Lord Keeper.

He befriended

Essex, apparently in the hope that the Earl would place
him in some secure governmental post.

Essex was flattered

at the attachment, since he recognized and admired Bacon's
intellectual talents.35
In 1593 the office of Attorney-General became vacant,
and Bacon, heavily in debt, besought Zssex to secure the
position for him.

Essex spent much time and effort in ar-

guing Bacon's case to the Queen.36

In Tudor England, the

ability of a Lord to secure an office for a friend was a
very real kind of credit.

One's influence with royalty

would be worth money, either given or at least borrowed 0
Even an Earl of Essex's stature was constantly in need of
money, and even Kings were not safe from the creditor's
34 _Ibid., 219-20.
35catherine Drinker Bowen, The Lion and the Throne
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956), ??-78.

36 Ibi.£. , 77.
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grasp.

Therefore Essex had a strong interest in securing

as many positions as possible to enhance the reputation
of his influence.
However, the Attorney-Generalship, the hiEhest legal
office in the land, was also sought by Sir Edward Coke, a
friend of the Cecils, who had

pract~cailaw

for fifteen

years and had considerably more experience than Bacon.3?
Furthermore, Coke already held the post of Solicitor-General, the second highest legal post, and was therefore the
logical successor to the vacant Attorney-Generalship.
Essex's pleas were to no avail, as the Queen chose Coke,
backed by the Cecils, over Bacon.

Additionally, the Queen

appointed Thomas Egerton, another Cecil supporter, to the
office of Master of the Rolls, the second highest office
in the Chancery Court.3 8
In desperation, Essex and Bacon sought the latter's
appointment to the Solicitor-Generalship.

However, Eli-

zabeth refused to appoint Bacon to any position.

Bacon

had some years before argued in Parliament against the
right of the Queen to secure a triple subsidy.

Whether

this militated against Bacon is difficult to discern, but
the fact remains that Bacon, even after changing sides and
working for the Cecils, was never appointed to a permanent
position under Elizabeth.39
37rbid.,

?6.

38 Ibid., 81.
39 Ibid., 77, 83.

Essex was furious at the
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re.fusal~

since his reputation was at stake, and sought to

compensate Bacon adding:

"Master Bacon, you are ill be-

cause you have chosen me for your mean and dependance.

I

die if I do not somewhat towards your fortune: you shall
not deny to accept a piece of land which I will bestow on
you. 1140

The overall ef.f~ct of the dispute was to set Sir

Edward Coke firmly in Cecil's camp, particularly since he
was allowed to keep both offices for fifteen months while
Elizabeth tried to decide on a successor. 41
~izabeth

was not oblivious to the Cecil-Essex dis-

pute and in true Tudor fashion sought to keep the factions
balanced off.

She apparently understood Essex and sought

to protect him against himself.

In July 1594, when Essex

begged to accompany an expedition against Brest, the Queen
refused, saying she wanted him by her side and did not wish
to hazard his person.

She gave him Y+OOO to console him

and added: "Look to thyself, good Essex, and be wise to
help thyself,. without giving thy enemies advantage, and
my hand shall be readier to help thee than any other. 1142
The Earl could not be held back indefinitely, and
when, in 1596, it was decided to send an expedition to
Cadiz "to singe the beard" of the Spanish King, Essex secured the position of co-commander along with Sir Charles
4

0ibid., 82.
41
Ibid., 85.
42
Harrison, Elizabethan Journals, I, 247.
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Howard.

As a result, Essex created another formidable

enemy in the great Lord Admiral Howard, the hero of the
Armada victory of 1588. 4 3

When learning of Essex's ap-

pointment as co-commander, Howard complained: "my commision, in being joined with the Earl is an idle thing, for
I

am

used but as a drudge."

4L.J.

Howard's prophecy proved

true as Essex dominated the expedition.

Sir Walter Ral-

eigh also joined the venture, but was relegated to the
post of Rear Admiral. 4 5
Outwardly, the attack was successful in that Cadiz
was sacked and Spain humiliated.

By not acting quickly

enough, however, forty Spanish merchantmen had time to be
scuttled rather than risk capture.

Furthermore a Spanish

West Indies fleet was due to arrive in the near future,
but the expedition, upon the urging of Howard, did not
· t fO'l"' i·+. 46 A recen t ar t'ice
1 b y L • '/
Henry wh.ic h
~.
Wa1
_

v

examines the Cadiz expedition, shows that the ill-success
of the venture was due not to any failing on Essex's part,
as his enemies alleged at the time, but rather to the uncooperative attitude and lack of initiative on the part of
Howard and Raleigh.

While Essex personally led an inspired

4 3williams, Elizabeth, 303.
44

Quoted in Handover, The Second Cecil, 135.

4
5charles G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Armi (Oxford:
at the Clarendon Press, 1966), 253-54.
46 Ibid., 276-77.

94
ground attack which captured the city of Cadiz, Howard and
Raleigh, leading the naval forces, refused to close on the
Spanish merchantmen, and thus gave the Spanish an opportunity to destroy their

Oi'm

treasure-laden ships. 4 7

Upon arriving in England, the Earl received a tumultous reception from the

~opulace.

Essex returned to the

Court of Elizabeth undoubtedly expecting the Queen's enthusiasm to be no less than that of the masses.

Instead,

embarrassing statistics were presented by Robert Cecil and
his father which showed that the expedition, which had
cost

~50,000

to finance, was returning only

~28,000

to

the Crown after the expenses of Essex and his men were
deducted. 48

Elizabeth, ever conscious of finances, could

hardly be enthusiastic when it was pointed out that rich
merchant ships had been sunk instead of captured and that
the returning West Indies fleet had not been intercepted.
As a final blow, Essex was informed that while he was
away at Cadiz, Sir Robert Cecil, upon the recommendation
of Lord Burghley, had been sworn in as Principal Secretary
to the Queen, 4 9 an unmistakable indication that Sir Robert
would follow in his father's footsteps when the latter
passed on.
4 7see L. VI. Henry, '"I'he Earl of Essex as a Strategist
and r~ilitary Organizer, 1596-7, 11 E.H.R. LXVIII, 363-93.
48
nandover, The Second Cecil, lLJ.5.

49 Ibid. , 137.
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The Earl's position seemed weakened and members of
his faction cautioned him to tread softly.

Francis Bacon

tried to convince Essex to rest on the laurels of the
Cadiz expedition--after all, the masses thought it was a
great success.

If Essex persisted in antagonizing so

many people, Bacon

couns~led,

then he, Bacon, might pos-

sibly have chosen the wrong patron.50
The year 1597 brought new rumors of a Spanish invasion and an expedition was organized to .forestall it by
attacking the Spanish Azores Islands.

Essex secured sole

command and with 5,000 experienced troops, went off to
search .for the enemy.

Tl?-e expedition experienced problems

with ocean gales which forced it to turn back without success.

The only notable achievement was by Sir Walter Ral-

eigh, second in command, who briefly took the island of
Fayal.

This action was taken without Essex's permission,

and he later .forced an infuriated Raleigh to apologize before the war council.51
Essex returned from the "Islands voyage," his ships
battered by storms, on October 24, 1597, to face a disappointed Queen, who blamed him for spending great sums of
money without accomplishing anything.5 2 The day before
Essex got back, his old enemy, Lord Charles Howard, was

50Williams, Elizabeth, 329.
51 Handover, The Second Cecil, 207.
52 Ibid., 200.
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created Earl of Nottingham.

Because of Howard's other

offices as Lord of Effingham, Lord Admiral, and Lord High
Steward l?ro tem;pore, Essex had to yield to Nottingham in
the House o.f Lords.

Indeed, Howard now outranked all the

nobility except the hereditary Lord Chamberlain, the Earl
of Oxford.53

As a furth~r annoyance, Robert Cecil had

himself appointed as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster
during Essex's absence, thus eliminating another office
Essex had sworn to acquire for his friends.54

But if

the Earl was disappointed in the Court, the general populace loved him even more.

The same storm which battered

Essex upon his return, forced the new Spanish armada to
turn back.55

Panic over invasion rumors subsided and gave

way to renewed glorification of Essex, to whom the people
attributed their deliverance.5 6
The year 1597 ended with Essex adding Lord Cobham to
his growing list of enemies.

Cobham, who would later be

on the jury at Essex's trial,57 sought to be installed as
the Warden of the Cinque Ports of Kent, a lucrative position.

Essex violently opposed his bid and managed to de-

lay the appointment until August 29, 1598, when pressure
53Ibid., 204.
54rbid., 210.

55~., 200.
56 Ibid., 209.
57Bowcn, Lion and 'l.1hrone , 141.
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from Robert Cecil and Lord Howard forced it through.5 8
Cobham was intransigently in the ranks of Essex's enemies
thereafter, often protesting his hatred for the Earl.59
In addition to creating enemies, Essex's uncompromising nature caused many of his supporters to change sides.
In 1598 he became

suspic~ous

of the favors bestowed on

Lord Thomas Grey by Elizabeth.

Essex thereafter called

on Grey to publicly state whether he supported the Secretary or himself--there could be no neutrality.

Grey

stated that he would not be dependent on Essex and that
Essex had no right to monopolize the advancement of men
from war as he had been doing, since this was the Queen's
prerogative.

Finally, Grey explained that he liked the

favor of Sir Robert Cecil, and would never be dishonest
or ungratefui. 60
That disputes with the Cecils continued over every
issue was probably caused by the difference in orientation
of both :parties, particularly regarding the question of
warfare.

The Cecils were administrators who sought the

efficient running of a growing bureaucratic structure.
Warfare, particularly if it brought no treasure, merely
interfered with the effective running of the ship of
state.

But to Essex war was his mettle and his means of

58 Handover, The Second Cecil, 206.
59Harrison, Elizabethan Journals, I, 420.
60 Ibid., II, 41 •
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advancement.

The war with Spain had dragged on without

profit for too many years.

The Cecils therefore sought

an end to an uneconomical venture.
When the issue of peace with Spain took concrete form
in April 1598, Essex violently protested that he would
never consent to a treatY. or peace.

Upon this Lord Trea-

surer William Cecil answered that all Essex thought of
was war, slaughter and blood.

Burghley then pulled out a

psalm book and pointed· to a verse ivhich read: ":Men of
blood shall not live out half their days. 1161
Two months later, Essex wrote a letter explaining
why peace with Spain should not be made.

In the same

letter he made a passing reference to the Irish war, which
had dragged on

inter~ittently

for years, referring to that

conflict as a "beggarly and miserable" war which held no
prospect of glory as compared to the war against the Spanish king. 62 Yet before the passing of another year, Essex
..

would find himself mired in the Gaelic bogs.
By early 1598 Essex's military reputation had reached
its zenith, and his fame was renowned throughout Europe. 6 3
The King of France, Henry IV, wrote to Essex with "affection" and offered his good will, 64 while the King's sister,
6lsir William Camden, Historie of the Most Renowned
and Victorious Princess Elizabeth (London: 1636), 126. ·
.

6~

LHarrison, Elizabethan Journals, II, 33.

631'188. Salisbur;[, vol. 8, 222.
6L~Ibid.,

356.
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Catherine de Bourbon, wrote to him as her "cousin and dear
friend·. 116 5

His .fame at home was unexcelled.

The Bishop

of Carlisle called him "a Joshua unto us in .fighting His
battles, 1166 while a layman referred to him as "the Scipio
and sword of England. 116 7

When Essex was appointed Chan-

cellor of the University.of Cambridge, Sir Thomas Cartwright congratulated the Earl in a letter, and concluded:
"Let the chronicles o:f our land be perused, and I think
it will be hardly :found that there hath been any subject,
especially of those years that your Honour has yet come
into, clothed with·so much honour, and girded with so much
authority as you are. 1168
By late 1598, however, there were indications that
Essex's position at Court was on a downward course.

Sir

Robert Cecil had consolidated various posts in the a<Lro.inistrative field and was continually strengthening his
position.

Although Essex was regarded as the greatest

military leader o:f the realm, his relationship with Elizabeth was becoming increasingly more strained.

Into this

conflict the Irish problem emerged, offering Essex an
opportunity to reassert his ascendancy.
6 5Ibid.,

73.

66 Ibid., 66.
6 7Ibid., 561.
6S ... b.d

.±2._·'
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The situation in Ireland was badly deteriorating by
June 1598 as Hugh O'Neill remained defiant and unpunished.
The last Lord Deputy, Lord Burgh, had died in 1597, and
Elizabeth had still not appointed a successor.

Neither

Cecil nor Essex had wished to send any of their supporters
to that island.

In fact, both men concentrated on con-

vincing Elizabeth that a member of the opposition should
go.69
The climax came on July l in a conference in which ·
Elizabeth and the Council tried to finally resolve the
appointment of a governor for Ireland.

Essex had strongly

recommended that Sir George Carew, one of Cecil's supporters, should be sent to Dublin.

Elizabeth, however, an-

nounced that Sir William Knollys, Essex's friend and uncle, should be appointed Deputy.

The Earl, in a rage,

contemptuously turned his back on the Queen, who responded
by rising out of her throne and cuffing him on the ear.
Impetuously Essex whirled and laid his hand on his sword,
swearing that he would not take an insult like that from
Henry VIII himself.

Lord Admiral Howard restrained his

hand, whereupon the Earl stormed out of the chamber, to
remain absent for many weeks.70

The issue of a new Vice-

roy for Ireland still remained unsettled.
Such conduct at the July 1 meeting is reflective of
6 9Handover, The Second Cecil, 58.
7°camden, Historie, 126.
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Essex's personality.

He was passionate, spoiled, quick to

anger, and unlike other men of his time, he was unawed by
the position of monarch!

While other great men in Tudor

England tended to consider the Queen as sacrosanct and as
a personage on a higher plane altogether, Essex tended to
treat her like an ordina:rzy human being, who, while outranking him, did not command his total adoration.

During

his brief self-imposed exile after the meeting, Essex
wrote to one of his court friends that he was no lackey
or slave of Elizabeth, whom he considered to be only an
earthly power.71 Such a sentiment was heresy in an age
where the notion of the divine right of monarchs was generally accepted throughout Europe.
Essex's presumptive actions, such as creating titles
whenever the opportunity presented itself, or insulting
the Queen as no other subject ever dared, reflects the
peculiar independence he was allowed.
-

cense was the Queen's own doing.

This unusual li-

Because of her fondness

over the years for Essex she pampered him shamelessly and
indulged.his every whim.

This indulgence from the begin-

ning only encouraged Essex to become even more spoiled and
independent.
On August 14, 1598 Sir Henry Bagenal, Marshal of the
English Army in Ireland, gathered all the mobile forces
at his disposal, 3500 foot and 500 cavalry, and invaded

71 Harrison, :Slizabetban Journals, II, 462.
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Ulster to relieve the small English fort on the Blackwater.
As he approached the Yellow Ford over the Callan River,
his force was ambushed by Tyrone's Army, which slew over
2000 of the English Troops, including the Marshal himself

.
72
and thirty of his best officers.
stantly thrust Ireland

i~to

The catastrophe in-

the forefront of English pol-

itics, and debate continued for some time on what course
of action should be taken.73
When Essex heard the news from "younder cursed cou...-1try of Ireland," he wrote to the Queen:
••• when
would be
and your
son of a
rouse me

I apprehended how much your Majesty
grieved to have your armies beaten
kingdom like to be conquered by the
smith, duty was strong enough to
out of my deadest melencholy.74

This letter of August 26 was the first indication that
~ssex

might be considering personally to undertake the

pacification of Ireland.
In any case, after blocking R:nollys' appointment,
even though Knollys wanted the position, Essex subsequently objected to the Queen's and the Council's intention to
appoint Lord I1ountjoy to the post of Lord Deputy. 75

By

his dissatisfaction with such proposed Council nominations

72 c.s.P.

Ireland,

1598-99, 228.

73Harrison, Elizabethan Journals, II, L~7-48 • .

74 J,·TC'C'
• b ur;z,
. vo 1 • 8 , 318 •
i,.:·....,. S!! ).is
?5sir John Harrington, Nu5ae Antiquae (New York: Ams
Press, IHCo, 1966), I, 241.
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Essex was making his own appointment as Lord Deputy an
inevitability.
His subsequent investment as Lord Deputy was still
no ctraightforward appointment; rather, it was to be a
drawn-out bargaining procedure, involving bitterly disputed proposals and counterproposals, lasting from August
1598 until March 12, 1599!

On September 10, after recov-

ering from several weeks of sickness, Essex returned to a
warm welcome at Elizabeth's court.7 6 By November it was
generally believed in Court circles that Essex would lead
a great campaign to Ireland in the followine; spring.77
However, :i:;ssex, the

(~ueen

and the Council could not come

to agreement on numerous points in Essex's

commission--~

namely, the size and composition of his army, the position
of his subordinates, the military and political powers he
should have, the title that should be conferred upon him
and the financial arrangements for the campaign.

Concern-

ing the last item Essex had insisted that the Queen forgive many of the debts he had accumulated in organizing
past expeditions for the Queen.78
On December 8 Sir John Chamberlain wrote to English
officials in the Netherlands:
Essex's journey is uncertain, because the

76 T "C ey
..J.,JCJ.
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proportions for his enterprise are daily diminished. The nwnber of troops wa~3 a.t first set
down to be lL~, 000 with full allowance of victual
and money, but these rates are diminished and
Essex is displeased.79
Two days later, however, his appointment seemed certain
and Sir Robert Cecil wrote to the Irish officials: "I
think Her Hajesty is now.resolved of her General to be
the Earl Marshall (Essex) and he shall have there a good
army of 12,000 to 14,000 foot and 1,000 horse. 1180

But on

December 20 Sir John Chamberlain wrote that the Earl of
Essex's journey to Ireland "is dashed."

Chamberlain ex-

plained:
Till Sunday the Earl was to go, but there ca.me
a sudden alteration, the reason of which is
kept secret. Some say the Queen had promised
to forgive him his fathers debts of 12,000 h,
and she says she meant forbearance of it during
his absence. 81
As for the relationship of Essex and Cecil, Chamberlain
commented, "He (Essex) and Mr. Secretary ply the tables
hard in the presence Chamber, and play so round a game as
though Ireland were to be recovered at Irish. 1182
Finally, on January 3 Chamberlain reported that "The
disgust that stayed the Earl's going are removed, and now
he is preparing for Ireland. 118 3 Apparently by this time,
79Ibid., 129.
80C.S.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 401.
81
C.S.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 13 1 ~.
82 Ibid.
8 3Ibid.., 14?.
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Elizabeth had finally agreed to discharge Essex of

~10,000

worth of debts so that he could meet the expenses of the
campaign. 84 In a~y case the greatest difficulty had been
resolved and Essex could turn his full attention toward
preparing the expedition.

There were still other diffi-

culties which would arise and his full commission was not
agreed upon until January 31, and not signed lmtil March
12.85
Essex's final commission, dated January 31, represented the most far reaching powers any Viceroy had yet had
in Elizabeth's reign.

Instead of the usual designation

of Lord Deputy, Essex was granted the more prestigious
title of Lord Lieutenant, an honor which had baen granted
only to Sir Philip Sidney in 1567.

Under his Commission

Essex was empowered in addition to his prerogatives as
Governor, also to pardon treasons, to restore traitors,
to grant lands, to displace martial officers, to make
knights, to command ships appointed for Ireland, and to
dispose of the Queen's treasure with the advice of the
Irish Council, as long as he did not exceed the sums authorized. 86
Essex, as is evident,.had made many enemies in his
rise to power, and more recently in his quest for appoint84Lacey, Ess~, 217.
8 5c.S.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 156, 168.
86 Ib'd
168.
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ment

as

Lord Deputy.

Aside from the

obvious oppon-

ents of the Cecil faction Essex had eroded his support
within his own circle.

Sir William Knollys, Essex's

uncle who had wanted the position as Lord Deputy, was
reported as being "not well pleased" that Essex had
blocked his appointment.~?

Sir John Harrington, as he

prepared to follow Essex to Ireland, was cautioned by a
Court observer, Robert Markham, that Essex "hath so many
showing friends, and so many unshowing enemies. 1188 Markham told Harrington that Lord Mountjoy had sent two or
three of his relations with Essex's army
your conduct to us at home. 118 9

11

to report all

As a precaution Markham

counseled Harrington:
say, do you not meddle in any sort, nor give
your jesting too freely among those you know
not: obey the Lord Deputy in all things, but
give not your opinion; it may be heard in England.90
I

Harrington would follow Markham's advice, keeping a diary
as Markham also had suggested, and attempting to keep a
noncommital position in case things did not go well in Ireland.

Essex's own state of mind at the time of his
8 7Harrington, Nugae Antiquae, 242.
88 Ibid.

-

8 9Ibid., 241.
90ibid., 242.
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appointment and his attitude toward the task ahead have
been the subject of much speculation.

The general opin-

ion has been that he was enthusiastic at first, but quickly became defeatist in outlook.

Indeed after his confir-

mation was finally settled on January 3, 1599, Essex
wrote to.Sir John Harrington with great exhilaration: "I
have beaten Knollys and Mountjoy in the council, and by
G-d I will beat Tyrone in the field; for nothing worthy
her Majesties honor hath yet been achieved. 11 91
At the same time, Essex wrote a very detailed analysis
of his position to his friend, Lord Willoughby, the Governor of Berwick, on January 4, 1599.

After discussing some

technical problems concerning the employment of troops from
the Berwick garrison, Essex devoted the remainder of his
letter to his own personal situation, and began:
Now for myself. Into Ireland I go. The Queen
hath irrevocably decreed it; the Council do
passionately urge it; and I am tied to my own
reputation to use no tergiversation. And as it
were indecorum to slip collar now, so were it
"minime tutum," for Ireland would be lost, and
though it perished by destiny, yet I should only
be accused for it, because I saw the fire burn,
was called to quench it, and yet gave no help.
I am not ignorant what are the disadvantages of
absence; the opportunities of practicing enemies
when they are neither encountered or overlooked:
the constructions of princes under whom "magna
fama" is more dangerous than "mala" and 11 successus minus quam nullus, 11 the difficulties of a war
where the rebel that hath been hitherto ever victorious is the least enemy that I shall have
against me; for without an enemy, the disease of
that country consumes our armies, and if they
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live, yet famine and nakedness makes them lose
both heart and strength. And if victuals be
sent over, yet there will be no means to carry
it. And yet all those were better endured than
to have a Hanno at Carthage or a Cato at Rome,
barking at him that is every day venturing his
life for his country abroad. All those things,
which I am like to see, I do now forsee. For
the war is hard; pulchra que difficilia: the
rebel successful that only makes him worthy to
be undertaken: the qUpplies uncertain; it is
safer for me to perform as much as shall lie
in me or depend upon me, and to show the world
that my endeavors were more than ordinary, when
the state that set me out must conspire w~th the
enemy against me. Too ill success will be dangerous; let them fear that who allow excuses,
or can be content to overlive their honour. Too
good will be envious; I will never forswear virtue for fear of ostracism. The Court is the
centre; but methinks it is the fairer choice to
command armies than honorers. In the meantime
enemies may be advanced; so I show who should
be, let fortune.show who be. These are my private problems and night4.y disputations, which
from yuur lordship, whom I accow:i.t anotl1e1· mjself, I cannot hide. Use them according to
their nature and their author's purpose, that
is, to commit them to no other eyes than your
own.92

While some authors have inferred a defeatist attitude
on the part of Essex,93 this author considers his analysis
a very realistic evaluation by an experienced soldier and
politician.

Instead of being defeatist, Essex had a heal-

thy respect for the military problems connected with an
Irish campaign, along with a prophetic insight, borne
from past experience of the political consequences which
his absence from Court would engender.

92 MSS. Saiisbury, vol. 9, 10-11.
93see comments in Introduction.

In any case, with
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his appointment made certain, Essex could now turn to the
tactical and organizational considerations which a great
foreign expedition would entail.

CHAPTER IV
PLANS AND PREPARATION
,.
',.

The strategy which the English forces employed to
subdue Ireland was fairly well determined by the political situation and the geographical realities.

Throughout

the Irish wars of the sixteenth century, the rebels were
invariably on the defensive, holing up in their mountains,
forest and bogs, and putting the onus on the Queen's
troops to march in and enforce her authority.

Tyrone's

war was no exception to the pattern, for although he did
have a better army than his predecessors, Tyrone basically
fought the same defensive war.

Indeed, the fortified posts

of the English, the lack of Irish artillery, English sea
power, and the great disparity between English and Irish
logistical production rendered a truly offensive strategy
impossible for Tyrone.

Additionally, the Irish leader

had built up a precarious alliance of independent-minded
Irish chieftains, many of whom were less than enthusiastic over Tyrone's sudden preeminence, 1 and one serious defeat could shatter the loosely knit coalition.
In view of the Irish methods of warfare the English
were forced to adhere to an offensive strategy.
1 c.s.P. Irelund, 1598-99, 166.
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Tyrone was the heart of the rebellion the major effort
would be directed toward neutralizing him.

The ideal

procedure for dealing with revolt in Ulster was to invade
that country from the two natural overland entrances: in
the west by an army from Connaught going through Ballyshannon; in the east by g.n army moving through the I1owry
Pass to the Blackwater.

Further, it had long been recog-

nized that the key to subduing Ulster lay in isolating the
area from outside support by cutting off the sea-entry
lane at Lough Foyle.

By a sea-borne operation, a garri-

son could be planted at Derry which would not only sever
Ulster's lines of supply to Scotland, but would place
Tyrone's home base in imminent danger.
The above basic strategy for dealing with revolt by
the O'Neills was developed during Shane O'Neill's rebellion from 1562 to 1567.

In 1566 Colonel Randolph estab-

lished a garrison of 1,000 foot at Lough Foyle in October
of that year, to operate in conjunction with Lord Deputy
Sidney's overland invasion through Connaught. 2 However,
the country around Lough Foyle was particularly desolate3
and a garrison was forced to depend on outside SUJ:?ply.
In Colonel Randolph's expedition the garrison was immobilized for lack of supplies, and through the winter the
supply system broke down completely, leaving the garrison
2

c.s.P. Ireland, 1209-72, 308-09.

3C.S.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 23.
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to starve. 4

Finally in I1ay 1567 the survivors were with-

drawn, having tied down Shane O'Neill to a degree, but
being otherwise ineffective due to lack of support.
With Tyrone's rebellion of 1595-1603 the Irish and
English faced basically the same strategic situation as
in Shane O'Neill's

rebel~ion.

In 1597 Lord Deputy Burgh

planned to subdue Tyrone with a similar strategy.

Forces

in the east would garrison the Blackwater fort area to

prevent Tyrone from slipping past the English forces and
into the Pale.

In the west, the Governor of Connaught,

Sir Conyers Clifford, would attack through Ballyshannon;
while most importantly, a garrison would be placed at
Lough Foyle in Tyrone's rear.5

Regarding the Lough Foyle

aspect of the plan, Sir Henry Wallop, the Treasurer at
Wars for Ireland, wrote to the Privy Council that he hoped
Her Majesty would send 1,000 foot and 100 horse to Lough
Foyle, with supplies to last six or eight months, and coneluded:
The Place, being withal weil fortified will
more annoy the Earl (of Tyrone) and O'Donnell
than an army of 10,000 men, making journeys
into their countries without provision or means
to enable them to continue in the field longer
than has been accustomed.6
In July 1597, however, rebel threats to the Pale

4c.S.P.
5c.s.P.

Ireland 2 1509-73, 317-18.
Ireland 2 1596-97, 373-75, 357-58.

6Ibid., 357.
-
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caused Lord Deputy Burgh to shift the men a.nd supplies intended for Lough Foyle instead to reinforce the troops
guardin-,;; the Pale. 7

·while Lord Burgh was cancellinf5 his

Lough Foyle plans, Sir Conyers Clifford's invasion force
was defeated in early August and turned back at Ballyshannon by O'Donnell's ar;my. 8 The entire project thereupon collapsed and the plans instead would be held in
abeyance untii the forces and supply magazines could be
replenished.9
At the same time that Lord Burgh's plan was meeting
with disaster, the Earl of Essex was in Plymouth preparing

to leave on his Islands Voyage.

On August 12,

1597, Essex

wrote a letter to the Queen in which he commented on several matters, including the state of affairs in Ireland.
Unaware of Lord Burgh's·recent difficulties, Essex stated:
••• as for Ireland (than.'l{s be to God) your Majesty's
affairs do ever~ day mend; the last Deputy [Sir
William Russell ended well and this [Lord Burgh]
begins well. I your Majesty's garrisons towards
Ulster of the Newry, Dundalk, the Blackwater and
Armagh be kept strong and Sir Conyers Clifford
build up Ballyshannon and by that means free Connaught from the incursions of 'l'irconnel, you
shall keep these countries [the Pale and south
Ireland] that have ever yielded you profit and
remained in obedience: and whensoever you shall
be at leisure to attempt the utter extirpation
of the traitor Tyrone and his Sept by landing on
his back at Loughfoile and fortifying and planting garrisons along the river Liffer, as at the
?Ibid., 358.
8
Ibid., 373-77•

9Ibid., 377.
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Castle of Liffer and Derrie, it will be an
easy work.10

~·

Thus as early as August 1597 Essex, while not yet remotely

t

connected with Ireland, demonstrated that he understood

(

L
t
i!

the strategy necessary to subdue that island, and in particular the decisive importance of the Lough Foyle expediti on.
The emphasis on the Lough Foyle expedition increased
throughout the next two years and is evident in almost all
the strategic recommendations for subduing Ulster.

In

July 1598, the Earl of Ormonde, Lord Lieutenant General
of the forces in Ireland, and leader of the allied Protestant Irish, recommended that 1,200 foot and 100 horse be
sent to Lough Foyle. 11 In reply Queen Elizabeth and the

Privy Council, who usually sought to cut down any troop
request because of the expense, voluntarily increased the
proposed expedition to 2,000 foot and 100 horse, with provisions for six months. 12 However, before this expedition
commenced Sir Henry Bagenel suffered his disastrous defeat
in August 1598 and all of Ireland seemed in danger of falling to T;>rrone.

Once again the Lough Foyle project was

shelved as the troops and supplies intended for that operation were diverted to Dublin in order to shore up the
10B. M., Hulton MSS., 150.
11

c.s.P.

Ireland, 1598-99, 11.

12 Ibid., 202.
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defenses of the Pale. 1 3

Preparation for the Lough Foyle

expedition were so advanced in 1598 that the Earl of Ormonde feared that news of Bagenel's defeat would not
·reach England in time to countermand the order to sail. 14
In December 1598, Sir Geoffery Fenton, Commissioner
for the Affairs of

Ulste~

and Connaught, wrote to Sir

Robert Cecil, emphasizing the necessity of occupying Lough
Foyle with at least 2,100 men. 1 5 And in January 1599,
Captain Thomas Reade, an experienced company commander in
Ireland, upon hearing of Essex's appointment as Lord
Deputy, wrote an analysis of the Irish situation for the
Earl.

The strategy he recommended wa.s to occupy Bally-

shannon, Lough Foyle and the Blackwater area, and to
devastate Tyrone's country in a series of coordinated
attacks from three directions.

Captain Reade further

recommended that Essex ought to conduct the Ulster operation until October 1599, and then withdraw to the south,
thereafter conducting a winter campaign in Leinster, when
the Irish would be at their weakest. 16 The only change
which Essex recommended in the above strategy was to increase the proposed garrison at Lough Foyle to 4,000 foot
l3Ibid., 239.
l'+Ibid., 243.
l5Ibid., 426.
16Ibid., 450-51.
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and 100 horse. 1 7
pation of

Lou~h

Essex also planned to accompany the occu-

Foyle by a direct overland thrust into the

center of Ulster, planting garrisons in Tyrone's country.
Any other course of action was, by agreement of Essex,

the Queen and the Privy Council, "but waste and consumption.1118

Tyrone was the center of resistance; once he

was crushed the rest of the island could be easily subd.ued.
The strategy which Essex and succeeding deputies should
follow was generally recognized and agreed upon by all
the principal personalities concerned with the project.
However, the Lough Foyle landing and a coordinated
overland invasion was a particularly difficult strategy
for a sixteenth-century English army, and could be easily
upset if any one element of .the operation failed.

As we

have seen, English defeats on the overland routes had
ruined the strategic plan before the Lough Foyle expedition was even undertaken.

Even if the enemy caused no

interference, the overall strategy hinged on two crucial
prerequisites, shipping and horses.

The Lough Foyle oper-

ation depended on the availability of shipping to transport men, horses and supplies for six months.

While

England had a respectable navy and merchant marine, gathering and coordinating this fleet for specific projects
was a colossal undertaking.

The overland expeditions,

17c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 19.
18 Ibid., 106.
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particularly with a large army, required numerous horse to
transport the supplies that the army must take to sustain
itself,

Captain Reade, in his advice to Essex in January

1599, made a special note of the necessity of having "very
many" of the powerful carriage horses to pull the supply
carts across the rugged ijlster terrain. 1 9
Since the strategy Essex would use was practically a
foregone conclusion by the time of his appointment on
January 3, 1599, the new Lord Lieutenant had as his principal task the gathering of men and material to implement
the strategy.

Essex therefore ·spent the next three months

in England supervising the assembly and transporting of
ships, men, horses and supplies; and it is this important
effort which we shall now consider.

By 1599 the Earl of Essex was probably the most experienced man in England when it came to organizing and
leading an overseas campaign.

In 1585 he had begun his

military career by recruiting and equipping 700 gentleman
and 1585 common soldiers for the Queen's Netherlands campaign,20 which lasted two years.

In 1592 he played a

prominent part in the English expedition which raided
Portugal and threatened Lisbon. 21

Previously in 1591, he

19C.S.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 451.
20Lacey, Essex,
21
Ibid., 64-70.

35.
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had organized and led an English force of 4,000 men into
France to assis·t Henry IV against the Spanish. 22

Five

years later, in 1596, Essex had achieved his greatest
triumph in organizing and leading the expedition which had
sacked Cadiz.

After the Cadiz experience Essex wrote a

paper in which he called.for major reforms in the English
military system.

Instead of continuing a large, ineffi-

cient militia to conduct campaigns, he asserted that England should create a small, efficient standing army of
6,000 men, organized on a regimental system.

In 1597, Essex had attempted to implement his ideas
in preparing the expedition to the Azores Islands.

The

result, according to C. G. Cruickshank, the foremost authority on the Elizabethan military establishment, was
that Essex's army for the Islands expedition "formed probably the most efficient force to leave England in Elizabeth's reign. 112 3 It is in the context of Essex's military
experience and proven organizational ability that we should
view the problems and conflicts which arose as Essex made
his preparations for the Irish expedition.
Essex's first area of concern was the composition of
his army.

Regarding the force which he had at his dispo-

sal, his contemporaries were lavish in their. praise.
Chamberlain Hi.msdon articulated the national sentiment
22 Ibid., 82-89.
2 3cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 204.
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when he subsequently stated that with the Army Essex had,
he should have been able to march through Spain itself, 24
while later historians have echoed similar judgments.
(For a more extensive judgment see the comments in the
Introduction.)

From the writings of contemporary obser-

vers and historians the reader may be tempted to picture
Essex gathering a powerful and cohesive army of 16,000
foot and 1,300 horse in England, and leading them over to
Ireland to deal with Tyrone.

The facts of his Army's com-

position, however, are not nearly so impressive.
On December 8, 1599, while Essex's ultimate appointment was still in doubt, Sir John Chamberlain, a member
of the Privy Council, wrote to the Crown's representative
in the Low Countries concerning the estimated composition
of the army intended for Ireland.

The number of troops

was set at about 14,000, an estimate confirmed two days
later by Robert Cecil, but that number was to include those
troops already in Ireland! 2 5

A more specific breakdown

was given by Chamberlain on January 3, 1599, when he wrote
that Essex's force was to consist of "500 or 600 horse" and
"not more than 2,000 from here (England), 2,000 from the
Low Countries, and 10,000 are said to be there already. 1126
24

Anthony Bacon, The Earl of Essex's Vindication of
of the War wi_!;h Snain (London, 1?29), 60.
2
5c.s.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 129.
26 Ib'd

...;.2:,_. '
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The Essex force, therefore, was not to be a whole new army,
but a combination of soldiers already in Ireland, 2,000
raw levies from England, "strengthened with the old soldiers of the Low Countries. 112 7 By February 25, 1599 Essex
succeeded in having the army increased to 1300 horse, organized into 26 bands,

a~d

16,000 foot organized into 160

companies, by persuading the Queen to levy about 2,000
more men from England. 28
The bulk of Essex's "great army" consisted of 10,000
troops who were in Ireland by January 3, 1599.

Of this

army, officials in Ireland wrote back of its dilapidated
state caused by the corruption of the company captains.
The Earl of Ormonde wrote in October 1598 that the captains, claiming that they had received little money, had
only paid their men two months of their pay in the last
eight months, and had not supplied "hose or shoes, or almost any apparal" for the winter. 2 9 Furthermore, the captains had replaced many of their English soldiers with
Irishmen, who served for less pay, or had discharged men
altogether, but were still collecting money as though they
had full companies.30
When word of the defeat at Yellow Ford reached England,

27 C.S.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 389.
28

Ibid., 483.

29 Ibid., 334.

30ibid., 63, 138.
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the (t_ueen had immediately attempted to bolster the Army's
strength.

The force scheduled for the Lough Foyle opera-

tion was diverted to the Pale, while on August 26 a new
levy of l,?OO men was ordered.

The

assemblin~

of this

force of levies caused numerous problems since many men
deserted,3l and 400 Londoners drafted for Ireland mutinied
on the road to Chester.3 2 Eventually, Sir Richard Bingham managed to get 700 men to Ireland by the end of October, but they were in a mutinous mood.33

On October 28 a

further levy of 2,000 men was ordered, and all these
troops, divided into three contingents, reached Cork, Kinsale and Waterford by December 9, 1598.34
At the end of 1598 Sir Robert Cecil wrote some "Observations" on the condition of Ireland and noted the corruption of captains, and emphasized the need for a general
reform of the demoralized army.35

The bulk of Essex's

army, therefore, consisted of men who had already been
defeated in the field by Tyrone, who were cheated of money
and supplies by their captains, and whose main concern was
to avoid starving to death in the winter at hand.
The second part of the army was originally to consist
3libid., 276.
32Falls, Elizabeth's Irish Wars, 326.
""'3
) C.S.P. Ireland 1598-99, 411.
2

4

3 Ibid., 399.
35Ibid., 444.
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of not more than 2000 levies from England; however, the
number of levies was increased to about 4000 by the end
of March.3 6 These levies were of the usual reluctant
character, despite the fact that Essex applied enough
pressure on the officials to insure that the troops were
all present and well supplied.

On December 10, an advance

guard of 1000 men under Sir Arthur Savage was designated
to go to Ireland.

Sir Robert Cecil wrote to Sir Conyers

Clifford of Connaught that this force was "sent you before
my Lord of Essex came, ••• to put you into some life •••
whereby you may know that you

are not neglected."37

Un-

fortunately, the process of assembly, preparation and embarkation was so cumbersome, that i t was not until January 31 that this first small contingent reached Dublin.3 8
As for the remaining 3000 levies, Essex 1 s plans stipulated: 2600 men, 200 cavalry horse, and "a great number
of carriage horse" were to assemble and embark at Chester;
450 men, 100 cavalry horses, and 50 carriage horses were
to assemble and embark at Milford; and 100 cavalry horses
were to be sent from Bristol.39

Essex found that the mus-

tering, equipping and transporting of these troops took up

36c.s.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 147; Falls, Elizabeth's
Irish Wars, 22?.
37c.s.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 402.
3Sibid., 473.
39A.P.C. XXIX, 527, 531.
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most of his time for the next few months.

On January

5,

immediately after the final approval of his commission,
Essex sent the Privy Council a list of all the men and
support he would need for the Irish expedition and then
began work on the details. 40
By the end of

Janua~y

the plans for the assembly

and embarkation for the troops was drawn up,

4-1

and on

February 5 Essex sent very detailed instructions to Captain John Goite and Captain Robert Davies on how they
were to proceed to gather the shipping to get the troops
to Ireland.

Goite was to go to Bristol and gather all

shipping -''especially such as will serve to transport horses" for the troops which were to leave from that port.
After that Goite was to travel to all ports from Bristol
to the Cape of Cornwall and gather whatever shipping was
available.

In the meantime, Captain Davies would have the

task of supervising the assembly of ships for the main
force assembling at Chester.

If Davies found himself

short of shipping then Goite would send him what he needed
from Bristol or Milford. 42
The process of gathering ships proceeded slowly and
on February 26, 1599

Esse~

and the Privy Council directed

that the nayor of Barnstable send seventeen ships, known
40

41

C.S.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 449.
A.P.C. XXIX,

527.

L~ 2~., 529-31.
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to be in his port, to Chester immediately to assist the
shipping of troops. 4 3 By March 21 shipping was fairly
well assembled to take the bulk of the troops, although
the horses and the last contingent of 800 men still did
not have sufficient shipping to allow them to accompany
Essex. 44
The difficulties in the gathering of shipping was
equalled by the problems of levying men and getting them
to the port of embarkation.

The slowness of the communi-

cations systems, and the difficulties of communicating
only by letters caused maddening delays.

On November

1598 the Privy Council sent a notice of levy for

29,

400 men

to the Archbishop of York, and the letter did not reach
4
the north country until January 28, 1599! 5 Yet on February 9, the Earl of Stanhope wrote to Essex stating that
specific instructions had not yet been received; among
other things, the officials in York wished to know whether
they should arm the men in York, or send them to Chester
with the money to buy arms there.

In any case they insis-

ted that no further progress could be made until the other
instructions from the Privy Council had arrived. 46
On February 2 the Sheriff of Lancashire received the
4 3Ibid., 615.
44
Ibid., 700.
4 5r/lC"Q

l.:.h., •

s a.1 1· s b ur;r , vol. 9, 46.

46 Ibid.,

67.
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the Queen's letter of January 16 levying 200 men "to go
into Ireland accordine; to direction to be received; 114 7
the directions, however, were not as yet received and
therefore the Sheriffs and Justices of Lancashire reported, "we cannot proceed in the work for want of your
directions. 1148

Even when instructions were received and

understood the problenB continued.

Sir John Gocke in

London was ordered to deliver 100 men to Halifax for
shipment to Ireland, and to send their equipment by carts
to West Chester.

On

February 16 Sir John wrote to Sir

Robert Cecil to explain the delay by saying he could not
hire carts because it was seed-time, and the owners refused to rent them out.

Sir John asked that Sir Robert

Cecil obtain a warrant so that he could commandeer as many
carts as were needed. 4 9
Most obstacles were eventually overcome and the main
contingent of 2600 levies was assembled at Chester by the
middle of Harch.50

Upon inspection by the f1ayor of Chester

and Sir Arthur Chichester it was found that all the troops
were well prepared "except eleven of the men raised in Norfolk, whose coats were coarse, who wanted altogether both
hose and shoes, and of whom some had no sword. 11 51 All but
4 7rbid.,

69.

4 8Ibid.
Lt-9Ibid. , 72.

50rbid., 113.

5lrbid., 108.
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23 of these men were safely embarked for Dublin on March
21 and 22, a remarkable performance compared to previous

efforts to ship levies to Ireland.
While the new recruits were comparatively ·well armed
and well equipped, they still possessed all the unfortunate characteristics of raw levies serving in Ireland for
the first

time~

Essex therefore was relying on the third

part of his army, the Low Country contingent, to provide
the resolution and experience which the other elements
lacked.

In short, the Low Country contingent was to be

the backbone of the army.

Essex's plan, as approved by

the Queen, was to have 2000 new levies in England organized into companies v.,ri th their officers, and sent as whole
units to the Lowlands.

In exchange, 2000 English veterans

serving in the Lowlands, also organized into companies
along with their own officers, would be transferred directly to Ireland to serve as the hard core of Essex's
army.52
The reaction of the States General of Holland to
Essex's plan was immediate and negative.

Prince Maurice

of Nassau, upon hearing of the plan, wrote to the Earl of
Essex on December 26, 1598, voicing his displeasure at the
proposal.

Prince Maurice pointed out that his country had

spent much effort in training the English soldiers in the
methods of service used in Holland and in bringing the

52 Ibid., 65.
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4000-man contingent to the point where it was the "chief
reliance" of the Dutch army.

Now, if Essex's ·plan were

implemented, and if half of their veterans were replaced
by "novices, 11 the Dutch would have to completely rebuild
this contingent for the coming spring campaign season.53
In addition to Princ.e Maurice's obj ec ti on, the chief
opponent of the Essex plan was Sir Francis Vere, an English nobleman who had brought a regiment to serve in Holland.

Vere had first come to prominence through Essex's

patronage and assistance on the Cadiz expedition in 1596.54
After that expedition, when Sir Walter Raleigh and Lord·
Admiral Howard had sought to denigrate Essex's performance, Vere presented a forceful and incontestable justification of the conduct of Essex in the presence of Elizabeth and the Court.55

Thereafter Sir Francis Vere, osten-

sibly a great friend of Essex, went to the Netherlands
war where he made a great reputation for himself, and established a promising future in the service of States
General.
By January 1599 the States General had appointed
Vere to be general of all English in the field, while his
personal sentiment seemed to be "wholly addicted unto the
States and their proceedings. 11 56 To retain his position,

53rbid., 502.
54cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 269.
55Lacey, Essex, 203.
56~ms. Salisbury, vol. 9, 123.
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according to one observer, Sir Francis Vere was willing to
betray "your Majesty's special service into Ireland, the
Council's determination in England, and ny Lord of Essex's
intended journey. 11 57

In any case it was both in the

States General's interest and in Sir Francis Vere's interest to maintain the best.army possible in Holland, despite
the Queen's directives showing the need for trained troops
to go with Essex to Ireland.
When news of Essex's appointment as Lord Deputy and
his intended journey to Ireland reached Holland, Sir Henry
Docwra, a commander of the English army in Holland, immediately wrote to Essex to offer his services.58 Sir Henry
was an antagonist of Sir Francis Vere, with whom he had
often quarreled, and he now

soug~_t

tion to be a-way from Vere.59

to join Essex's expedi-

Since Essex was fully pre-

occupied in organizing the new levies in England and because Sir Henry Docwra was an experienced and willing
solicitor, Essex placed Docwra in charge of the project
of supervising the transfer of troops between Holland and
England.

As a result, from January to March 1599 Sir Hen-

ry Docwra fought a running battle with Sir Francis Vere
and the States General of Holland in an effort to try to
have Essex's plan implemented.

Although Vere and States

57Ibid., 124.
58 :MSS. Salisbury, vol. 8, 1+99.

59 Ibid., 507.
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General could not ignore Elizabeth's orders altogether,
they did contrive to insure that the transfer would be
of maximum benefit to Vere's forces.
Elizabeth had appointed Sir Thomas Yuiollys to lead
the 20 companies of new levies from :England to Holland,
and on January 22 he arr:Lved at Flushing with his contingent of 2000 men. 6
From then until February 9 Sir Thom-

°

as Yuiollys tried in vain to have the transfer of troops
proceed as Essex had instructed; finally in despair,
Knollys wrote to Essex in order to appraise him of the
status of the Low Country contingent.

To make up the

2000 men which had been promised to Essex, Sir Francis

Vere had appointed only "broken companies, 11 and his officers chose only the

11

worst men and worst furnished that

were in the companies. 11

This lot of rejects was sent to

Zeeland for shipment, "without a captain or any other
officer to conduct them to Ireland. 1161
The commanding officer in The Netherlands, Sir Francis Vere, refused to send one man from his own well
trained regiment.E2 On the other hand, the troops from
England who had arrived in company organizations were
disbanded and distributed to Vere's officers, while Sir
Francis Vere personally assigned 400 of the new men to his
6Qr"SC
·1 u.

r< ] .J.s
•
b urv,
,;)a

61 Ibid., 65.
62 Ibid., 36.

vol. 9, 36.
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own regiment to bring it up to strength.

All the officers

from England, with the exception o.f Sir Thomas Knollys
himself, were summarily dismissed by Vere. 6 3 In this
position the newly unemployed officers volunteered for
service with Essex in Ireland. 64
The problems brought on by such a cumbersome communication and administrative system are strikingly illustrated
in Essex's attempt to implement the plan for the use of
Low Country troops.

In an age when a simple telephone

call can do nuch to solve a crisis or eliminate confusion
it is perhaps difficult for us to appreciate the admiriistra ti ve handicap under which Tudor officials worked, in
that they had to disseminate all instructions and solve
all problems through the tedious processes of sending letters or messengers across land and water.
The most serious administrative handicap was that
reaction time was agonizingly slow.

If orders sent

out by the Privy Council were lost or misinterpreted, or
if the recipients chose to violate the orders, it would be
weeks, and even months, before official inquiries or the
personal representatives of the Privy Council could sort
out the difficulties and determine who was responsible
for not complying with instructions.

In preparing for

the Irish campaign of 1599, and in dealing with Sir
63 Ibid., 64-65.
6Li-Ibid. , ix.
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Francis Vere and the States General of Holland, Essex had
little or no reaction time.
Essex's appointment as Lord Deputy was not made certain until January 3, 1599, and since the situation in
Ireland was critical it was expected that Essex should
depart as soon as possible.

Essex had apparently hoped

to be in Ireland by February, but problems in organizing
the expedition forced him to delay his intended departure
date until March. 6 5 By February 15, the Queen's Secretary
in Ireland was ·writing to Sir Robert Cecil that it was
high time" Essex were in Ireland to control the deteriorating situation. 66 Despite the pressure, Essex remained
11

in England until April 5, supervising the setting up of
supplies and the embarkation of his raw levies, the main
contingent of which finally sailed on March

25.

It is in

the context of this three-month period--from January 3 to
April 5--that Essex's dealings with the Low Country contingent must be viewed.
In early January, Essex had set out confirmation of
Sir Henry Docwra's appointment, along with instructions
for handling the Low Country troops.

On January 12, Cap-

tain R. Morison, a Privy Council observer sent over to
· Holland in December 1598, wrote to Essex about the cooperative attitude of the States General, who were readying

65 C.S.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 151.
66 C.S.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 480.
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their companies for transfer to Ireland as instructed. 6 7
On the same date, Docwra wrote to Essex, acknowledging
receipt of the Earl's letter, and assuring Essex that his
instructions were being followed.

He

added, however, that

Essex might not receive the caliber of soldiers which he
was expecting from Sir Fr.ancis Vere.

Essex immediately

wrote back that if men or equipment were lacking, Docwra
was to make up the deficiencies by taking men and equipment from Sir l'homas Knollys' contingent of new levies
1

which was beincs sent to Vere. 68
The first really ominous note did not appear until
Sir Thomas Knollys arrived at Flushing, the J.Jowland port
of embarkation, on January 22.

Sir Thomas wrote back

that he found all things "unready" at the port of embarkation. 6 9 But on January 23, Docwra wro·te to Essex and indicated that there might be some problems; however, he
did not wish to discuss "the Particulars of them until" he
had "waded further in the business."

Docwra further con-

eluded by stating that he was carefully following the instructions of Essex and that the Earl would most certainly
be satisfied with his service.70

On January 25, Sir William Brown

6 711ss. Salisbury, vol. 9, 22-23.
68 Ibid. , 42.
6 9Ibid., 36.

70ibid., 38.

wrote to Essex and

r
'

~.

133
mentioned that Sir Francis Vere was sending him men from
"broken companies" without officers, but that Sir Henry
Doc-...yra had written to Sir :F'rancis Vere about the problem. 71

On the same day Sir Henry Docwra also wrote to

Essex, telling him that he had arrived at the port of embarkation, and after observing defects in the number of
rnen and equipment he was in the process of making up the
deficiencies as Essex had instructed.

Docwra concluded

that he and the troops were preparing to sail from Holland
with the first good wind, which they expected to be about
January 31.

Docwra's last letter from Holland was writ-

ten on February 6, in which he stated that he expected to
depart any day, and that he was still having difficulties
making up the deficiencies from Sir Francis Vere.7 2
The full extent of the situation was not made known
to Essex until Sir Thomas Knollys wrote to Essex on February 9, reporting the full scope of Vere's betrayal in no
uncertain terms.73

On the same day, three captains, Nich-

olas Saunders, George Laycester, and Francis Maddisen,
"'~

officers under Knollys, also wrote to Essex confirming the
true state of the Low Country cont:ingent.7 4 Essex received these
reports in the middle of February, and had the Privy
7libid., 40.
72 Ibid., 59.
?3Ibid., 64-65.
74 Ibid., 67.

Council send out a scathing letter to Sir Francis Vere
insisting that he comply with instructions.75

The Privy

Council's letter did not arrive at The Hague until early
March, by which time it was far too late, since Docwra,
catching a good wind, had sailed for

~ngland

with the

forces he had in hand, aqd had arrived in Ireland on February 28, 1599.76
When Sir Thomas Knollys questioned Sir Francis Vere
about the problems of the Low Country contingent, Sir
Francis remained outwardly friendly, while placing the
blame on Count Maurice of Nassau.77

The Count, in turn,

"pleadeth ignorance," maintaining that "he never understood, either by the Queen's letters or the lords of the
Council of England that there was any intent ever specified whereby whole companies should be drawn from hence,
but only in exchange of 2000 men that should be supplied
out of England. 11 78 Since it would be impolitic to call
Count Maurice a liar, Essex had no alternative but to accept the fait accompli presented to him by Sir Francis
Vere in the name of Count Maurice.
Essex had expected a well-armed, well-trained corps
of veterans, organized into company units under officers
75A.P.C. XXIX, 621.
vol. 9, 93.
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who had served with their companies for considerable time.
Instead he received a leaderless collection of castoffs
who immediately placed a burden on the supply system to
make up their deficiencies in equipment.79

If Essex had

been able to go to the Low Countries personally, such a
deception could not have _occurred.

But Essex had too many

tasks in England, and had to rely on his subordinates·,
the good faith of Sir Francis Vere and Count Maurice, and
the communications and administrative channels of the
period.
Aside from the garrisons in Ireland and the Low Countries, the only other source of trained men in England
were the Berwick bands and Scottish bands.

These troops,

about 1100 in number, were stationed principally at Berwick on the Scottish border, in order to protect the northern English counties from any Scottish incursions. 80
Essex had requested that Queen Elizabeth allmv him to
draft these well-trained men from Berwick, and send newly
drafted levies to take their place, on a pattern similar
to that of the Low Country troops.

Yet

C.~ueen

Elizabeth,

who had already approved the same basic plan regarding
2000 troops in the Low Countries, objected to this new
proposal of switching levies with veterans, stating that
the transfers, ''being a double work must needs be a double
79Ibid. , 36.
BOibid., 43.
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charge."

The apparent reason for her sudden opposition

to such a sound course of action was that by January

1599,

when Sssex had made this Berwick request, the staggering
cost of the expedition was becoming obvious, and Blizabeth
was unwilling to pay for any other "unnecessary" moving
of troops. 81
Even if Elizabeth had approved the Berwick plan, it
may well have failed, since the Berwick band members,
like most English soldiers, were totally unenthusiastic
about the prospect of service in Ireland.

When news of

Essex's proposal reached Berwick, an official wrote to
Sir Robert Cecil as follows:
We have been at great charges of training and
furnishing them, and they were promised when chosen that they should never be pressed to any
foreign service. I assure you there is not one
man of them but, before he will go to Ireland,
will give his captain ±,20, ±i30, or Y+O to put
another in his room. [Berwick band members
were generally the sons of the richest farmers
and freeholders, and could well afford such a
sum.J
What a charge and discontentment that
woulu breed here you can well conceive. I hope
you will make a stay if any such matter be attempted; or that if companies must go from this
shire to Ireland, such men as are fittest may
be pressed, but our trained bands may be kept
for the purpose for which they were first chosen. 82
The officials need not have worried since Elizabeth had
already disapproved the plan, but the sentiment expressed
by the above written note is indicative of the provincialism, lack of national allegiance, and general fear of
81
82

Ibid., 10.
Ibid. , 43.
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Irish service prevalent in England at this time.
A final element in Essex's army, unique to the Irish
wars, was the presence of many "gentlemen volunteers."
The Lord Lieutenant's great reputation among the martialoriented nobility of England, resulted in many young noblemen, eager for
his army.

advent~re,

to apply for positions in

Essex could not find places of importance for

all the applicants, and so a group of about fifty young
gentlemen foliowed along in his personal retinue, or occasionally accompanied some of Essex's subordinate commanders.83

These enthusiastic volunteers, by their gallant,

and sometimes reckless example, provided a well-needed
spark to the generally uninspired disposition of the Army
rank and file.
The overall situation of the Army in Ireland was not
encouraging.

In January 1599, the Earl of Ormonde had

written to the queen that as a result of forgery in connection with the musters by the Captains, "the strength
certified is far greater than they are in deed. 084 Ormonde's charge was confirmed by Sir Geoffrey Fenton, who,
as "Surveyor of the Queen's possessions in Ireland," conducted a careful survey of the entire Army strength during the months of February and March 1599.

The returns

were completed on March 7, 1599 and Sir Geoffrey reported
83 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 505.
84
C.S.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 455.
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that of 14,000 men who were supposed to be in Ireland by
March 1, 1599, only 10,000 were present, concluding that
Her Majesty was being defrauded "to pay shadows and not
men. 118 5 Essex had insured that the new levies and the Low
Country

contin~ents

were close to full strength; therefore,

the 4000-man shortage came almost entirely out of the
10,000 men "already there" at the time of Essex's appointment, an indication of how greatly the rolls were falsified in Ireland.
Sir Geoffrey Fenton sent his report to Sir Robert
Cecil on March 13, 1599, 86 hoping that this report would
reach Essex in time to arrange to make up the deficiency
before he left England.

However the report did not ar-

rive before the end of March, by which time Essex had already started his journey to the port of Chester.

And by

the time Essex saw the report, it was too late for him to
do any more than notify the Privy Council of the Army's
state, which he did.

On March 14 when confirmation of

this was made, Captain Thomas Reade wrote to Sir Robert
Cecil that the 2000 men who came out of the Low Countries
"do much decay, for there are. many of them sick, and they
do die apace."

He concluded that Essex would be "much

deceived" of the strength of the army of Ireland, when he

B5Ibid. , 488.
86 Ibid., 489.
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mustered it. 8 7

(

r

l

The other tasks which kept Essex occupied from early
January to late March were the problems involved in laying the logistical groundwork for his campaign.

In Tudor

England there was no established governmental machinery to
gather an army, send it

~verseas

and keep it supplied.

After the county officials had gathered their quota of
men

~nd

had sent them off, responsibility for the men and

all the other acoutrements which made up an expedition
fell directly upon the ?rivy Council and the general in
charge.

In practice the general personally had to coor-

dinate and insure the availability of the items which
would be needed on his campaign, particularly, money,
shipping, horses and supplies.
One of the critical problems faced by Essex was the
financing of his campaign.

The late sixteenth century

was a time of rising national states and rising inflation
which culminated in a great depression in 1622.

In

1597

the purchasing power of the p.verage weekly wage fell to a
point lower than at any time between the thirteenth century and the present day.

At the same time, from 1591 to

1603, the government had to levy four times as much taxation as had been levied in the previous thirty-four years
of Elizabeth's reign. 88 Although Elizabeth was extremely
8 7Ibid., 492.

88 Joel Hurstfield, Elizabeth I and the Unity of
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frugal in her expenditures, the cost of running the government in a normal year was up to

~300,000

by the last de-

cade of the sixteenth century.

With Tyrone's rebellion

overall cost skyrocketed from 1595 onward.

In the year

and a half before Essex arrived the cost of the Army in
Ireland amounted to

~250,963,

while the cost of Essex's
campaign was set at ~277,782 in February 1599. 8 9
In order to .finance the coming campaign the Queen
levied subsidies, and even borrowed
of London.

~20,000

.from the city

By December 1598, in dire need of money, the

Queen sought to borrow another

~150,000

from the merchants

and aldermen of London, offering to mortgage ±i5,000 of her
land, and the customs duties of the city for repayment.90
The citizens were annoyed at this forced loan, and in January the Queen let it drop after

~100,000

had been paid

in.91
Throughout his preparation and campaign Essex was
constantly at odds with the Queen and the rest of the
Privy Council over funds.

Once the contracts and salaries

had been provided for, the main point of controversy was
over how much money Essex would be allowed to take with
him .for "extraordinary expenditures," which included cost
(London, 1960), 184; E. A. Abbott, Bacon and Elizabeth (London, 1877), 34.
En~land

89c.s.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 483.
90c.s.P. nome~.s...J597-160l, 130.
9lrbid., 134, 147.

'

:

r
141

of trnnsportation by sea and land for men, horses, munitions, and victuals. 92

11

Extraordinaries'' would also in-

elude the cost of maintaining a headquarters and paying
for any emergency necessities.

rhe Council, rightly not-

1

ing that there was "no superfluity in England, 11 93 agreed
to give Essex ±i5,000.

The Earl on the other hand pointed

out that the previous administration in Ireland, which had
far fewer troops, had spent over

~6,000

on extraordinar-

But the Council remained adamant and re.fused to increase the ±i5,000 allowance.94
ies.

At the same time, because of the generally known corruption in Ireland, particularly on the part of the Irish
Treasurer at Wars, Sir Henry Wallop,95 Essex sought to
sever his accounts from the administration which had gone
before, by having his accounts start afresh as of March 1,

1599.

When Sir Geoffrey Fenton heard of this plan he

wrote to Robert Cecil, stating that while he admired Essex's intention to eliminate corruption and start anew,
the Cro1·m owed much back pay both to the army and the
towns which could not be written off without "several
clamors" being raised by those ·who were owed money. 9 6

92c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 66.
93Ibid., 13.
91.~Ibid.
_ , 94.
95Ibid., 13.

96c.s.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 489.

142

Essex's efforts to get this situation rectified were fruitless and as late as April the .Pr.ivy Council refused to pay
any back debts to the soldiers until Sir Henry
records were sent over and examined.

·~1allop'

s

Unable to receive

satisfaction on the state of financial affairs in Ireland Essex prevailed upo11 the Queen to dismiss Sir Henry
Wallop in March, and to appoint Sir George Carey to the
post of Treasurer in Ireland.

.rhe l'.Ti V-.f COU..."1.Cil' however'

1

still refused to pay any back debts to the army until it
had examined all of Wallop's records,97 a process which
would take months to complete.
Arranging for victuals and clothing was also an immediate concern of Essex.

On January 5 he sent p:roposals to

the Privy Council to have Commissary officers sent to
Bristol, Milford and Chester in order to look after the
gathering of levies and supplies.98 On January 12 he and
the Privy Council signed a contract for the shipping and
delivery of victuals with a London merchant, John Jolls,
who agreed to deliver the supplies to the Irish ports of
Dublin, Newry and Cork.99

After contracting for victuals

Essex next sought to contract for the supply of winter and
summer uniforms which the army would desperately need.

On

January 16 it was resolved to contract with two pro.r.iinent
Ireland, 1599-1600, 13.
9Sibid., 449.
99Ibid., 452.
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merchants of London, Ury Babington and Robert Bromley, for
the supply of uniforms.

The total sum, amounting to

Y+-5,000 was to be given to the new Irish Treasurer at

Wars, Sir George Carey, who in turn would pay the merchants when the uni.forms were delivered.lOO
The task of trying

~o

gather men, horses, money,

ships and supplies was a tedious and involved process
which took the months of January and February, and still
left many problems unresolved.

On March 1, 1599, John

Chamberlain wrote:
The Earl of Essex is crazed either in mind or body.

New difficulties daily arise about his commission,

about the tine of his abode, his entertainment,
and the disposing of offices, and he is so discon- 101
tented as sometimes to question whether he will go.
·
In addition to the problefls in England, Essex had by
this time received ominous reports about the state of affairs in Ire1and. 102 To resolve these problems which
were delaying his Army's departure to Ireland and jeopardizing his expedition, Essex called an emergency meeting
of the Privy Council at his house on March 8, 1599.

Out

of the discussions which took place in this meeting one
may gather a clear picture both of the critical problems
still facing Essex after two months of preparation, and
also of an uncooperative and irresolute attitude on the
,. . . I) • Domestic,
100 0 • 0

1597-1601, 151 •

lOlrb·d
. -2-·' 165.
102!1SS. Salisbury, vol. 9, 93.
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part of the Privy Council.
As the meeting of March 8 opened, the first point
made by Essex was that not enough money had been appropriated to pay for the maintenance of the army in Ireland.

f

The Privy Council however deferred any motion to appropri-

~

ate more money until they had received the next set of
certificates from Ireland, enu.i'Ilerating the state of supplies and finances.

Essex next brought out the fact that

the original victualing contract was only to sustain an
army of 10,000.

His force was expected to number 17,300

and required a great increase in foodstui'fs.

Here the

Council agreed to license merchants to transport more victuals to points designated by Essex.
Essex had received word about the shortage of uniforms in Ireland.

He now asserted that half the troops in

Ireland had not received uniforms, although the two merchants, Babington and Bramley, allegedly had already delivered 10,000 uniforms.

The Council informed Essex that

2,000 uniforms had been delayed on the way and that 1,000
more were due to be sent.

They also assured Essex that

10,000 more summer uniforms would be delivered by June 10.
The Earl further inquired as to how the Council proposed
to make good the deficiency in troops from the Low Country contingent.

The Council assured Essex that they would

request that the Queen raise men .from Kent, Surrey, Sussex
and London.

After thatt however, Sssex would be respon-

r
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sible for arming, clothing and transporting the contingent to Ireland.
The next two items were absolutely crucial to the campai~n,

and concerned the availability of carriage horses

and shipping for the Lough Foyle operation.
the carriage horses

Esse~

available in Ireland.

Regarding

reported that there were few

J.i,urthermore, in the poorly tracked

country/of Ireland and particularly in Ulster, an army
could not march or live without the big carriage horses
to pull their transport.

The Council authorized Essex to

raise a further 100 horses, thereby bringing his total
number of carriage horses authorized to 200, enough to
pull transport wagons for a-force of 1,000 to 1,500 men,
but still far below the requirements for an army of l?,OOO.
Finally, Essex inquired about the want of shipping to
transport the troops to Lough Foyle.

Shipping had been

authorized in order to get his forces to Ireland, but as
of March 8 he lacked enough shipping to get all his troops
and supplies across, let alone to conduct a separate amphibious operation to the north of Ireland with 4100 men.
The Council's reply was that they would defer judgment on
the issue, and con$ider it further at a later time.

In

such an atmosphere of uncertainty regarding key issues,
the March 8 meeting ended.l03
Understandably frustrated, Essex spent the next few

l03c.s.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 167-68.
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weeks supervising the last stages of the embarkation proceedine;s for his 3000 levies at Chester and Milford.

On

March 27 he set forward from Landon to Chester, as crowds
thronged the streets to see him ofr, 104 while a measure
of the popular devotion and expectation was expressed j_n

William Shakespeare's pla.y, Henry V, which opened soon
after Essex's departure:
Were now the general of our gracious empress
As in good time he may -- from Ireland coming
Bringing rebellion broached on his sword
How many would the peaceful city quit
To welcome him.105
- And from Ireland, the Justice of Munster, James Goold,
wrote to Essex and expressed the joy of the English
Establishment at the prospect of the Lord Lieutenant's
arrival, and added his hope that Essex's "famous victory
in mighty Spain shall not be subject to receive blemish
in miserable Ireland. 11106

104
Lacey, Essex, 218.

l05Bowen, Lion and Throne, 67.
l06c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 4.

CHAPrER V

THE SOUTHERH CAMPAIGN
In his own journey to Ireland, Essex experienced an

.

ominous indication of the problem in communication with
which his expedition would have to contend.

After leav-

ing London on March 27, Essex journeyed northwest to
Chester, arriving at the port on April 4. 1 For the next
several days the sea voyage was delayed by "contrary winds"
and "mists so great that all the pilots of Christendom
could not tell how to carry a ship out of the river. 112
Unable to tolerate further delay, Essex ordered the two
ships which would carry his party to move out and hug the
coastline until they reached Beaumaris, on the northwestern
co?st of wales, from whence it was hoped a more favorable
wind could be caught.

In the meantime Essex and his

offi~·

cers rode over the mountain from Chester to Beaumaris,
where they met their ships·· on April 11. 3
The next day Essex sailed for Ireland and arrived at
a point about eight miles north of Dublin at midnight on
April 13. 4
1

As the Earl went ashore, the two ships, which

C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 2.

2 Ibid.

3Ibid., 10.
4JVT1C:.~
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still had their sails "up and full," aJ.most collided.

Ac-

cording to Sir George Carey, the collision would have
sunk the two ships, and.perhaps the campaign as well,.
since the entire treasure to finance the campaign was
being carried on the
to Dublin, and on the

11

Popinjoy."5
15~h

The next day Essex went

he took "the sword and sway of

this unsettled kingdom," after a "grave" sermon preached
by the Bishop of Meath. 6 Sir Anthony Standon, one of Essex's officers, in describing the magnificence of the
ceremony, stated: "it passed all the service that I ever
saw done to any prince·in Christendom. 11 7

Despite the haz-

ards and near catastrophes of the journey, the Earl with
his inevitable flare for· the spectacular, had made an impressive beginning.
Despite the confident appearance engendered by the
majestic ceremonies of his inauguration, Essex was deeply
troubled by the unsettled state of affairs at home and in
Ireland.

From the time he left the Court on March 27 his

letters immediately reflected his concern for supplies of
victuals, apparel, men and money, which apparently were
still in an uncertain state, despite Essex's many conferences with the PriV'J Council. 8 While at Chester, Essex

5~s.P. Ireland 2 1599-1600, 12.
6

MSS.

Sal~~burl, vol. 9, 134.

7Ibid., 144.

8_c_._S_._P_.__I_r_e_l_a_n_q,_ 1599-1600, 1, 4-5, 6, 9, 10.
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had received two dispatches from Ireland which confirmed
his worst fears about the state of the Army.
(f·

The first

dispatch dealt with the sufferings caused by lack of pro-

;;

r

~·

visions, while the second related "idle and miserable
journeys" the c'om.rnanders in Ireland had recently been
conducting with the trooP,s, whereby Essex would find many
of the men "weak and unserviceable 11 when he arrived.9

Another source of immediate concern to Essex was the
caliber of his subordinates.

A general's success is in

many ways dependent on the performance of his subordinates,
and this was particularly true in Elizabethan Ireland.
Because of the difficulties in travel and communications,
the Lord Lieutenant could not easily travel to any area of
crisis, analyze the situation, and give timely guidaDce.
He needed commanders and representatives in the provinces
who could make sound decisions, use their initiative, and
carry through independent actions with a minimum of supervision.

In this respect Essex was severely handicapped.

The English officials in Ireland contained no personalities of great stature.

The Irish Council, who were to

advise Essex, were a weak-willed and cowed group of individuals who would repeatedly demonstrate their mediocrity.
In Munster, the President, Sir Thomas Norreys, had neither
the means nor the disposition to pursue an active campaign

9~.'

10.
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on his own.

Additionally, he was suffering from an ill-

ness which would take his life in July 1599.

In Connaught,

Lord Governor Sir Conyers Clifford was an enthusiastic and
capable politician and administrator, but he had military
failings which had already led to one setback in Connaught
and would soon lead to another.

Even the E.Brl of Orcronde,

though a dependable personality, was more concerned with
protecting his immediate estates in Kilkenny and the Pale,
and preferred not to venture out of his area. 10
As for the officers in his army, the Lord Lieutenant
had many enthusiastic hot bloods, but few men of sor>histicated military background.

Prominent individuals, who in

the past had demonstrated their military ability--Lord
Mountjoy, Sir Walter Raleigh, Lord Admiral Howard, Sir
Francis Vere--remained epart from the Irish enterprise
because of their rivalry with the Lord Lieutenant.
In Essex's circle, the only persons in whom he had
confidence were the Earl of Southampton and Sir Christopher Blount, and Essex would experience considerable difficulty in attempting to utilize their services.

Southamp-

ton was appointed General of the Horse, a position suited
to his dynamic personality, but unfortunately he had displeased

C:'~ueen

Elizabeth by making her lady-in-waiting, Eli-

zabeth Vernon, pregnant, and then marrying the girl a:-:;ainst
10c.s.P. Ireland, 1598-99, 258.
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the ciueen' s wishes. 11

When Elizabeth found out about

Southampton's appointment she ordered Essex to send him
home. 12 The Lord Lieutenant, needing this very talented
officer, avoided this directive of the Queen's, and in
.fact managed to keep Southampton with him u._11til the end
of the

despite.periodic warnings from Elizabeth.

campai~n,

Regarding Sir Christopher B1ount, Essex had asked the
Queen to appoint him Marshal of the Army, the second most
important post in the Army.

At first the Privy Council

wrote back that Elizabeth had refused, whereupon Essex
complained
hand. 111 3

th<~t

he was being sent out "maimed before-

The ·~ueen eventually relented in regard to

Blount's appointment, but refused to make him a member of
the Irish Council, because as the Privy Council explained,
"we conceived it rather to be a thing fixed in Her Hajesty's mind ••• thnt she doth not very well approve the gentelman's sufficiency to do her service. 1114

This hostile

attitude on the part of the Queen was undoubtedly prompted
by the fact that Blount had married Essex's widowed mother
Lettice, who had incurred the Queen's hatred by taking the
Earl of Leicester away from Elizabeth.

Even after much

further haggling Blount was not ad:mi tted to the Irish
11 Lacey, Essex, 217.

. . . Ireland,

i2 0 ....::;
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l3Ibid., 1.
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Ibid., 29.
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Council, and was thereby placed in the awkward position of
commanding officers who were honored with Council membership.15

\./hen Blount was :lncapac.i.:ta.M at the end of August,

Essex wrote to the Privy Council, "I have with me none
fit to succeed him, but must myself do his office and
mine own. 1116
Equally distressing was the spectacular success
achieved by Tyrone and his rebels during the months after
the Yellow Ford, ,and during the time Essex was preparing
his campaign.

Although Tyrone had been unable to follow

up his victory on the Yellow Ford, due to his deficiencies
in munitions, the Irish leader had made great progress in
all parts of Ireland.

Ulster had been saved from invasion

and, except for the towns of Carrickfergus, Newry and
Carlingford, the province had been abandoned by the English survivors who now cringed in the Pale around Dublin
expecting Tyrone's new offensive at any time. 1 7
In Leinster, Tyrone's allies, the O'Mores, took
Philipstown and Athy, while one of Tyrone's captains,
Redmond Burke, seized the Earl of Ormonde's castle of
Cruminagh on the Shannon River.

In Munster, Tyrone had

set up James Fitzthomas as the new Earl of Desmond, and
the Geraldine subjects rallied to their new and handsome
l5Ibid., 5.
16Ibid., 137.
l7Silke, Kinsale, 53.
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leader.

A number of gentlemen in Munster, principally

Edmund Fitzgibbon, Lord Mountgarret and Lord Cahir had
joined the rebel forces.

Together they swept away all

the New English settlers, including the noted poet Edmund
Spencer, who had been settled on confiscated Geraldine
land since the great

reb~llion

of 1584.

By the time of

Essex's arrival the English held only strongpoints in
Munster, with Sir George Carew in Mallow, Sir Thomas Norris at Cork, and the Earl of Ormonde defending Kilkenny
and Tipperary. 18
At the same time, Hugh O'Donnell, Tyrone's principal
ally, kept up an unceasing series of raids in Connaught,
climaxed by the taking of Ballymote Castle.

North of

Galway the English held only garrisons at Boyle, Tulsk,
Roscommon and the castle of Sligo, as O'Donnell threatened
to break the precarious English line of strongpoints and
open a western passage down to Munster. 1 9

The total rebel

strength, according to the Earl of Ormonde and the Irish
Council, exceeded 20,000 fighting men, distributed as follows:

in Ulster, 8,922; in Leinster, 3,230; in Munster,
4,555; in Connaught, 3,290. 20 The exactness of the estimates is suspect; however, it does seem to accurately
18 Ibid., 52-54.
19

20

r~i(~., 53-54.
C.S.P. Ireland,

~599-1600,

14.
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reflect the relative distribution of Irish forces.

With

the exception of Tyrone's personal army in Ulster most of
the rebels were indifferently armed, but nonetheless still
posed a formidable threat.

For the two weeks fqllowing his arrival Essex consulted with the Irish Council and appraised himself of
the details of the army's situation.

On April 28, having

arrived at certain conclusions, Essex sent his first detailed report to the Privy Council.

This letter, repre-

senting the official position of Essex and the Irish
Council concerning the state of affairs in Ireland, decisively influenced the course of the entire campaign, and
therefore deserves detailed consideration. 21
The principal assertion of Essex and the Irish Council was that an invasion of Ulster at this time was prevented by certain insurmountable difficulties.

In Ulster

there was no grass or forage to be had for horses, nor
would there be any available "till summer be further advanced."

By the same token, the arni.y would have to take

a great number of "beeves" along with it to have a mobile
supply of meat.

However, the cattle were still weak and

lean from the winter and, like the horses, would be unable
to find forage in the northern province.

The alternative

to taking cattle along would be to have the army sustain
2lcontents of the following letter are taken from
C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-160Q, 17-20.
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itself entirely with "dry victuals," pulled in carts by
the huge carriage horses over the poor roads.

A survey

of carriage horses indicated that there were not even half
the number present to carry the three-month's supply of
food which an invading army would require.

Essex had

raised 200 carriage horses in England before he left, but
had to leave them behind because of insufficient shipping.
At the time of his writing they had still not arrived in
Ireland because, as he supposed, "of the contrariety of
the wind."
In view of the difficulties with horses and beeves,
the Irish Council estimated that the Army would not be
able to move north "before the.midst of June, or the beginning of July next."

In the meantime, Essex intended to

move into Leinster and "prosecute" the rebels there, in
order to bring back under English control this richest
part of Ireland.

Then after dealing with Leinster the

Earl intended to go on to Waterford in order to meet with
Sir Thomas Norreys, the President of Munster, and confer
with him on the action to be taken in that province.
Another crucial factor affecting the Ulster strategy
was the lack of shipping that Essex would need to

imple~

ment the Lough Foyle expedition, which he and the Privy
Council had agreed upon.

He requested that the Privy

Council send him "competent shipping to transport thither
[Lough Foyle] 4,000 foot and 100 horse, with their victuals,

r
156

munitions and all other necessaries."

It would be neces-

sary to transport almost the entire force at once since
intelligence reports indicated that Tyrone labored "to
give some impediment to their landing."

Since the shipping

was not now available, the Lough Foyle expedition also
would have to be held in.abeyance; however, Essex expected
that the Privy Council would have the shipping ready by
June.
Turning from strategy to the immediate problems of
maintaining the Army, Essex's first concern again focused
on the lack of carriage horses, the importance of which
he emphasized at three different points in his report.
The country, he stated, was "unable to furnish carriagehorses for this present journey of Leinster, and far more
unable to supply the great expedition to Ulster."

He

therefore requested that "200 carriage horse at the least,"
in addition to the 200 horses already on the way, be gathered and sent from England so that Essex could move his
army and its supplies.

He also requested that the Privy

Council take care to insure that the first batch of 2,000
reinforcements reach Ireland in June as scheduled, so that
they would be available for the Lough Foyle expedition.
Essex reminded the Council to send out the supplies
of victuals and money, "according to the conditions agreed
upon between such of your Lordships as were Commissioners,
and me. 11

Specifically the Council was to send a three•·
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month advance supply of food and money; but now, two of
the three-montm'supply of victuals--starting on March 1,
1599-- had expired and he had still not heard of the impending arrival of the next three-months' supply.

Fur-

thermore, the Privy Council had only signed contracts
for the provisioning of

~0,000

men, and he urgently re-

quested that the Council amend those contracts to provide
for an army of at least 14,000.
The final subject of the dispatch was the strength
of the Army.

Essex found upon his arrival that the list

strength, for which the captains drew pay, numbered
19,000 men.

However, on examination Essex concluded that

the real number was only.16,000 and therefore he cashiered
certain captains and redistributed their men to other companies.
Along with the above formal report, which Essex and
the Irish Council sent to the Privy Council, Essex also
sent a private letter to Sir Robert Cecil, deploring the
state of affairs in Ireland and complaining that he "found
all things so in confusion as it hath been an extreme toil
to bring things to that pass at which they are. 1122

The

lack of shipping was keeping many men and horses from coming over to Ireland.

He had "displeased multitudes" of

captains and officers by examining the list strength of
the Army and forcing captains to reflect accurately the
22 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 20.
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number of men in their units.

But as for the present

Essex promised:
••• when I have given some direction to Munster,
and settled Leinster in some reasonable state,
I will into Ulster, if you supply me out of England according to the agreements, which you know
was (sic) to have three months victual and treasure still beforehand; for with a less proportion we cannot go tqither.23
Regarding strategy, with the original plan forestalled,
Essex chose the better of several options.

One alternative

was to simply wait in the Pale until the arrival of the
ships and carriage horses, which would not take place
before June at the least, and which, based on past experience could take even longer.

Another alternative was to

take whatever troops could be supported by the carriage
horses available, and invade Ulster immediately.

Since

the 200 carriage horses and the available lighter horses
could only support a mobile force of about 1500 or 2000
men, Essex would be forced to try to seek out and confront
Tyrone with a much diminished force.

Furthermore without

the Lough Foyle expedition, which would force Tyrone to
fight or be crushed between two converging forces, the
Irish leader could resort to his old tactic of avoiding
combat altogether while Essex's force wore itself out.
Without a secondary effort at Lough Foyle to tie down
Irish forces, Tyrone, if he so desired, would also be free
to concentrate his entire Army along Essex's route of

...
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advance.

The outcome of any battle would have been uncer-

tain at best, considering the untrained state of the new
English levi.es, the demoralized condition of the old Irish
veterans, and the unsavory nature of the Low Country contingent.
The third alternative, which Essex chose, was to garrison the Ulster borders to keep Tyrone pinned up, place
other garrisons in the weakly-held rebel territories in
Connaught and the Pale, take all the troops which could be
supported by the supply horses available, and then sweep
tllil:'ough Leinster and northern Munster.

\.Jhen the horses

and shipping arrived in June, Essex could then pursue the
original attack on Ulster with an army which had gained
some cohesiveness and combat experience.

As a final jus-

tification, Essex received word that Tyrone was considering an invasion of Munster with 3000 or 4000 men in the
near future to render assistance to his ally, Ed.ward Gybbon, the White Knight. 24

Therefore a journey through

Leinster and :Munster at least offered the possibility of
stopping the invasion of Munster and of eliminating several of Tyrone's allies in the south.
Having decided upon his course of action Essex distributed his forces to implenent his strategy.

By April

28, when Essex sent a detailed strength report to the

Privy Council, the Army in Ireland was located as follows:
24

Ibid., 8, 20.
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in Connaught, Sir Conyers Clifford had 3000 foot and 175
cavalry; in Leinster, the Earl of Ormonde corm.anded some
2500 foot and 100 horse; while in Munster, Sir Thomas Nor-

reys disposed of 3450 foot and 200 horse.

In order to

keep Tyrone secured in Ulster, and to protect the northern
approaches into the Pale, Essex placed over 2000 more
troops in the following areas: in Carr1ckfergus, Sir Arthur Chichester had four infantry companies and one cavalry company; Sir Samuel Bagenal, brother of the English
Marshal slain at the Yellow Ford, occupied Newry and the
surrounding area with eight infantry companies and one
cavalry company; Dundalk on the northern boundary of the
Pale was garrisoned by Lord Crumwell with four infantry
companies and one cavalry company; and further south Ardee
was held by one infantry company under Captain Bingley.
After placing one other foot company in Dublin, Essex was
left with 4950 infantry and 450 cavalry for his campaign
into Leinster. 2 5
However, between April 28 and May 9 Essex decided
that no more

th~n

3000 foot and 300 horse could be sus-

tained on the southern campaign by the number of supply
horses available.

Essex therefore disposed of a further

1950 infantry and 150 horse as follows: Sir Henry Harring-

ton took five infantry companies and one cavalry company
2 5MSS. Salisburi, vol. 9, 143-46; C.S.P. Ireland,

1599-1600' 32. .
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into Wicklow; Ardee was reinforced with two foot companies
and some cavalry under Sir John Shelton; while the remaining fourteen companies were distributed throughout the
Pale border areas. 26
In the meantime the Privy Council was writing letters
of its own to Essex, crystallizing their position and replying to the Earl's first dispatch.

The first letter of

the Privy Council was sent on April 17, two days after
Essex arrived in Ireland.

It began with an ominous state-

ment:- "The main points and pillars that must uphold this
service [the Irish Campaign], at least for anything to be
provided for by us, are these five: men, munition, apparel,
lendings [money], and victuals. 112 7
In this statement the Council was defining the areas
for which it would accept responsibility.

Significantly

absent from the Council's list were two critical items
necessary for the prosecution of the campaign: shipping
and horses.

Essex had tried to get the Council to give

him affirmative support on the shipping for Lough Foyle,
but in his emergency meeting on March 8 before he left for
Ireland, the Council's only answer was to say that shipping for Lough Foyle was "to be further considered of. 1128
Now, in this letter of April 17 the council was implying
26 Ibid.

27 C.S.P.
.
Ireland, 1599-1600, 13.
28 c.s.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 168.
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that shipping and horses were Essex's problems, which he
would have to solve.
As for the five items which the Council considered
their responsibility, they discussed each point and showed
their determination to meet their obligation, asserting
that all the agreed-upon.supplies of munitions, money,
apparel and victuals had been provided for.

Regarding the

first batch of 2000 reinforcements, the Council suggested
that Essex try to recruit the English and Anglo-Irish who
had been ejected from their homes by the rebellious Irish.
Such a recruitment would save a great deal of money.

Fin-

ally, the Council promised that they would do their utmost
to root out corruption from their areas of responsibility~
The Privy Council did, in fact, take measures to stop
corruption.

On April 24 they sent orders to the Treasurer

at Wars, the Master of the Ordnance, the Mustermaster in
Ireland and the Comptroller of the Victuals, directing
those key individuals to send a report every two months,
accounting for every item received or used, and the status
of the overall supply system.30

To discourage corruption

the Council made an example of Sir Henry Wallop, the previous Treasurer in Ireland, who died on the day Essex
arrived, and who had apparently stolen at least bl4,000
2 9cc.S.P. Ireland, 1299-1600, 14.
30ibid., 15.
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during his tenure.3 1

As punishment, the Council resolved

to have his lands and goods seized, despite the pleas of
his son, who complained that the family and many servants
would be ruined.3 2 The Council therefore intended to
cover itself and meet its obligations so that, as they
announced in their letteD, "not one man living" would "be
able to cast one spot of just imputation on them," if
deficiencies arose in their areas of responsibility.33
On May 8, the day before Essex left for the Leinster
campaign, the Council drafted a reply to Essex's first.
dispatch, a reply which left little doubt as to the sinister attitude of the Privy Council.

The Council stated

that Her Majesty, in view of the circumstances, approved
his distribution of forces and the proposed campaign in
Leinster.34 But as to his request for 2000 reinforcements,
there was a difference of opinion as to when they would be
due.

Essex assumed that since his official tenure began

on March 1, 1599, and since the Queen had agreed to send
2000 men every three months, the first batch of reinforcements should arrive on June 1.

The Council, however, had

received Essex's certificate of April 28 of .A:rmy strength
which showed a list strength of 16,000 men.
3libid., 7.

32 Ibid., 23-34.
33Ibid., 14.
3 4 Ibid., 28.
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since Essex had the full strength of 16,000 men on April
28, the Council did not feel obligated to send the 2000
reinforcements until three months after April 28, which
would be July 28.
until the

Pri~J

Even this levy would not be authorized

Council had heard if Essex had been able

to recruit volunteers from within Ireland.
Regarding Essex's request for shipping to transport
the 4000 foot and 100 horse to Lough Foyle, the Council
asserted that "his Lordship cannot be so unprovided with
barks in Ireland, as to be driven to fetch all shipping
from England for such a service. 11 35

The Council reminded

Essex of the great sums Her Majesty had spent in transporting the Army and horses to Ireland.

Therefore, if the

Earl could procure some proportion of the shipping in Ireland, the Council "might" then provide the rest from England.

After all the difficulties which Essex had exper-

ienced in attempting to gather shipping for 3000 levies
from England, difficulties which delayed his initial depap.
ture for over a month, it was an insidious suggestion on
the part of the Privy Council that Essex should try to
gather shipping in Ireland to transport 4000 men to Lough
Foyle.3 6

This is especially true because contemporary

naval records, which were available to the Privy Council,
35Ibid.

36 Ibid.
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revealed that few ships were in Ireland at the time.37
In any case, in view of the cost of hiring ships, the
Council would not make final arrangements for contracting
transport vessels until the Leinster rebels had been suppressed and concrete preparations made for Lough Foyle.3 8
As to Essex's requeqt for horses, the Privy Council
expressed surprise that the Earl was asking for an extraordinary allotment of 200 more carriage horses, in addition to those already promised, without having scored any
success against the rebel.

The Queen was expecting a re-

turn for her great investments and nothing had so far been
achieved, and yet Essex was asking for further expenditure.
The Council reluctantly agreed to his request, commenting,
"if it be so necessary, and cannot otherwise be supplied,
we will then move Her Majesty that they may be provided
and the charge borne by the checks. 11 39

Unaware of the

Privy Council's answer to his requests, which would not
arrive until the end of the month, Essex moved out on his
Leinster campaign on May 9, 1599.

Essex's original plan was to march inland from Dublin to Carlow, relieving the fort of !1aryborough on the
way.

From Carlow he would march south to Waterford,
37Henry, "The Earl of Essex and Ireland," 9.
38 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 28.
39Ibid., 29.
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confer with the President of Munster, and then march back
up along the coast through Wicklow to Dublin.

The entire
journey was expected to take about three weeks. 4
From

°

the beginning, however, there were problems with the horses and the cavalry force was made up of only those horses, drawn from all the troops, which appeared fit to survive the journey.

Carriage horses, and even lighter pack

horses, were in such short supply that only one half of
the Army's provisions could be carried at one time!

Thus

the carriage horses had to make two trips from Dublin to
the Army's first stopping point at Naas. 41 From Naas the
Army moved towards Athy, leaving behind two companies at
Naas to guard one half of the victuals which could not be
transported by the horses.
Rebel Irish soldiers showed themselves as soon as the
march started; but despite intermittent skirmishing which
occurred, they did not prevent Essex from reaching Fallacory, a short distance from Athy, on the 11th of May.
There Essex met the Earl of Ormonde, who joined the Lord
Lieutenant with 700 foot and 200 cavalry, and two captured
rebel leaders, Viscount Mountgarrett and Lord Cahir.

The

two rebels humbly submitted to Essex on their knees, confessing their faults and begging Her Majesty's forgiveness.
After admonishing these individuals, Essex forced them to
40
Mss. Sali~bur~, vol. 9, 212-13.
41
c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 37.
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accompany his army to Athy.

At the approach of Essex's

army, James Fitz Piers, who co1Il.Il1anded the rebel-held castle of Athy, surrendered to Essex, and was turned over to
the Provost Marshal.

On the 13th and 14th of I1ay the

army waited in the vicinity of Athy until supplies could
be brought up from Naas •. So far the progress was moving
according to plan, but the lack of carriage horses was
causing great inconvenience.

In order to move faster

after· taking Athy, Essex had to order his men to carry
the next four days' provisions on their backs, while the
horses were used to carry relief supplies into Maryborough
fort. 42
After seizing the castle of Athy, Essex started distributing his force to secure his line of march, sending

350 men to Carlow, 750 men into Offally, 350 horse and
foot to garrison O'Dempsey's castle, and 500 foot, 50
cavalry, 150 horses and great quantities of supply to Maryborough.

Essex accompanied the relief force into Mary-

borough whereupon the commander of the fort presented Essex with an important prisoner, Captain Nugent, one of
Tyrone's best subordinates.
~,000

The rebels offered Essex

sterling to spare Nugent's life, but Essex declined

the offer and turned Nugent over to Sir Francis Rush, the
commander, instructing that Nugent be executed and his

r
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head set above the gate. 4 3
By now the rebels were showing themselves in great
numbers and attempting to draw the English into a skirmish in the woods.

Some of the gentlemen volunteers were

only too happy to accept the taunting Irish challenges,
and Essex had to order these hotheads not to leave the
Army formation.

On May 16, in one such skirmish near

Ballyknocken, Lord Grey disobeyed his superior, the Earl
of Southampton, and charged right up to the treeline,
endangering his life and those who followed him.

For this

indiscretion, Grey was sentenced to one night's imprisonment by Essex, a humiliating experience for a member of the
nobility.

After the incident, Lord Grey was the implac-

able enemy of Essex and the Earl of Southampton, and would
later play a significant part in the intrigue surrounding
Essex's trial. 44
With the Irish so close and in such numbers, Essex
had to continue his advance in tactical formation.

At the

very head of the army marched a reconnaissance group,
aptly named the "forlorn hope," which consisted of 40 musketeers and 20 calivers.

Following them was the vanguard

composed of a regiment of infantry.

Next in order were the

baggage.train and part of the cavalry, the main "battle"
of regimental strength, the bulk of the cavalry, a
4

3Ibid., 38.

44 Harrington, Nugae Antiquae, 271.
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rearguard of a few foot companies, and finally a detachment of 30 cavalry called the "forlorn rear. 114 5

To pro-

tect the flanks were wings of musketeers, supported by
pikemen and calivermen who would relieve the musketeers
if the enemy got too close. 46 In .this formation Essex
approached the pass of C&shel on May 17, held by "great
multitudes" of Irish rebels, who were determined to stop
the Army's advance.

The pass was about 500 yards long,

wooded on both sides, with a hill on one side, a bog on
the other, and an enemy entrenchment across the far exit.
Essex debated as to whether they should go around the
mountain or force the pass, and concluded that "it was
necessary to teach the world that Her .Majesty's army could
and would in all places make way for itself. 1147 A force of
500 musketeers, supported by pikes and calivers, assaulted
straight into the pass.

At the same time wings of shot

and pikes held the pass on either side and secured the
woodlines as the main assault force advanced.

Om section

of the vanguard attacked and captured the trench on the
far end of the pass, while other sections secured the
sides of the exit of the pass.

The cavalry thereupon

charged straight through and seized a hill on the far side.
In the meantime the baggage sections moved into the pass
4 5Ibi.d.

46

, 273.

C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 39.

4 7Ibid.

l?O
covered by the rear guard.

The Irish attacked from all

sides, and on all sections of the Army, including the rear
guard, but were repulsed on every quarter as the Army
methodically cleared the area.

None of the English bat-

tle formations were broken during the operation and the
total loss amounted to two officers and four men killed
and two officers and seven men wounded.

The rebel loss

was "far greater," and their force scattered and fled,
"glad to trust to their lightness and swiftness. 1148
After the encounter at Cashel pass Essex's army continued unopposed, although the enemy hung about on all
sides and occasionally skirmished with the cavalry.

On

May 18 the Army approached another tight pass leading to
Ballyragget Castle but the enemy offered no resistance,
and Essex occupied this important strategic position without incident.

After placing 100 men in the castle the Earl

then pushed on towards Clonmell, where he settled his Army
down for a much needed rest from the "foul marches" which
they had endured on this first phase of the Leinster journey.

Essex himself, however, went on to Kilkenny, where

he summoned the President of Munster to meet bim, and from
where, on May 20, he sent a journal of his proceedings and
a personal letter to the Privy Council. 4 9
The first ten days of his march had been a sobering
48 Ibid.

4 9Ibid., 36.
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experience, and a rude introduction to the nature of the
problem he faced.

In his letter he concluded that the war

was no ordinary rebellion which could be lightly and
quickly snuffed out; instead the rebellion was "like to
exercise both our faculties that do manage it, and Her
Majesty's patience that DJ.Ust maintain it."50

Essex's re-

cent confrontation with the Irish fighting men led him to
conclude:
••• this people ·against whom we. fight hath able
bodies, good use of the arms they carry, boldness
enough to attempt, and quickness in apprehending
any advantage they see offered them. Whereas our
new and common sort of men have neither bodies,
spirits, nor practice of arms, like the others. 51
Essex further explained that the English advantage in cavalry ancl

OL.. derl;y

formations was lost; when the rebels i:e-

treated into woods and bogs.

The English "men of quality,"

however, had great courage and spirit, too much at times,
and it grieved Essex to see them hazard their lives against
"rogues and naked beggers. 11 5 2 The volunteer men of quality were now the very heart of the Army and Essex intended
to husband their lives with all care.
After dwelling on the circumstances of the last ten
days, Essex next discussed his future plans.

Originally

he had intended to spend only three weeks on the southern
journey, but now circumstances convinced him to carry
50ibid.
5llbid.

52 Ibid.

172
the campaign further into Munster.

The I)resident of Mun-

ster and his Council had informed Essex of the strength
and pride of the rebels, who possessed a well-organized
Army and had fortified several castles.

The English for-

ces assigned to Munster were incapable of taking the castles, or conducting a

ca~paign

to confront the main rebel

force under the new Earl of Desmond.

After considering

the situation, Essex decided that since he was now in the
area it would be best to seek to eliminate the southern
rebel forces completely.

Thereafter, "with more strength

and less distraction of mind," he would be able to pursue
"the main,service 11 53 of invading Ulster.
Considering the situation which Essex found upon approaching Waterford, his decision to continue the campaign
into Munster seemed to be the most sensible course of action.

The rebel force numbered a cohesive army of 4000

men in Munster, while the English army there was militarily weak and morally intimidated.

If Essex had adhered to

his original plan and returned directly to Dublin, he would
certainly have had to leave numerous garrisons and detachments to guard against the Munster rebels.

On the other

hand if now he could pursue the campaign into Munster and
defeat the rebel forces, then only a minimal number of
troops would be needed to hold t-hat province while the
bulk of the Arny invaded Ulster.
53Ibid. , 37.
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was a probability that the rebels might not fight, but
there was also an equally good probability that an invasion by the Lord Lieutenant would cause the rebels to submit when confronted by the Army.

Having concluded his

conferences with the Munster officials, and having decided
on this new course of

ac~ion,

Essex rejoined his Army at

Clonmell on May 23 • .54
The objective of this new extended campaign was to
sweep through Munster by way of Waterford, Limerick, Cork
and then bayk to Waterford again.

In addition to the

prospect of confronting and defeating the main rebel force,
the route of march offered Essex the opportunity to accomplish several secondary goals.

In marching from Waterford

to Limerick Essex would be able to attack Cahir castle,
reputed to be the strongest fortress in Ireland, and the
cornerstone of rebel strength in Munster.

At Limerick,

the natural meeting place for Munster and Connaught officials, Essex intended to meet with Sir Conyers Clifford,
the President of Connaught, to discuss and plan their
joint operations for the invasion of Ulster in July or
August.

Finally, by traveling down to Cork and then back

up the Coast to Waterford, Essex sought both to examine
the coastal defenses and also to strengthe? the area
against any threatened Spanish landing, rumors of which
were ever-present.55
54Harrincton, l\~ugae Antiguae, 275.

55MSs. Salisbury, vol. 9, xviii-xxiv.
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To assist in the campaign, Sir Thomas Norreys, Presi-

dent of Munster, was instructed to join Essex with all the
forces available, about 1000 men, along with additional
supplies of food and munitions which the new campaign would
require.5 6

Accordingly, on May 25 the two forces linked

up a short distance from "Waterford, and began the march
to Cahir castle and Limerick.

The march would be slower

since many supply horses had been used to sustain garrisons, like Har,yborough, and much of the remaining supplies
would have to be carried by the men themselves or by porters!

Particularly troublesome were two artillery pieces,

a cannon and a smaller culverin, which Sir Thomas Norreys
had been instructed to take along for the attack on Cahir
Castle.

Weak bridges, lack of draught horses, and wet

roads often made it necessary for the men to manhandle
the two weapons in order to get them from Waterford to
their objective.57
On May 29 Essex's army approached Cahir castle.

The

fortress was situated on a rock in the middle of the Suir
river, and was protected by strong walls and great towers,
a fortress in which "40 men might easily" hold "out against
4000. 11 58 Essex had taken Lord Cahir along with him as
hostage, since that Irish peer had promised in his original
56.t"IDS. Carew, vol.

3, 301.

5?H
.... enry, "The Earl of Essex and Ireland, II 11.
58l"IS8. Carew, vol.

3, 303.
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submission to turn the castle over to the English.

The

Earl apparently had little faith in Lord Cahir's influence,
since he went to such trouble to bring the cannon along,
but nonetheless when he reached Cahir castle, he gave
Lord Cahir an opportunity to induce those within to surrender.

Essex sent Sir

~enry

Davers and Lord Cahir to

parley with the rebel garrison, commanded by the latter's
brdther.

Davers reported back that the rebels were confi-

dent and resolved to hold the castle to the end, adding
that "Cahir himself was insolently and disgracefully used
by those who came out t9 parley. 11 59

The confidence of the

garrison was undoubtedly bolstered by the presence of ·!;he
main rebel army of Munster, now numbering some 5000 men,
which remained in the immediate vicinity across the Suir
river. 60
Essex thereupon placed the castle under siege, moving
the cannon and the culverin within 50 paces of the wall,
and preparing four veteran companies with ladders and
scaffolds to make the assault.

The cannon methodically

blasted "great breaches" in the walls all day on May 30
and the assault was scheduled to take place the next morning.

Cut off from all aid, and apparently no longer con-

fident about their ability to stand off the impending attack, the 100-man garrison sought to sally out at night to
59Ibid., 302.
GOibid.

1?6
cut their way free through Essex's lines.

Their surprise

attack failed and most of the rebels were killed, while
the castle was immediately occupied by two alert English
captains and their men.

The next day Essex placed a gar-

rison of 100 men in the castle, commanded by Captain
George Carye, who had be~n wounded "in the face. 1161
·With the rest of the army, Essex continued the march
unopposed, arriving at Limerick on June 4.

For the next

four days Essex rested his troops and conferred with Sir
Conyers Clifford about the state of affairs in Connaught
and plans for the future prosecution of the war in that
province and in Ulster. 62

Essex and Cliffo:;-d apparently
i·

made the ini.tial decision to conduct an amphibious operation by moving men and supplies from Galway to Sligo.
From Sligo a major assault would be mounted on Ballyshannon, the key fort and passage leading into the O'Donnell
part of Ulster. 6 3 After the conference Clifford was dispatched back to his province to begin his preparations,
while Essex resupplied his army from the city stores.
On June 8, Essex continued his journey, moving out
of Limerick towards Askeyton, an English garrison which
needed to be resupplied.

The Irish rebels under the pre-

tended Earl of Desmond boasted that they would block his
61 Ibid., 303-04.
62Moryson, Itinerary, 238.
6 3Henry, "The Earl of Essex and Ireland," 12.
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passage, and at Adare Desmond's army, "betwixt 2000 and
3000 men, with five or six ensigns flying," emerged from
the bogs and woods and challenged the English forces.
When the English advanced, the Irish faded back into the
woods and let the army pass.

The next day, while Essex's

force moved through another wooded pass, a fierce skirmish
occurred, causing 26 English casualties and 100 Connaught
"Bonnaughts" to be slain. 64 The slow and tedious march
continued as Essex moved down to Cork and back along the
coast towards 'Waterford.

The Irish skirmished constantly

with the cavalry and flank guards as the Army moved along.
They taunted the English and "breathed out great vaunts of
wonders they would do,'' but they refused to close for any
decisive clash. 6 5
By the end of May, the wet climate and harsh living
conditions both on the march and in garrison were beginning to have an effect.

In the field, the troops subsis-

ted on water and raw meat from the cattle which they had
b~ought

along, slept on wet ground in the same damp boots

day after day, and began to fall sick in great numbers
from "heat and colds." 66

Those who remained stationed in

garrisons fared·little better than the troops with Essex.
On May 28 Sir George Carey reported to the Privy Council
6l+M"'Q
db,..1.

carew, vol. 3, 304.

6 5Ibid., 305.
66Harrington,
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that over 300 sick men had already been sent back to Dublin from the outlying garrisons. 6 7 Those who could not
get back to Dublin to recuperate simply died, as in the
garrison of Roscommon in Connaught, where, out of a force
of 150 troops, some 60 men died of sickness, "some as
lusty men as an:y came out of England. 1168
With the days slipping by and his army suffering from
dysentery, which afflicted the Lord Lieutenant as well as
his men, Essex decided that he could delay no longer in
Munster.

On

June 18 at Youghal, Essex called a conference

of Munster officials to ascertain what forces would be
required for the defense of Munster and what plans should
be followed in his absence.

Regarding forces, the Presi-

dent of Munster estimated that he would need 800 foot and
50 horse added to his men to prosecute the war.

Essex

thereupon assigned him 900 foot and 50 cavalry, "all chosen companies commanded by able and gallant commanders. 1169
The Earl thereupon ordered the President of Munster
to make Youghal, because of its central location between
Cork and Waterford, his main headquarters to prosecute the
rebels in Munster and to guard against Spanish landings.
Furthermore Norreys was to "place a garrison in every
walled town" and to place any rebels who submitted

67

.
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directly under the supervision of the neares·t garrison
commander.

Finally, Norreys was to conduct a campaign

to deprive the rebels of food, by destroying everything
which could not be defended by the Government forces.?O
With Norreys so instructed and greatly reinforced, Essex
left Youghal on June 20 and continued his journey along
the coast via Waterford and Wicklow to Dublin.
With the garrisons and reinforcements which Essex
had left along his march, and with the casualties due to
battle and sickness, Essex's original force was now reduced to 1200 men.

However, while his fighting men had

dwindled, the camp followers increased until they numbered well over 3000.

These were composed of horseboys,

porters and many other "unserviceable people," who had
joined Essex's forces for protection, and whom the Earl
felt a responsibility to look after.7 1

Consequently,

while the army was considerably smaller, it could not
march any faster due to the increased number of refugees.

As for the rebel forces in Munster, once Essex had passed
through Waterford he saw little of Desmond's rebel army,
which stayed back in Munster to harass Norreys' forces at
Youghal.
While Essex's army plodded up the Irish coastline,
meeting little opposition, one of his subordinates, Sir
?Oibid., 307-08.
71

~.'
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Henry Harrington, suffered a disastrous defeat in Wicklow.

Before Essex had left Dublin for his Leinster journey, he
had appointed Sir Henry Harrington, a member of the Irish
Privy Council who had governed the county of Wicklow, to
take a force back into that cow1ty and defeat the rebels
under Phelim McFegh, and.their allies the O'Tooles.

Orig-

inally Harrington was to have had 700 foot, of whom 300
were to have been Low Country veterans,7 2 and a force of

50 cavalry under his nephew, Sir Charles Montague.

Addi-

tionally Harrington was to have had Sir Alexander Radcliffe, an experienced soldier, to be his second-in-com[·

mand.

However, as Essex prepared for the Leinster journey

he resolved to take all the experienced soldiers with him,
including Radcliffe.

Sir Henry Harrington was left with

only 550 foot, composed of four "new" companies of raw
recruits, and one company of foot who were all Irish, "most
of them lately come from the rebels."73

The only depend-

able group were the fifty cavalrymen under Montague.
With this uncertain force Harrington moved back to
his government in County

wicklol~,

determined to suppress

the rebels and Phelim McFeagh and the O'Tooles and "other
rogues of their consort. 11 74 Arriving at Wicklow, Harrington settled his troops into garrisons and conducted some

72 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 68.
73Ibid., 81.

?4 Ibid.,
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. limited training for the next few weeks.

On May 28, Har-

rington suddenly moved out of Wicklow and ventured toward
the rebel area for a distance of about five miles.

His

purpose, as he later explained, was to give his recruits
some practice in setting up camps and conducting marches,
to "refresh them" from the boredom of being cooped up in
Wicklow, and finally, to give them some experience against
the enemy. ?5

As the men set up camp near a. bog and woods,

Harrington's scouts came back to report that a great number of rebels, who always seemed to have good intelligence
regarding English troop dispositions, were gathering
against him.

The guard was doubled and the men spent an

anxious night, as the rebels, hidden by the darkness, periodically fired volleys into the English camp.7 6
The next day Harrington ordered his recruits, nervous
and tired from a sleepless night, to begin the march back
to Wicklow.

As Harrington began his retreat the forces

of Phelim McFeagh emerged from the woods with banners flying, and for the next three miles hung on the English
flanks and rear.

Despite the pressure, the English offi-

cers and sergeants held the ranks steady until

Harrington~

force approached a ford, which some of the rebels had occupied.

As Harrington and his recruit companies fought

their way across, the main force of the rebels suddenly
75Ibid. , 82.
76 Ibid., 83.
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converged on the rear English element, which was the "Irish" compan;v commanded by Captain Charles Loftus.
As the Irish closed in, Lieutenant Piers Walsh, the
company executive officer, suddenly grabbed the unit banner from the ensign and galloped off toward Wicklow.

At

this, the pikemen, whose·function it was to keep the enemy at bay while the "shot" reloaded, likewise broke
·ranks and fled after the lieutenant.

Without the secur-

ity provided by the pikemen, the musketeers fired one
volley at the oncoming Irish, dropped their weapons and
ran.

The men from Loftus' company fled into the ranks of

the recruit companies which were crossing the ford behind
them, and a general panic ensued.

Sensing their opportun-

ity the Irish crashed against the English troops, who
were too panicked to defend themselves.

As the Irish

followed the English across the ford, Captain :Montague's
cavalry which had been leading the way toward Wicklow,
turned back and charged the rebels.

The charge stopped

the Irish, and Montague reformed and charged again, whereupon the rebels gave ground.
Instead of using this breathing space to reform, Harrington's recruits took the opportunity to divest themselves not only of their weapons, but of their armor and
heavier clothing.77

The officers tried to halt this

cowardly behavior, but they were not particularly effective.
77Ibid., 82-86.
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In this state o:f panic the main body streamed into Wicklow
as the Irish slaughtered all the stragglers.

To a rebel

force which barely matched the English in numbers, Harrington had lost almost hal:f of his force of 600, 78 and more
importantly, an inestimable amount of prestige.
Essex received news·of the debacle a few weeks later
as he arrived in Waterford from Cork.

On June 25, he

wrote to the Council that he would make straight for Wicklow in order to "seek some revenge on those rogues who, in
my absence, had the killing of our base, cowardly, and
guided clowns. 11 79

il~

As for the conduct of the officers and

men in Harrington's force Essex stated: "I purpose, by
God's grace, to do such justice as shall be for Her Majesty's honour, and make other men hereafter know that the
justice of a martial court is no less terrible than the
fury of all the rebels in this kingdom. 1180
One might be teopted to criticize Essex for not having left at least one veteran company to stiffen Harrington's force.

However,,, it should be noted that the Lein-

ster journey was the main effort, and there were few dependable veteran companies to be had.

Furthermore, Har-

rington was not expected to encounter much resistance and
had even indicated to Sir Alexander Radcliffe that he

78 Ibid., 69.

79Ibid., 65.
BOibid.
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intended "to do nothing" until Essex returned froo Leinster
with reinforcements. 81 Later, Harrington and his captains
all
wrote reports describing the battle from their view,
points, attempting to justify their actions and placing
all the blame on Captain Loftus and Lieutenant \lalsh of
the Irish company. 82 Despite their efforts at self-justification, the facts of the battle, and the extent of the
panic would seem to indicate that the English leaders,
with the exception of Captain Montague, were, at best,
uninspired.
While at Water:'ford, Essex also wrote a letter directly
to Queen Elizabeth in which he evaluated the overall state
of affairs in Ireland.

He had been through Leinster, Mun-

ster, and on the frontier of Connaught, and what he had
observed led him to conclude that the war would indeed be
"great, costly, and long. 118 3

Essex then discussed the

specific problems in subduing Ireland and recommended
certain courses of action, which, incidentally, would
later be implemented by JJord Mountjoy in his three-year
subjugation of Ireland from 1600 to 1603.
Essex's principal suggestions were to garrison the
towns, stop their trade with the rebels, cut the rebels
off from Scotland and Spain, waste the countryside, destroy
s1rb·,

--3:..9:. '
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the Irish herds of cattle, and starve the Irish into submission.

Essex concluded his letter by noting that it

was common talk in the army and amongst the rebels, that
many in Ene;land--Lord Cobham, Sir Walter Raleigh and
others whom he could not mention "for their places sake"-wished to see the ill success of. this

"most important

action," and the destruction of Her Majesty's most faithful servants. 84 After senqing both letters off and resting his forces, Essex prepared to move off on the final
lap of his journey back to Dublin.

Essex moved north

from Waterford along the coast, and by June 29 was in the
vicinity of Arklow.

Since leaving Waterford not one rebel

had been seen, but now Essex suddenly confronted a rebel
force of 800 foot and 40 horse determined to give battle. 8 5
The rebels tried to ambush Essex's vanguard under the Earl
of Ormonde, and at the same time sought to cut off his
supply horses from the rest of the army.

Essex reacted

by sending all his cavalry under the Earl of Southampton,
and 300 of his "lightest foot" to attack the rebels on
their flank and rear.

The result was a severe defeat for

the rebels, who scattered into the bogs after sustaining
numerous casualties. 86

Phelim McFeagh, the Irish rebel

leader, sent word on the conclusion of
84
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that he desired a conference with Essex.

The Earl replied

that he would confer with McFeagh only if the latter came
in as "a repentant rebel, to tender his absolute submission.1187

McPeagh thereupon withdrew into the woods, while

Essex moved through Wicklow and on towards Dublin.
On July 1, with his.southern journey almost completed,
Essex sent off to the Queen a journal of his proceedings
in Leinster and Munster from June 22 to July 1.

His re-

port, as Essex said in a letter which accompanied the journal, was indeed a "plain and true text" of the events in
the southern campaign, without any attempt to gloss over
the shortcomings of the campaign.
letter to the Privy

However, in his private

Council, which accompanied his jour-

nal, Essex claimed that he was forced to work with " a
weak and inefficient Council" in Ireland which provided
few trustworthy subordinates. 88
More seriously, Essex again charged that the Privy
Council in England was undermining his service, and stated;

"I was provided for this service with a plastron and not a
curate; that is, I am armed on the breast, but not on the
back.u 8 9 Furthermore, the rebels were aware of his difficulties with the Privy Council at home; they knew that he
.

was'wounded in the back, not lightly, but to the heart."
8?Ibid., 312.
88 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-16Q_Q,
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But Essex promised that when he returned to Dublin, and
after he had settled his "distempered

brains" from the

Munster journey, he would reorganize his forces and continue the mission.

Two days later he arrived in Dublin.9 1

The southern campaign was over.
the journey had.been to

~resent

The objective of

a strong show of force,

capture certain strong points, intimidate the rebels into
submission, and leave behind pacified provinces in Leinster and :Munster.

Based on the conduct of past Irish

wars and rebellions, it was a common occurrence for local
Irish leaders, when confronted by an English army in
their province, to make a submission to Her Majesty and
be forgiven in return.9 2
Indeed, when Lord Mountjoy arrived in Ireland in
1600 and viewed the situation, he wrote back to the Privy
Council that Essex's course of action, considering the time
of the season and resources available, was the only sensible course which could have been followed.93

In this re-

spect, both Essex and Mountjoy initially underestimated
the impact of Tyrone's influence and the determination of
the rebel Irish chiefs.

After the experience of several

weeks in Leinster and Munster Essex reevaluated his opinion of the problem he faced, but by then it was too late.
9lMSS. Carew, vol. 3, 312.

92 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 150.
93Moryson, Itinera~, 289.
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Aoide from winning some minor skirmishes and the taking of
Cahir Castle, the Lord Lieutenant had made little impression on the enemy.
At the same time his Army returned to Dublin "weary,
sick and incredibly deminished in number. 11 94 Instead of
leaving secure areas behind him and being able to concentrate all his strength on Ulster, Essex had left behind
over 3000 men, many of them his best troops, to garrison
strongpoints in Leinster and to help Sir Thomas Norreys
prosecute the war against Desmond in r·Iunster.

Finally,

whatever success Essex might claim paled before the disgraceful route of Harrington's force at Wicklow, a defeat
for which Essex would later be blamed by the Privy Council. 95

But if the southern campaign were fraught with

disappointments, it was nothing compared to the frustrations Essex would experience in the next few weeks.

94 Ibid., 243.
95c.S.Po Domestic, 1597-1601, 545.

CHAPTER VI
THE W-ESTERN JOURNEY
Upon arriving back in Dublin on July 3, Essex met
with the Irish Council, received an account of all that
had transpired in his, absence, and conferred about the
status of provisions for the invasion of Ulster.

Regard-

ing the latter subject the news was ominous: no carriage
horses or reinforcements had arrived, and no ships had
yet been made available for the Lough Foyle operation. 1
After concluding the meeting, Essex delivered himself
over to the care of his physician, in an effort to recover from the dysentery he had incurred during the Munster
journey.
Three days later,' Essex turned his attention to the
disastrous rout in Wicklow and kept his promise of dealing harshly with Harrington's ill-fated troops.

A court

martial of all Harrington's officers was immediately held;
and it was determined that the English troops, having had
"advantage of number, and no disadvantage of ground,"
were cut to pieces "without striking a blow. 11

Therefore,

Lieutenant Peirs Walsh, of the Irish company, "for giving
the first example of cowardice and dismaying to the

1Mss. c~, vol. 3, 312.
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troops" was condemned to death, and shortly afterwards
executed.

The other captains and officers who had not

run away, but whose troops had fled, were all cashiered
because "in such an extremity and distaste they did not
something. very extraordinary, both by their example to
encourage the soldier and to acquit themselves."

The

rank and file of Harrington's force were all condemned
to death for cowardice in the face of the enemy.
modified the order, and

11

Essex

for example's sake," executed

every tenth man and pardoned the rest. 2
As for Sir Henry Harrington himself, since he was a
member of the Irish Privy Council, Essex decided to take
no action until he knew Her :Majesty's pleasure.3

In fact,

Harrington was never brought to trial, although he did not
command any other troops while Essex was Lord Lieutenant.
After Essex's departure Harrington wrote to Robert Cecil,
asking for a new command of 200 foot, noting how he had
lost his "blood and limbs," his eldest son and most of his
possessions in doing the Queen's service in Ireland for
twenty-three years. 4

His request was granted and by Janu-

ary 1600, Harrington was back in Wicklow, building a new
castle and commanding a new force.5
2 Ibid.

-

3rbid.
4
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Having taken such stern measures to restore discipline, Essex spent the next week surveying the Army's situation in Ireland, and on July 15 sent a detailed report to
the Privy Council. 6 The purpose of the report, according
to Essex and the Irish Council, was to make known "the
means we have, or are like to have, ••• lest Her Majesty
and Your Lordships should expect more at our hands than
we have ability to perform, or we fail of supplies by
not making our wants known in time. 11

The list strength of

the Army was still 16,000 foot and 1300 horse, now distributed as follows: 3300 fo'ot and 200 horse in Munster to.
face Desmond's army of 5000; 2850 foot and 200 horse in
Connaught, although Sir Conyers Clifford felt he was too
weak to attempt to attack Ballyshannon; 3000 foot and 300
horse in the Leinster area facing the victors over Harrington's force; and 1000 foot and 100 horse in garrisons
along southeast Ulster to pen up Tyrone.

This left a list

strength of 6000 foot and 500 horse to attack Ulster.
Essex stated that if he should attempt to try a landing at Lough Foyle, he would have to divide his forces
into two parts of 3000 men each, and Tyrone would be in a
position to defeat each force in turn.

It should be noted

that in his report, Essex was talking in terms of the "list
strength" of the army, rather than the real strength.

The

casualties from battle and sickness on the southern
6contents of the July 15 report are taken from C.S.P.
Ireland, 1599-1600, 80-81.
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caopaign, as well as casualties suffered by those simply
in garrisons around the country, were so extensive that
the 2000 reinforcements which were due on June 1, and
which still had not arrived, would barely bring the army
up to full strength.

Even the presence of 16,000 sol-

diers was deceiving for, ·as Essex reported, "our men do
fall sick, and our companies decay daily."
The troops, as we have seen, were suffering from
poor clothing and equipment, which rapidly disintegrated
in the wet climate, and from the lack of adequate victuals.
Regarding the latter problem Essex concluded that part of
the victuals "is not come out of hngland, part lost by
shipwreck, and intercepted [by pirates] off the coast of
Connaught, and a very great part so unsavory and unserviceable, that it would poison all the soldiers to whom it
were delivered, ••• "

Essex suggested to the Privy Council

that food would not spoil so readily if they would "make
the provision of butter and

:f'

ch~ese

not in Essex and Suf-

folk [counties], places so remote, but in Cheshire, Lancashire and Wales," so that the journey would not be so
long.
After considering the above conditions, Essex suggested that the Lough Foyle operation, ships for which were
still not available, and the invasion of Ulster must be
postponed again.

Until the other provinces were subdued,

the most that could be attempted at Ulster would be for
Sir Conyers Clifford to take Ballyshannon in the West,
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while Essex planted another garrison at Armagh.

Even

these plans would be doubtful if Elizabeth did not send
more reinforcements.
Essex's final suggestion of the report gives an indication of how highly he had come to regard the endurance
of the Irish fighting men.

The Earl requested that 2000

Irish be hired by his army, and added:
••• these rebels will hardly be subdued, ii' some
of themselves be not used against themselves.
For besides the daily decay of our English soldiers, those men which are sent hither do not
in good time make so good soldiers as these
rogues here are.
Essex suggested that he be allowed to draw Irishmen from
the rebel side, and under his personal leadership, "carry
them every day to fight, assuring myself I shall do good
service in making a riddance of either side."

In this man-

ner he would be able to save his Englishmen, his "triarii, 11
and to deliver the final blow once loyal Irishmen had
weakened rebel Irishmen.

It was an interesting scheme,

representing a cold-blooded outlook--using natives against
each other while the outsider reaped the benefits--but
Essex would not have the opportunity to implement it.
Along with the above official report of the Lord Lieutenant and the Irish Council, Essex sent a personal letter to the Privy Council.

Essex had just received a let-

ter in which the Privy Council assured him that the Earl
did indeed have "sufficient backpiece of defense," and
that the carriage horses, victuals, apparel and
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reinforcements had already been sent, or would be sent in
the near future.7

Essex thereupon sarcastically replied:

I do humbly beseech your Lordships to believe
that I charge not your Lordships with want of care
or breach of promise in directing supplies of all
things in this war; but these wants we have, I
acknowledge to have grown by casualty by sea, or
by ill choice of victual, or contrariety of winds,
which have stayed the supplies of men and provisions. 8

Laying aside the sarcasm he continued:
I lay open to the malice and practice of
mine enemies in England, who first procured a
cloud of disgrace to over-shadow me, and now in
the dark give me wound upon wound--I know that
those who are guilty of them will confidently
deny, and cunningly distinguish to excuse themselves. 9
But Essex was confident that once back in England he
would be vindicated because: "Your Lordships' own memories,
and the Council book, wherein all your

dispa~ches

corded, will make up some part of this account."

are reHaving

made his feelings plain Essex concluded:
But no more, neither now nor hereafter, of this
argument. Your Lordships shall see that I will
not fail of doing the uttermost duty that the
happiest man could have performed. And I will
humbly and patiently bear my unlooked-for, contemptible destiny.10
After this written exchange, and while waiting for
horses, ships, reinforcements and victuals for the Ulster
7c.s.P. Ireland, 1599~1600, 80-81.
8 Ibid., 95.
9Ibid., 96.
lOibid.
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campaign, Essex resolved to make an interim campaign
across the western borders of the Pale, in the areas known
as Kings county and Queens county.

Essex had received

word that the rebels in Kings county had recently ambushed
Captain William Williams and 300 of his men, killing 60
and sending the rest fleeing back to the principal city,
Phillipstown, which was now endangered. 11 In Queens
county, the O'Mores were threatening Maryborough, the principal fort in that area, which Essex had resupplied in
May, but which now needed another convoy of provisions.
Essex was exceedingly disappointed with the army's performance in Kings and Queens counties, complaining to the
Privy Council in a letter on July 13 that, although the
men had been well victualed and provided for in this area,
they had u1aid still.like drones without doing service."
Their recent defeat, in which they had showed rrextreme
cowardice," was indicative of the failing morale, and
Essex.resolved to move out and put some life into them. 12
Accordingly on July 22 Essex sent the Lord Marshal,
Sir Christopher Blount, into Queens county with 1000 men
to relieve Maryborough and suppress the 0'.Mores, while the
Lord Lieutenant led 1200 foot and 200 horse towards Phillipstown.13

The objective of Essex's force was to move

11 Dymrnok, A Treatice on Ireland, 42.
12MSS. Salis12_ur;y, vol. 9, 231.

l3Dymmok, A Treatice on Ireland, 42.

196
into a part of King's County knov-m as Fercal, an area "so
strong as nature could devise to raake it by wood and
bog, 1114 and the place which, because of its supposed inaccessibility, was the chief rebel stronghold wherein the
rebels stored munitions, food, and cattle.

At the same

time, Essex wished to use this western journey as another
opportunity to confer once again with the Governor of
Connaught, Sir Conyers Clifford, who was accordingly instructed to bring a strong force and meet Essex in the
Fercal area.
Essex moved to Phillipstown without incident, viewed
the qight of the williams' ambush, and then moved on to
Fercal.

An enemy force of 600 men hung on the flanks and

rear of his force, but attempted only one attack in which
they lost a principal coI!lillander of the O'Connors and about
40 men, whi.le Essex sustained only a few wounded.

His

force cut its way through the thick woods, built a small
bridge across the Derrow river and arrived at Ardengroffe
without further incident.

Sir Conyers Clifford, with nine

companies, entered Fercal from the western side, and
encountered fierce opposition, losing 10 killed and 40
wounded as he cut through the woods, while the rebels reportedly lost twice as many men. 1 5
Battered and weary from his labors, Clifford arrived
14
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at the Ardengroffe meeting place, and for the next two
days, the troops rested while the Lord Lieutenant and Lord
Governor of Connaught discussed future plans. 16 One of
the chief topics of their discussion was the fate of
O'Connor Sligo, an Irish chief who was the principal
English supporter in ConRaught, 1 7 but who had recently
been besieged in his castle at Sligo by O'Donnel1. 18 It
was resolved that Clifford should employ all means necessary to rescue O'Connor Sligo, and thereafter protect the
landing of the Galway force at Sligo (discussed in their
first meeting at Limerick) and finally to tie down O'Donnell's forces by capturing Ballyshannon.

ing their conferences Clifford departed for Connaught
while Essex turned to the business of subduing Fercal.

Essex divided his army into three units, resolving to
sweep through the rebel area with two units abreast, each
consisting of 500 infantry, while the Lord Lieutenant followed with a reserve of 200 foot and 200 horse, ready to
reinforce or react to any enemy threat to the leading
units.

In this configuration the Essex force moved

through Fercal, burning houses and corn, destroying supplies, and capturing about 1000 cows and 100 horses. 1 9
16Henry,

11

The Earl of Essex and Ireland," 16.

!

17C.S.P. Ireland, 1299-1600, 22.

r

18MSS. Salisbur~, vol. 9, 289.

~

After conclud-

,.

'

l

l9Ibid., 268; Dymmok, A Treatice on Ireland, 44.
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The rebels tried unsuccessfully to battle Essex's force,
but after losing many men, they decided the effort was
futile and disappeared into the woods.

Essex completed

the systematic destruction, leaving the rebels of Kings
and Queens counties scattered and defeated, and returned
to Dublin in early August. 20
Upon entering Dublin, Essex was presented with a
letter from Queen Elizabeth which she had written on July

19, after receiving Essex's official report of the jou!ney to Leinster and Nunster. 21

Elizabeth wasted few words

with preliminaries, and immediately complained:
••• you must needs think that we, that have the
eyes of forei~n Princes upon our actions, and
have the hearts of our people to comfort and
cherish, who groan under the burden of continual
levies and impositions, which are occasioned by
those late actions, can little please ourself
hitherto with anything that hath been effected.
Essex's two-month journey had "brought in never a capital
rebel. 11
Regarding the seizure of Cahir castle, the most substantial military accomplishment on Essex's southern journey, the Queen contemptuously characterized the action as
having taken "an Irish hold from a rabble of rogues."

But

to Elizabeth the most exasperating aspect of this
20 Dymmok, A Treatice on Ireland, 44.

21 The following excerpts are taken from the Queen's
letter to Essex, dated July 19, 1599, found in the C.S.P.
Ireland, 1599-1600, 98-101. For complete text, see Appen-

dix A.
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situation was the adverse effect on her prestige which
resulted .from allowing an Irish rebel to remain defiant
and unpunished.

She lamented to Essex that

••• this one thing, that doth more displease us
than any charge or expense that happens, which
is, that it must be the Queen of England's fortune, to make a base bush kern to be accounted
so famous a rebel, ~s to be a person against whom
so many thousands of foot and horse, besides the
force of all the nobility of that kingdom, must
be thought too little to be employed.
She continued:

"Little do you know how he [Tyrone] hath

blazed in foreign parts the defeats of regiments, the death
of Captains, and the loss of men of quality in every corner; and how little he seemeth to value their power ••• "
She conc.luded her letter with the forceful ins truetious:
••• we must now plainly charge you, according to
the duty you owe us, so to unite soundness of judgement to the zeal you have to do us service, and
with all speed to pass thither [to Ulster] in such
order, a~ the axe may be put to the root of that
tree, which hath been the treasonable stock from
whence so many poisoned plants and grafts have
been derived.
While Essex was still contemplating this first letter,
a second letter. arrived from the

·~ueen.

The occasion for

this correspondence was to answer Essex's report o:f July

15, in which the Earl had enumerated the difficulties of
going to Ulster this year.

The Privy Council had received

Essex's report on July 28, and Elizabeth sent an immediate
reply on July 30. 22 In her letter, Elizabeth quickly
'>2

c.

The following excerpts are taken from the Queen's
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dismissed Essex's complai.nts of shortages in supplies by
stating that her examination of the problem had revealed.
that most supplies had been sent, while the remainder of
the promised supplies were delayed merely "by those accidental causes which accompany sea transportation."
Elizabeth's main

co~cern

was Essex's overall conduct

of affairs, and she again launched into a denunciation of
his actions.

She reminded the Earl that the agreed-upon

plan was "to assail the Northern Traitor, and to plant
garrisons in his country, it being ever your firm opinion,
amongst others of our Council, to conclude that all that
was done in other kind in Ireland, was but waste and consumption."
Elizabeth stated that Essex's complaints of deficiencies in troop strength defied explanation, "except it
be that by your unseasonable journey into Munster, and by
the small effects thereof, you have broken the heart of
our best troops, and weakened your strength upon inferior
rebels, and run out the glass of time which hardly can be
recovered ••• "

She further commanded, "we must expect at

your hands, without delay, the passing into the North,
for accomplishment of those counsels which were resolved
on at your departure, to the intent that all these six
months charges prove not fruitless ••• "
letter to Essex, dated July 30, 1599, found in the C.S.P.
Ireland, 1599-1600, 105-07. For complete text see AppendixB-:--
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Elizabeth concluded her second letter on a particularly ominous note.

In Essex's original commission the

Earl had been given permission to return to England whenever he deemed it advisable, and to constitute a temporary
governor in Ireland in his absence.

Now the Queen revoked

that liberty and warned: ·"we do charge you (as you tender
our pleasure) that you adventure not to come out of that
kingdom, by virtue of any former liscense whatsoever."
In the second letter; as in the first, Elizabeth
again seemed to find it incomprehensible that the northern
strategy had not been implemented, and seemed unaware of
the true state of affairs in Ireland.

A certain insight

may be gained by considering the problem of correspondence
between Essex and the Queen.

'

Essex addressed all but two

of his letters to the Privy Council--which was the appropriate communications channel--and consequently the correspondence passed through the hands of Sir Robert Cecil, who
quite probably merely briefed the sixty-six year old Elizabeth about the contents, and most certainly was asked for
his opinion.

An indication of how various aspects of the

Irish campaign were interpreted to the Queen can be seen
in Elizabeth's first letter in which she referred to the
seizure of Cahir castle as the taking of "an Irish hold
from a rabble of rogues."

In the same letter she con-

demned Essex's movement into Leinster and Munster before
"that proud rebel" in the north was attacked, even though

i

l
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the Privy Council earlier reported that she had given her
consent to both the Earl's distribution of forces and the
Leinster campaign. 2 3 Ernest George Atkinson, editor of
the Calendar of State Papers,

Trela~~'

explains this dis-

crepancy by stating that Elizabeth "forgot" that she had
given Essex permission tQ go to Leinster first. 24

The

next document in the Calendars, however, shows the corrections made in the letter of July 19 to Essex by the
Queen's secretary, Robert Cecil. 2 5 If Elizabeth did forget, is it possible that Robert Cecil, who corrected parts
of the letter, forgot also?

The more logical explanation

is that either Cecil did not inform Queen Elizabeth of
Essex's intent to go south in the first place, or that
Elizabeth really did forget and Robert Cecil sent the letter out anyway,

w~thout

bringing this obvious error to her

attention.
In the Queen's second letter of July 30 we see that

the Queen merely accepted the Council's word that provisions
were not arriving only because of those common accidents
which normally accompanied sea transportation.

Since

Elizabeth took only two days to answer Essex's letter,
her "examination" of the supply situation must have been
very superficial, and probably only consisted of receiving

23c.s.P. Ireland,
24
2

Ibid. , xxvi.

5~.'

101.

1299-1600, 28.
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assurances from the chief officials that all things had
indeed been sent.

In the Queen's reproaches Essex could

undoubtedly see the work of Sir Robert Cecil, particularly
in that part of the letter in which Essex was now forbidden
"to come out of that kingdom by virtue of any former liscense whatsoever," until·he had "reduced things in the
north."

In view of the impossibility of conducting a

northern campaign without the necessary means, and considering the difficulties

Esse~

was experiencing in acquir-

ing those means, Elizabeth's revocation of his license to
return to England when he saw fit, must have sounded like
a sentence of exile by his enemy, Sir Robert Cecil.

In-

deed, in the copy of this letter kept in the State Papers,
Cecil has endorsed the Queen's letter, and has written on
his copy the words: 11 To command him not to come over. 1126
At the same time, a court official made the following observation to a friend in ·Venice: "since Essex is away Her
Majesty is wholly directed by Mr. Secretary, who now rules
all as his father did," and added, "though he pretends
friendship to the Earl, he is thought at heart his greatest enemy, envying his former greatness with the Queen,
and intending his utter overthrow if Irish affairs take
no better effect. 112 7
26

C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 107.

27c.s.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 251.
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Essex had little time to dwell on the ramifications
of the Queen's first two letters, for on August 5 occurred
the most decisive disaster of the Essex campaign.

In

accordance with agreements made by Essex and Clifford at
their meeting at Fercal in July, the Governor of Connaught
prepared to conduct an

e~edition

to Sligo, to rescue his

ally, O'Connor Sligo, from O'Donnell's forces.

In order

to assist Clifford, Essex had reinforced him with four of
his best foot companies, the Earl of Southampton's crack
cavalry unit, and the services of Sir Alexander Radcliffe,
one of Essex's best subordinates.

Essex must have still

been dubious about Clifford's chances, for on July 30 the
Lord Lieutenant sent the ·Governor a message, warning him
not to "venture the breaking of his neck," and counselling
him that unless he was assured that he could go .forward
without danger, it would be better to wait until the Lord
Lieutenant had started his force toward Ulster, to distract
the rebels. 28

Although 'Clifford privately professed that
he feared the upcoming expedition, 2 9 he resolved nevertheless to carry on the mission without waiting for Essex.
The Lord Governor of Connaught moved out .from Tulske
with 1900 infantry and 200 English and Irish horse.
though he had some reinforcement from Essex, Sir John
Harrington described the force as one consisting of

28 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 121.
2911ss. So.lisbur;J::, vol. 9, 289.
.
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twenty-one weak companies, some of which had only 60 men
instead of the authorized 150.30

The army moved in a nor-

therly direction toward Sligo, and by early afternoon had
traveled fourteen miles to the town of Boyle, at the foot
of the Curlews Hills.

By then it was four o'clock in the

afternoon and Clifford had decided to camp for the evening.
However, Captain Henry

who had traveled through the

Cosb~r,

dangerous Curlew pass the day before, told Clifford that
the enemy had only a few scouts in the pass, and advised
that it would be expedient for Clifford to push

011

through

the pass immediately, before the enemy had a chance to
fortify it.3 1
Without reconnoitering the pass further, the Lord
Governor gave the order for the army to continue its march
into the Curlew pass, which started out as a narrow way
between two bogs,

The pass soon broadened out untii it

gave "liberty for twelve men to march in front," and then
led up a gently rising slope with a hill and bog on the
left, and thick woods on the right.

The order of march

was the vanguard of 571 men, commanded by Sir Alexander
Radcliffe, followed by the main battle of 421 men, commanded by the Lord Baron o! Dunkellin, and the rearguard of
50L~

men commanded by Sir Arthur Savage.

Behind the main

army was the Irish cavalry and the Earl of Southampton's
30Harrington, ~ugae·Antiqua~, 264.

3 1 ~., 265; Dymmok, A rreatice on Ireland, 44.
1
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cavalry troop, commanded by Sir Grtffin Markham, whose mission was to guard the baggage train and to reinforce the
main army if the need should arise.3 2
As Sir Alexander Radcliffe's vanguard moved into the
pass, they were surprised to find about 400 rebels, led
by O'Donnell's ally, O'Rourke, entrenched on both sides
of the pass and manning a barricade near the entrance.
Radcliffe pushed forward driving the rebels back from
their barricade, and then placed companies along both
sides of the pass as he moved through, and ordered the
company commanders not to relinquish their positions until
he had so instructed.

The vanguard, followed by the main

battle and the rearguard, moved into the pass until they*
reached another great barricade acro.ss the pass, held
numerous rebels.

byi'iilb:

Sir Alexander Radcliffe, who had already

been shot "in the face," nevertheless resolved to lead tbie
charge, and ordered Captain Cosby, an Anglo-Irish officer:~ .
to take his company and attack with him.

Cosby refused

and held back from the enemy fire, whereupon Radcliffe
stated: "Well Cosby, I see I must leave thee to they baseness, but I must tell thee before my departure, that it
were much better for thee to die in my company by the
of thy countrymen, then at my return to perish by my
sword."33

Cosby still refused to move and Radcliffe

32 Dymmok, A Treatice on Ireland, 44-45.
33Ibid., 45.

l
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p~epared

to attack without the captain, and about 200 men

who also stayed behind.
By this time Colonel Radcliffe's men had fired off
most of their powder, so he be(5an to assemble "choice
pikes" from the body of the vanguard, calling key men out
by name.

While gathering the pikemen Colonel Radcliffe

was shot again in the leg and collapsed in the arms of
two "gentlemen volunteers. 11 34 As they tried to bring the
Colonel away one of the gentlemen was shot dead, while Sir
Alexander Radcliffe was shot a further time through the
body and fell dying.

••

Upon observing the fate of his com-

mander Captain Cosby turned and fled with his unit.

The

rest of the vanguard, raked by enemy fire, likewise broke
and ran back through the following formations, causing the
inevitable panic.
Sir Conyers Clifford, traveling with the main battle
saw the vanguard streaming back down the pass, pursued by
the exultant Irish, and vainly tried to reform them.

As

the Irish closed in on the Governor Sir John MacSwine and
Captain Oliver Burke tried unsuccessfully to convince
Clifford to withdraw, and finally forcibly laid hold of
him and pulled him back.

Enraged at the spectacle of his

men fleeing in such a cowardly manner, the Lord Governor
tore himself loose and charged the rebel horde singlehanded.
He crashed into the oncoming Irish and died fighting in
4

3 Ibid., 46.
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their midst, with a pike through his body.35

Perceiving

the leaderless, panicked mob of English soldiers fleeing
down the pass, with the Irish slaughtering them at will,
Sir Griffin Markham attacked with all his cavalry.

Al-

though wounded by a bullet which broke his arm, f'1arkham
pressed home the charge,·broke the Irish attack and scattered the rebels, thus giving "security to this ignominious flight. 11 36
When the English had a chance to ascertain their
losses, they found

241,o.fficer~a.nd

men slain, and 208

officers and men wounded.37

The rebel loss was later reported to have been greater than that of the English,38
although considering the circumstances of the action, it
hardly seems probable.

As for the Lord Governor, his head

was cut off by the O'Rourkes and sent· to the O'Donnells
as a trophy, while his body was taken and buried at a
nearby monastery.39

Captain Cosby's subsequent fate is

unknown, although he and his conpany were initially left
to garrison Boyle, at the foot of the Curlews, while the
rest of the demoralized army retreated further back to
Tulsk.

Aside from the loss of men, and the negative effect

35Ibid.

36 Ibid., 47.
37 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 113-14.
3Bibid., 123.
39Dymm.ok, A Treatice on Ireland, 47.
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on morale, the Curlew

disaster meant that the threat to

Ballyshannon and western Ulster had been totally eliminated.

Tyrone and O'Donnell were now free to concentrate

all their forces against any invasion of eastern Ulster
through the Mowry Pass.
When Essex heard

th~

news, he was understandably en-

raged, and immediately sent off instructions to Sir Arthur Savage and Lord Dunkellin, the two surviving senior
officers.

First, they were to send back all of Southam.p-

ton' s cavalry troop, along with any other cavalry they
could spare.

Sufficient garrisons were to be kept in the

key cities of Galway, Athlone, Boyle, Tulsk and Roscommon,
while the rest of the foot were to be sent back to Mullingar.

Essex contemptuously stated: "I will send them to

keep walls, since they do so cowardly and basely in the
field. 114·0 While his rage at the rank and file of the Connaught army was boundless, he had only the highest praise
for the heroic efforts of Sir Alexander Radcliffe, Sir
Griffin Markham, and the gallant Sir Conyers Clifford.
Regarding the Lord Governor Essex commented: "Connaught
hath lost a valiant, a liberal, and understanding Governor,
and cannot by me be supplied with another Conyers Clifford,
though he also found too hard an encounter, and perished
in it. 1141
Ireland, 1599-1600, 120.
123.
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When Essex returned from the Western expedition to
Kings County on July 31, he assembled the Irish Council
and announced his intention to move into Ulster. 42 The
Council objected to this course of action, and on August

3 voiced their objections in a letter to the Privy Council.

The Irish Council members asserted that Essex, par-

ticularly after receiving the Queen's first letter of
July 19, had been strongly urging the invasion of Ulster,
in spite of the weak state of the army.

The Council, how-

ever, believed that "perilous sequels" would grow out of
such a course of action.

The key to a successful invasion

was the Lough Foyle operation, which the Lord Lieutenant
was not able to implement.

Therefore the most he could

accomplish would be to plant garrisons at Armagh and the
Blackwater, and even these garrisons would only turn into
hospitals for the weak and sickly soldiers. 4 3
There was a great lack of carriage horses, which
would make any such garrison virtually impossible to rel

1

l

supply except by "frequent convoys," which only invited
ambush.

Additionally the original plan called for the

Governor of Connaught to attack Ballyshannon to divert
Tyrone's forces; however, t-he Governor was in a weak posi. tion, while the rebels had "dangerously fortified the
Curlews and other straits by the which he must pass. 1144
42Mss. Salisbury, vol. 9,.263.
4 3rbid., 263-64.
44rbid. , 265.
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To further their argument, the Irish Council included a
list of the troop dispositions in Ireland, which showed
11,250 .foot and 925 horse in garrisons and patrol duty
throughout the country, and no more than 4750 foot and
378 horse available for the Ulster journey. 4 5 In closing their letter, the Irish Council, in spite of Essex's
objections, strongly urged that the Ulster campaign be
again postponed until the other provinces had been settled. 46
On the same day in which she received the above letter .from the Irish Council, Elizabeth sent a scathing
reply to both Essex and the Irish Council, a reply which
probably would have been.harsher still if she had known
of Clifford's recent defeat on August 5. 4 7 She began:
"The letter which we have read this day from you of that
Council concerning your opinions for the northern action,
does rather deserve reproof than much answer."

Elizabeth

charged that the Irish Council, because of its "former suffering (nay, favouring) Popery, 11 was responsible .for much
of the present trouble in Ireland.
The Irish Council's suggestion that the Ulster campaign must be postponed brought a torrent of abuse from
· Elizabeth.

Such a course of action would "increase the

45c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 111.
4 6r1ss. Salisburv, vol. 9, 267.
4 7The following excerpts are taken from the Queen's
letter to Essex, dated August 9, 1599, found in the C.S.P.
Ireland, 1299-1600, 114-16. For complete text see Appen-·
dix c.

i

l

212

rebel's pride, and frustrate one whole year's charges,"
adding, "What would you have us believe, if we did not
think you loyal, but that either some of you cannot forget your old good wills to that Traitor, or else are insensible of all things, save your own particulars. 11
Regarding the alleged inability of the English forces to implement the Lough Foyle landing, Elizabeth commented: "Lastly, for Lough Foyle, which still you ring in
our ears, to be the place that would most annoy the rebel,
we doubt not but to hear by the next that it is begun, and
not in question."
of the army.

Her final comments concerned the strength.

The Irish Council had estimated that only

4750 foot and 340 horse would be available for an invasion of Ulster.

Elizabeth, on the other hand, calculated

that if one took into account the forces in Connaught, the
new reinforcements, and portions of garrisons throughout
the country, "you may not reckon under ten or eleven thousand for that service."
Elizabeth's letter of August 9 again illustrates her
lack of appreciation of the true conditions in Ireland.
Particularly revealing are her comments on the Lough Foyle
operation, in which she simply cannot understand why the
landing has not yet been accomplished, and in which she
demands that it be accomplished immediately.

Addition-

ally, Elizabeth's calculation that Essex should have had
at least 11,000 men. available for the Ulster project· shO\rn
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that she did not appreciate the necessity for garrisons
or the problem of sickness which brought the real strength
of the army far below the list strength.
Part of Queen Elizabeth's false impression was undoubtedly caused by Essex, who in his letters back to
England dealt in "list-st.rength" figures.

Essex may have

used list strength numbers so as to simply explain the
relative distribution of the Army without complicating
his explanation with a breakdown of "unserviceable" men
in all garrisons, a figure which would have been difficult to ascertain or document with certainty.

A more

probable reason, however, may have been connected with
finances.

The Lord Lieutenant was terribly short of money

to conduct the ca.mpaign, and had protested th.at "no Governor in the kingdom \-ms ever so limited and restrained. 1148
Government funds were so scarce that Essex had to pay for
the bedding and sheets of casualties out of his own pocket, 49 and to use his own carriage as an ambulance,50
.facts which help in explaining his popularity with the
troops.

If he reported the list strength of the Army as

remaining at 16,000 .foot and 1300 horse, which he did,
then he would at least get the salary due all these
troops.
48
4

On the other hand, if he reported the real
Ibid.,

94.

9Ibid., 43.

50ibid.,

98.
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strength of the Army, which was well below the above fig-

ure, he may well have feared that the money for troop
salary would be cut proportionately.
was caught in a

11

However, the Earl

numbers-game 11 dilemma; by dealing in

list strength figures he gave Elizabeth the impression
that his strength was far greater than it was, and consequently she expected more out of his forces, and found
his troop dispositions incomprehensible.
However, the Privy Council, which was well aware of
the realities of campaigning in Ireland, might have enlightened Queen Elizabeth or explained Essex's position,
if they were so inclined and had the success of his expedition at heart.

Instead, on the day after Elizabeth sent

her third letter, the Council sent Essex a letter of their
own, in which they stated that the Queen had called them.
in for consultation and that they

11

must now only concur

with Her Majesty" concerning Essex's disposition of forces
and his lack of progress.

The Council further charged

that "there should have been a prosecution of the capital
rebels in the north, whereby the war might have been shortened. 1151

They concluded by informing Essex that his 2000

reinforcements, which he had

b~en

promised by June 1, had

not yet been sent, but would arrive shortly; and then
closed by wishing him "the same success" which bLs own
heart desired.5 2

51 rbid., i17.
52rbid., 118.
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Stung by the reproaches of the Queen and the hypocrisy

of the Privy Council, Essex resolved to march at the earliest opportunity.

On AuB-ust 14 Essex assured the Privy

Council that as soon as his "best companies'' came in from
Munster and Connaught, and as soon as he gathered up all
his "beeves" and

carriag~

horses, which would take about

eight days, he would be off to Ulster.53

53 Ibid., 121-25.

CHAPTER VII

THE NORTHERN JOURNEY
Essex's determination notwithstanding, the English
Army of Ireland had fallen to an exceptionally critical
state by mid-August.

A report written by Captain Francis

Kingsmill, a company commander in Munster, was sent to
Sir Robert Cecil on August 22, and gives a vivid illustration of the Army's plight.

In Mallow, an English gar-

rison consisting of 500 men from veteran companies was
not able· to field more than 200 effective soldiers.

Other

units were in similar straits, many having as many as half
their men down with sickness.

The troops had not been

given a new issue of uniforms in eight months, and the

l

damp, moist climate had long since reduced their clothes

f

to tatters.

.t

was rancid by the time i t arrived.

rr

The food, particularly the cheese and butter,
As for pay, they had

not received one penny of their salary in the last four
months, and had to commandeer what little food was available in the surrounding area.

In expressing his contempt

for the supply system, the captain sarcastically complained
that the troops had to wait for "six winds to blow" before
the cargoes reached them. 1
1

C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 130.
216

21?
Essex confirmed that the situation in the other provinces was just as serious, although he placed as much blru::ie
on the character of the individual soldiers as he did on
the want of supplies.

On August 14 he wrote to the Privy

Council: "every town and place of garrison is a hospital,
where our degenerate countrymen are glad to entertain
sickness

a~

a supersedeas for their going into the field,

and every remove of an Irish company is almost a breaking
of it. 112

The result of the supply situation, coupled with

the terrifying news of Clifford's recent disaster, had
destroyed morale to the point where, as Essex complained,
"the Irish go to the rebels by herds; the others make
strange adventures to steal over; and some force themselves
to be sick, and lie like creatures that have neither
hearts nor souls. 11 3
Conside~ing

the crucial part supplies and transporta-

tion played in the Essex campaign, it would be appropriate
at this time for us to explore in greater detail the problems of the Lord Lieutenant in acquiring the needed requisitions of ships, horses, victuals and clothing.

The most

critical item, on which the entire strategy hinged was the
t

I

acquisition of shipping for the Lough Foyle operation.

In

{:

the original warrant for shipping by the Queen on December 16, 1598, Essex was assigned two great warships, three
2 Ibid., 124.

3Ibid., 125.
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pinnaces, and four double fly-boats which were each capable of transporting 300 soldiers or a great quantity of
provisions.

The warrant for warships and fly-boats was

for a six-month time period; thus the ships would have to
be reassigned, and recommisioned not later than June 16,
1599. 4

In order to transport his 3000 levies from Eng-

land to Ireland Essex was granted the use of seventeen
merchant transports from the period January 16 to March
16.5

As we have seen, Essex's transporting of levies was
delayed by "contrary winds and other accidents," so that
he could not transport his units from Chester by the
March 16 deadline. 6 Therefore the seventeen merchant
ships were extended in commission by the Queen for one
month until.April 16, by which time the transporting of
levies was complete.

When the Queen assigned the warships

and transports for Essex's use, she stipulated that after
the initial transport of troops, the ships were "to perform upon the coast such service as he [Essex] shall direct. 11?
Thus, in summarizing Essex's shipping assets, by
early Aprill the time of his arrival, he should have been

4c·.s.P. Ireland, Addend~, 1565-1654, 507.
5Henry, "The Earl of Essex and Ireland," 9.
6

-Ibi.d.

?c.S.P. Ireland, Addenda 2 1565-1654, 60?.
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able to count on two great warships;, three lighter pinnaces, four double fly-boats and seventeen merchant ships
for the Lough Foyle operation.

It is interesting to note

that in 1600 when Sir Henry Docwra actually conducted the
Lough Foyle landing for Lord Deputy Mountjoy, with 4000
men--the same number

whi~h

Essex had planned to take--

Docwra' s shipping strength amounted to one pinnace and
seventeen merchantmen to make the initial landing, and two
pinnaces, three "special" ships and three converted merchantmen to keep the force supplied. 8
In Essex's commission for shipping, however, there
was a great exception to his authority, which stipulated
that all shipping dispositions were subject to the approval of the Lord Admiral, Sir Thomas Howard.9

Essex and

the Lord Admiral had long been antagonists, and continued
their feud up until the time Essex left for Ireland, quarrelling on January 1710 and again on March 1. 11

The com-

mand structure for the use of shipping implied that Essex
and Howard would have to cooperate on the use of shipping
to support the.campaign.

The Lord .Admiral exercised his

authority and ordered that the two great warships, one
pinnace, and the four double fly-boats should patrol a
8 Henry, "The Earl of Essex and Ireland," 20.
9Ibid., 10.
10C.S.P. Domestic, 1598-1601, 151.

11 Ibid., 166.
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line across the Irish Sea from Cornwall to southwest Ireland to scout for Spanish ships. 12 Essex does not mention
this diversion of his ships in any of his letters and
apparently did not protest the Lord Armiral's decision
too vociferously, probably because he still had at his
disposal two pinnaces and seventeen merchant ships, which,
judging from Sir Henry Docwra's landing in 1600, was still
sufficient shipping to conduct the initial landing at
Lough Foyle.

In any case the warships were taken from

him and by April 30 were still on patrol duty for Howard,
and remained on patrol duty until their six-months commission came to an end on June 16. 1 3
The decisive blow to the Lough Foyle operation occurred when Admiral Howard ordered that the seventeen
merchant ships, which had just delivered Essex 3000 levies
to Ireland in early April,, were to join the Lord Admiral's
naval force off southwest England.

On May 17, the mer-

chant ships arrived at Scilly and joined up with Admiral
Howard, thus leaving Essex with only two pinnaces. 14
Throughout Essex's campaign the two pinnaces did good service by shuttling men and supplies back and forth from
England, but the Lough Foyle expedition was clearly out
of the question.
12 MSS. Salisbury, vol. 9, 172.
l3Ibid.
14Ibid.

-
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When Essex returned from the Munster journey on July
1, and found that shipping had still not been made available, he again protested to the Privy Council about his
lack of shipping.

By that time the periods of commission-

ing had long since run out, and the transports had to be
recommissioned all over
manner.

~gain,

in the usual cumbersome

On July 19, in response to Essex's protest, Lord

Treasurer Buckhurst wrote a memo to a Mr. Skinner, one of
his assistants, instructing him to make out an order for
the payment of money to hire the necessary shipping.

In

the same memo Buckhurst explained how the Earl of Essex
would not be able t.o go· north to Lough Foyle without this
requisition. 1 5

Thus as late as July 19, while the Queen raged that
the Ulster expedition was not being pursued, and while
Essex, .deprived of his shipping by Lord Admiral Howard,
conducted torturous secondary campaigns while waiting for
more shipping, the Privy Council was only at the stage of
appropriating money to get the vessels needed!

In these

circumstances, because of the slowness of gathering up
shipping, the ships could not, and indeed would not, be
available before Essex's northern journey started in late
August.

In any case, by then it was far too late; the

critical time for the Lough Foyle operation--late April
l5Henry, "The Earl of Essex and Ireland," 20 •

•
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or early May--had long since passed and Essex was off on
his Munster journey.

When he returned from Munster, his

troops, as Essex related, were too depleted to conduct
the Lough Foyle operation, although if shipping had been
available in Dublin, Essex might have attempted the operation before his troops ware further depleted in the Kings
county campaign.
How the shipping situation was explained to Elizabeth by the Privy Council is not known for certain.

How-

ever, later at Essex's trial, Lord Admiral Howard testified that the ships for the Lough Foyle expedition were
all prepared to sail, but Essex's aroy was

in such a
weakened condition that it was not able to use them. 16
From the remarks made by Elizabeth in her letters regarding shipping, it would seem that the Queen, unconcerned
with such technicalities as commissioning dates, was assured by the Privy Council that the shipping was available,
and only awaited Essex's directions.
Lord Admiral Howard's order for Essex's ships to
screen the south English and Irish coasts has been explained b?" citing the great "Spanish Alarm" which swept
England in the summer .of 1599. 1 7

Indeed, at the height

of the panic, there were rwnors and reports that England
t~

;,

l

was about to be invaded by 30,000 Spaniards, 20,000 French,

16Bacon, Essex's .Vindication, 65.
l?Silke, Kinsale, 57-61.
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and 40,000 Scots, supported by a fleet of 250 Spanish and
Danish sailing ships and 70 galleys. 18 The English quickly mobilized almost 20,000 men from all the shires and
designated Lord Admiral Howard as supreme coI'llllander of
the forces :for defense. 1 9

The Reverend John J. Silke, in

his book Kinsale, quite rightly points out that although
the rumors were later proven false, it was still a threat
which the government could not ignore. 20

However, while

there were the usual rumors of a Spanish invasion, beginning in January and 21 continuing through May and June, 22
it was not until the end of July that real and universal
alarm ensued, when information reached the Court that the
Spanish fleet had assembied at Brest and Conquet. 2 3 The
crisis lasted from the end of July until August 20, by
which time all the rumors had been proven false, and Howard
was ordered to dismiss the motley collection of militia
which had been mobilized. 24

The "Spanish alarm" of late

July does not explain Essex's lack of competent shipping
in late April and early May, or Howard's order for the
18Mss. Salisbu~, vol. 9, 282-83.

l9Ibid., 289.
20silke, Kinsale,

57.

21Me<r-.
C'
l'is b ury, vol.
JJVb •
.::>a

22 Ibid., 171-72.

23Ibid., 253, 322.
2

L~Ibid., xxi, 307.

9, 20.
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ships to ply off the south English coast at that time;
although it does explain why Essex could not acquire
shipping after he completed the Western campaign in early
August.

One of the greatest.mysteries of the Essex campaign
is that the carriage horses, both those which Essex had
gathered himself and had left in .England, and the new
allotment of 200 horses assigned by the Privy Council,
never arrived in Ireland!

After the Essex campaign had

ended, and Lord Mountjoy was preparing to embark for Ireland, Lord Treasurer Buckhurst, in writing a list of "considerations" for the Irish campaign of 1600, listed as
Item 15:

•

That as well the 200 carriage horse allowed to
the Earl of Essex at his going over, as also
the other 200 carriage horse allowed him afterwards out of the chec}::s, may be known where theY:
be, and accounted for, and that they m'i"'y be delivered to the Lord Mountjoy for the Queens service.25
Before Mountjoy left .for Ireland in January 1600, he was
instructed, among other things, "To insure as to the 400
carriage horses supplied to the Earl of Essex. 1126 The
mystery was never satisfactorily cleared up and the incident was eventually forgotten as government officials

moved on to other matters.

However, an examination of

the Cecil papers reveals an interesting letter from

25c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 380.
26 Ibid., 443.
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Essex's. supposed friend, Sir William Knollys, to Sir Robert Cecil, written in May 1599.

Apparently Knollys was

responding to a letter from Cecil and commented as follows
on the subject of Essex's request for carriage horses:
I am not of opinion you have reason to hearkon
to any new demand, though he shew a necessary
reason touching the tarriage horses which are
not there to be had, and without which he will
not be able to march.27
Knollys further counselleQ. Cecil that "unless you keep
touch with him (Essex) in the agreements councluded on,
both for his number and the timely supplies, he may allege
the same excuses that former governors have done, ••• 1128
The coptext bf this letter would appear to indicate
once ae;ain that the Privy Council, principally Sir Robert

Cecil, wanted Essex to fail, but wished to insure that he
failed in such a way that no blame could be attached to the
Privy Council.

In Knollys' statement on the carriage hor-

ses he is alluding to facts obviously known to Cecil:
that carriage horses were not available in Ireland; that
the army could not march without them; but then he recommended that Cecil ought not send Essex any more carriage
horses!

Sir William Knollys' hopes were to be realized,

for the horses would not arrive, and the bulk of Essex's
army then was not able to march.
/'

Concerning the lack of victuals and clothing Essex
2

7r-ms. Salis~ur~, vol. 9, 188.

28

-Ibid.
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was hampered not by the Privy Council, but by corruption.
The Privy Council, as we have seen, openly accepted the
supply of these items as its responsibility and did all
that could reasonably be expected to insure their timely
arrival.

According to instructions from the Privy Coun-

cil on April 24, Sir Geor.ge Carey, the Treasurer in Ireland, and George Beverly, the Comptroller of the Victuals
in Ireland, were to send in reports on the status of vietuals, clothing and the money they had in their possession.

Upon receiving these orders Sir George Carey wrote

back to the Privy Council that, because of the difficulties of communicating, with the outlying pro1.rinces, it
would be very difficult for him to keep track of the various supplies of victuals and clothing, which often were
shipped directly to Munster or Connaught. 2 9 His reasons
for not being able to keep an accurate account were plausible, considering the circumstances surrounding commtmications; however the Privy Council still demanded an accounting.

But neither: /Sir George Carey, Sir George Bev/

.

erly nor Sir Ralph Lane, the Muster-Master, sent in their
bi-monthly reports, and on July 11 the Privy Council censored all three individuals for not following instructions.
The three men protested that "the state of this rebellious
kingdom being as it is," they could not get accurate and
timely certificates from all their subordinate officials
2 9c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 32.

l
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strung out in all the garrisons.30

And so the debate went

on by exchange of letters throughout the Essex campaign.
As early as May 16, Sir John Jolles, a merchant of
London who had contracted to supply victuals to Ireland,
complained to the Priv-y Council that Her Majesty was being
defrauded in respect to yictuals being sent to Ireland,
particularly to Munster.

An inquiry was sent to Sir Thom-

as Norreys, President of Munster, to look into the matter;3 1
however, he died before any investigation could be made,3 2
and the matter was not followed up.

On July 29, Jolles

again complained that all the victuals were being sent by
his firm, but that the prevailing great corruption in Ireland resulted in food being sold, stolen or wasted.

John

Jolles was apparently fulfilling his part of the contract
in England, because he suggested that a Mr. Darell, one
of the Privy Council's lesser officials--a Surveyor of
Victuals for the Navy•-should take the merchants' records,
go to Ireland, and check for himself the way Her Majesty
was being defrauded.33
The Privy Council apparently believed John Jolles,
because on August 4 they wrote to Essex that if there were
a shortage of victuals, then "the Treasurer (Sir George
Carey) must either have the magazines
.?Orb id. , 96.

3lrb~., 35-36.

32IP~.£. ' 128.
33rbid. , io5.

~ull,

or have a good
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store of money in his hands." 34·

In any case, to sort out

the matter the Council would send one of their Victualling
officials (Mr. Darell) with all the records, in order to
give Essex a "more clear satisfaction in all things."35
However, Mr. Darrell was not able to gather up his records
and depart before September 9,36 and by the time he arrived, the Essex campaign was over, and the matter was
subsequently unresolved in the general confusion following Essex's departure on September 24.
Although the investigation regarding victuals went
unsolved, the corruption in clothing was more clearly
brought to light.

Again, in response to Essex's protes-

tations the Privy Council assured the Lord Lieutenant on
August 4 that over 12,000 uniforms should have been received by this time, and insisted that if there were losses the fault must be with the officials in Ireland.3?
Indeed, Essex's choice of Sir George Carey as Treasurer,
and merchants Babington and Bromley as contractors for
uniforms, was unfortunate because together they perpetrated one of the most outrageous frauds in Elizabeth's reign.
The case was not brought to light until 1616, but the investigation revealed that the Crown had been defrauded of

34 Ibid., 111.
35Ibid.

36Ibid., 14?.
3?Ibid., 111-12.

!
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b27,000 by the merchants between 1597 and 1600.38
The merchants had supplied only two-thirds of the
uniforms contracted for, and in the winter of 1598 had
supplied only 2500 of the 10,000 uniforms which had been
authorized.

The way the deception worked was that the

merchants paid the captains money instead of giving them
clothing.

The Crovm, for instance, contracted for a

winter outfit costing forty-nine shillings, and then, instead of delivering the uniform, the merchants simply
paid the Captain twenty-four shillings, which the captains
pocketed.

Another method was to give the men rotten uni-

.forms, and then offer to buy the uni.forms back for eighteen
shillings.

The men would gladly agree to receive money

which they could use for food, instead of useless, rotting clothing, and in this way
as much as

~20

~he

on a single uniform.

merchants would obtain
Finally the deception

was kept quiet by bribing officers in Ireland, principally
Sir George Carey, and port officers in London, Bristol

r:

~
~

l'.

r

l

and Chester, to certify that the correct number of uni.forms had le.ft England and had arrived in Ireland.39
While Essex assumed he was making a clean sweep of

t~e

cop.

ruption of the past, he was in fact inadvertently bringing together some of the most corrupt individuals which
the Irish wars had seen.

38 cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 99-100.
39Ibid., 99-101.
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After Essex's campaign the Privy Council attempted
to conduct an investigation, noting that since the captains and officials in Ireland made no complaint, they
must have been bribed into silence.

They ordered Mount-

joy to investigate the matter, but nothing conclusive was
proved until well into James I's reign. 40
While Essex, as the overall commander must assume a
certain responsibility for not rooting out this corruption in victuals and apparel, we must consider the realties of the situation.

The Lord Lieutenant, as his jour-

nal indicates, spent virtually every moment in Ireland
either on his three journeys, or getting the army ready
for the journeys.

It is obvious that he had no time to

really delve into and keep up with the

d~y-to-day

lems of supply contracts and shipping schedules.
easy to see how Sir George

Care~

probIt is

the Treasurer in Ireland

could have answered any of Essex's inquiries by attributing the shortage of promised supplies to transportation
problems, or to bad faith on the part of the Privy Council, an explanation which Essex would have been all too
willing to accept.

On August 21 Essex called a council of all the highranking Army officers at Dublin Castle to discuss the invasion

of Ulster.

Faced with the Lord Lieutenant's

40C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 441-42.
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determination to prosecute the campaign with any means
available, the officers tendered the following declaration:
The opinion of the Lords and Colonels of the
Army dissuading the journey northward.
We, the Lords, Colonels and Knights of the
Army, being called to a Council at War, the
day and year above written, at what time the
Lord Lieutenant, proposing to us his purpose
of invading Ulster, as well in regard of Her
Majesty's express commandment, as also to pull
down the pride of the Archtraitor Tyrone, to
redeem the late scorn of the Curlews, and
lastly to hold up the reputation of the army,
required us to deliver our opinions in what sort
of present journey thither might be made, we,
who were then present, being thoroughly acquainted with the state of Her Majesty's forces (as
having particular charge of them, some as
Colonels over regiments, and some as Captains
over companies), after long debating every one
of us having spoken in order, at last by common
consent resolved that, seeing the army so unwilling
to be carried thither, that some secretly run into
England, others revolt to the rebels, a third sort
partly hide themselves in the country, and partly
feign themselves sick, and seeing that there
could be no planting this year at Lough Foyle,
nor assailing of the north but one way (the Connaught army, consisting of a great part of old
companies, being lately defeated), and that our
army, which passeth not the number 3,500 or 4,000
at the most, of strong and serviceable men,
should be far overmatched, when all the forces
of the north should encounter them; and sithence
that it was a course full of danger, and of
little or no hope, to carry the army into their
strengths, where the rebels should be first
lodged, and were able to bring 6,000 shot to
entertain fight with less than 2,000 (in which
places, also, our horse should never be able to
serve, or succour our foot); and, further, forasmuch as we could place no garrisons in the north,
but such as consisted of very great numbers, and
great numbers we could not spare from so small an
army, with any likelihood of making a good retreat
with the rest (to say nothing of the want of shipping and especially of victualling caused by the lack
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thereof); and lastly sithence, if we could spare
a.sufficient number, and could lodge them at Armagh and the Blackwater, it would but tie the
army to be ever busied in victuallj.ng them, and
consequently more incommodate us than trouble the
~ebels (as it appeareth in the former plantations
there in the times of the Lord Burgh, Sir William
Russell, and Sir John Norreys) in regard of the
premisses, we all were of opinion that we could
not, with duty to Her Majesty, and safety to
this kingdom, advisfi or assent to the undertaking of any journey far north. In which resolution if any man suspected it proceeded of weakness or baseness, we will not only in all likely
and profitable service disprove him, but will
every one of us, seal with his life, that we dissuaded this undertaking with more duty than any
man could persuade into it--Dublin Castle, 1599,
Augus~t 21. 41
To support the gloomy picture described by the army

commanders, Sir George Carey wrote to the Privy Council
on August 26 that "the soldiers fall exceedingly sick. 1142
Even after the arrival of the long-awaited 2000 reinforcements brought over by Sir Francis Darcy at the end of
July, 4 3 Carey estimated that there were only a total of
10,000 men alive and physically present, instead of the
now authorized list strength of 19,000. 44
Against the unanimous opposition of the Army commanders, Essex gave the order for the appointed companies to
assemble at Kells, and on August 28 he left Dublin with
100 cavalrymen, to join them.
41 Ibid., 126-27.
42 Ib:i.d.
. ,
131.

4 3Ibid.,
44

79.

Ibid., 131.

It took until August 31
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for all the units to arrive, by which time Essex's force
numbered 2500 foot and 300 cavalry.

After waiting ano-

ther day for supQlies to arrive from Drogheda, the Lord
Lieutenant started his army off to challenge the wilds of
Ulster and the army of Tyrone. 4 5 Without the Lough Foyle
operation to tie down

Tyr~ne,

without the attack at Bal-

lyshannon to engage O'Donnell, Essex could expect to find
the full force of the best Irish armies waiting to meet
him.
On September 3 near Ardolph Essex approached Tyrone's
force and the Irish leader sent out some foot and horse
to skirmish with Essex's troops. 46

The two opposing lea-

ders finally caught sight of each other, and Essex wrote
to the Privy Council on September 4: "yesterday Tyrone and
I looked one upon another from two hills; but the river
and his fastness was betwixt us. 1147

In the same short

note to the Council Essex informed them that he intended
to move towards Louth, where he hoped to meet another convoy of victuals coming north from Drogheda.

As Essex

marched towards Louth along an open plain, Tyrone paralleled Essex's march, keeping his Irish soldiers generally
in the woods, except for occasional skirmishes.

On Sep-

tember 5 Essex arrived at Louth, met up with the victual
4

5Ibid. , 144-'+5.

46 Ibid., 145.

4 7Ibid., 142.
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convoy from Drogheda, and held a council of war, to consider what should be done about Tyrone's army, which was
hovering nearby.
Essex had been keeping track of Tyrone's disposition
and plans, by means of intelligence reports which he had
been receiving continuougly throu@lout his campaign. 48 The
general opinion of the Essex agents was that Tyrone intended "to make strong fights upon every pass" by which Essex
was to go to Ulster, drawing out the war to "unmeasurable
length" until "the three furies, Penury, Sickness and
Famine," forced the Queen's army to retire. 4 9 Captain
"J.C." in his intelligence report in June concluded that
Tyrone would make use of "the desert, craggy and boggy
mountains of Sleoughe Gallaine, containing forty miles in
compass, with the great woods of Killultagh, Kilwarlin,
Kileleyrto, and Clancakie !'50

The captain added: "these

fastnesses were inevitable stops to the journeys of all
former Deputies into Ulster, in times of far easier wars
than this one is like to prove. 11 51

As for the size of

Tyrone's army, the estimate fluctuated continuously.
early September, Essex and the Irish Council estimated
'

Tyrone's force at 6000 foot, while Sir George Carey in

48 Ibid., 43, 68, 136.
4

9Ibid., 69.

50ibid. , 69-?0.

5libid., 70.
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Dublin, estimated Tyrone's Army at 8000 foot and 700
horse,5 2 and Captain Dymmok estimated 10,000 foot and
1000 horse.53
In view of the Irish leader's commanding position,
one can imagine Essex's surprise when he received a message

from Tyrone on Septe.mber 5 that the Irish chief

wished to have a parley.

Essex refused, but informed the

messenger that if Tyrone still wished to parley he could
find the Lord Lieutenant the next day at the head of his
troops. 5'+
On September 6, after leaving 500 foot and 20 horse
behind to guard the supply train, Essex formed his army up
on the plain of Louth and began to move towards Tyrone's
position.

Essex's force of 2000 foot and 300 horse were

drawn up in a tactical formation which Captain Dyrn.mok
called a "Saint Andrews cross" which consisted of infantry
in the center, 100 horse on the left, 100 horse on the
right and 100 horse in the rear, which could rescue any
threatened part of the army, and prevent any retreat.

At

the head of the formation was the Lord Lieutenant and his
immediate party, who led the way as the army drew closer
to the rebels. 55

52J_bid. ' 143.
53Dymmok, A Treatice on

Ireland, Lt-8.

54c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-l~QO, 145.
55Dy:mmok, A

Treatice on Ireland, Lf.9.
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Tyrone's advance guard of cavalry drew back as Essex
approached, while the Irish infantry refused to emerge
from the woods.

At 3 o'clock in the afternoon, after

much feinting and some skirmishing, an Irish horseman
approached Essex and delivered a message, the substance
of which was

11

that Tyrone would not fight, nor draw forth,

but desired to speak with the Lord Lieutenant, but not
between the two armies. ,,56

Essex sent the messenger away

without an answer and, since it was approaching dusk,
Essex made

11

his rear, the vanguard" and withdrew back to

his camp for the night.5?
The next day the army moved out again, but before
they had gone a mile, Tyrone's messenger approached, and
stated that the Irish leader desired Her Majesty's mercy
and that the Lord Lieutenant should meet with him at a
ford called Billaclynthe, located a short distance to the
right of Essex's army.

Essex halted his troops and sent

two gentleman volunteers to the ford, where they found
Tyrone, who was, however, located too far out in the water
to converse with the messengers.

Upon hearing this report

Essex grew impatient and exclaimed, "Then I shall despair
ever to speak with him. 11 58 At last, however, a suitable
place was found and the Lord Lieutenant led a troop of

56 c.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 146.

57Dymmok, A Treatice on Ireland, 49.
.
7r:a Harrington,
Nugae Antiquae, 299.

237
cavalry to a hill above the ford.

Below, in the water up

to the belly of his horse, was Tyrone, waiting there alone
for the Lord Lieutenant.

When Essex saw this he left his

cavalry escort on the hill and rode down to the edge of
the ford by himself.

Upon Essex's coming, Tyrone saluted

"with much reverence" anc! the two conversed alone for one
half-hour, out of hearing distance of any other witnesses.59
Such a private conference by the Queen's representative was a highly irregular procedure in Tudor England, or
in any diplomatic circle.

Since no witnessed record was

kept of the proceedings, the meeting was the subject of
much speculation among the Lord Lieutenant's friends and
enemies.

Essex later stated that the private meeting was

only an occasion to arrange for a more formal meeting,
which took place later in the day.

The various State

Papers, however, tend to shed a different interpretation
on the conference.

As Essex began his Ulster journey, one

of his agents, Richard Weston, wrote a report on August
28 which Essex may not have seen until after he returned

from Ulster.

According to Weston, Tyrone had received a

letter from an agent in Scotland.

The agent asserted that

"your honor (Essex) was mightily crossed in England, since
you left it, and did think that you would make no great
stay here. 1160 If the above report is true, and if Tyrone
59nymmok, A Treatice on Ireland, 50; Harrington, Nuga~
Antiquae, 299; C. ;:.~ ._..>. 1'.rolana, 159Y-=1600, 146.
60c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 137·
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believed it, it would explain why Tyrone offered to parley with Essex, hoping that the Earl would be ready to
make any truce, so that he could leave Ireland and return
to his affairs in England.
Another reference to the private conference occurs
in the Calendar of State .Pauers in the Archives of Simancas.

On July 1, 1600, the Archbishop-elect of Dublin

wrote to the Spanish king:
O'Neil (Tyrone) had almost gained the earl of
Essex, the Queen's commander, to leave her side
and join your Majesty, surrendering the country
to you on the promise of great favors in your
majesty's name, and O'Neil gave him his own son
as hostage. The Earl did not carry out arrangement, out of suspicion of your Majesty in consequence of certain acts of his against Spain
some time ago.61
The "certain acts" undoubtedly refers to the sacking of
Cadiz in 1596, a humiliation which the Spanish King would
be loath to forget.
Another interpretation of the private conference was
later offered by Sir Robert Cecil, who stated that Essex
had made a bargain with Tyrone by which a force of Irishmen were to land in England with Essex, depose the Queen,
and make all the English "prey to Irish kern. 1162 While
. . .

. ·'' ·.:;)ii-.. ·

. ·,_ ..

Cecil's interpretation seems a bit outlandish, it is
probable that Tyrone did make treasonable offers, and that
Essex, anxious to make a quick end of the matter, was in

61 c.S.P. Simancas 1587-1602, 663.
2
62 C.S.P. Domestic
r:54
2 159(-1601, /

.

r

239
no mood or disposition to drive a hard bargain.
In November, after Essex had left Ireland, Tyrone
sent a letter to England containing twenty-two articles,
which supposedly had been agreed upori, or at least discussed, by the Earl of Essex.

The most controversial

provisions concerned

freedom, and stipulated

rel~gious

that Catholicism could be "openly preached and taught";
that the Catholic Church in Ireland was to be governed by
the Pope; that free travel of all priests and missionaries was to be insured; and that the lands and privileges
of the Catholic church should be restored.

The remaining

articles provided for measures which would allow Ireland
and the Irish people virtually an autonomous existence.
Robert Cecil labeled the document with the word "Eutopia"
and cast it aside. 6 3
In any case at the end of the half-hour private conference Essex and Tyrone each brought down six of their
principal advisors.

Again Tyrone and all his party rode

their horses into the water, while the Lord Lieutenant's
party remained on the shore, and in this setting they
continued the conference for another hour.

After agree-

ing to have their commissioners meet to draw up terms o:f
a truce, Essex and Tyrone parted, and would not set eyes
on each other again. 64

The next day an agreement was

63 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 279-80.
64 Ibid., 13?.
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drawn up whereby there would be a six-weeks' truce, which
would be renewed from one six-weeks' period to another
six-weeks' period until May day, and could be terminated
by either side with 14 days' notice.

Additionally, com-

missioners would mee·t and draw up more details of the
terms during the next fe'V( weeks. 6 5

To seal the bargain

Essex gave his word, while Tyrone gave his oath, after
which the English commander dispersed his army and returned
to Drogheda to "take physic" for his illness, while the
Irish commander retired, "with all his forces, into the
heart of his country. 1166
Essex immediately sent a copy of his journal of proceedings from August 28 to September 8 to the Privy Council.

In this journal the Earl only mentioned that a six-

weeks' truce had been concluded, but did not give any
details. 6 7

Essex had given Tyrone twenty days to discuss

terms of the truce with his allies, principally O'Donnell, 68 and the Lord Lieutenant moved back to Dublin Oastle to await Tyrone's final answer.

While in Dublin, on

September 15, Essex wrote up a detailed description of all
the truce's terms and sent them off to Elizabeth. 6 9
6 51188. Salisbur;y, vol. 9, 348.
66

C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 147.

6 7Ibid.

68 Harrington, Nugae Antiguae, 301.

69c.s.P. Irelan~, 1599-160Q, 154.
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On September 20 Essex received a stinging letter from
Elizabeth, written in response to the Earl's short note of
September 4 in which he related his Ulster proceedings;
proceedings which may well have appeared cautious and irresolute. 70

Elizabeth opened her letter to Essex by not-

ing "how little the

mann~r

of your proceedings hath an-

swered either our direction or the worl.ds expectations."
She then launched into a lengthy denunciation of the whole
course of Essex's campaign.
The Queen would accept none of Essex's excuses for
having postponed the Ulster invasion:

If sickness of the army be reason, why was there
not the action undertaken when the army was in
better state? If the spring were too soon, and
the swmne:i::· th.at fullowecl othei·wise spent, i f the

harvest that succeeded were so neglected as
nothing hath been done, then surely we must conclude that none of the four quarters of the year
will be in season for you and that Council to
agree to Tyrone's prosecution, for which all our
charge is intended. Further, we require you to
consider whether we have not great cause to
think that your purpose is not to end the war.
Concerning strategy she continued:
How often have you told us that others that preceded you had no judgement to end the war, who
often resolved us that until Lou~h Foyle and
Ballyshannon were planted there could be no hope
of doing service upon the capitol rebels? We
must therefore let you know, as it cannot be
ignorance so it cannot be want of means: for
you had your asking, you had choice of times, you
had power and authority more ample than ever any
70'l'he following excerpts are taken from the Queen's
letter to Essex, dated September 14, 1599, found in the
C~S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 150-53.
For the complete text
see Appendix D.
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had or shall have.
As for the steadily diminishing numbers of the army
the Queen observed: "For the small proportion (of troops)
you say you carry with you of 3,500 foot, when lately we
augmented you 2,000 more, it is past comprehension, except
it be that you have left.too great numbers in unnecessary
garrisons, which do increase our charge and diminish our
army ••• "

Finally, the Queen commented on Essex's inces-

sant charges that his campaign was being undermined by
persons in England: "We have seen a writing, in manner of
a catalogue full of challenges, that are impertinent, and
of comparisons, that are needless, such as hath not been
before this time presented to a State, except it be done
more with a hope to terrify all men from censuring your
proceedings."
This last letter contained the most serious accusations burled at Essex to date.

In addition to a general

condemnation of his proceedings, there was the ominous new
charge that perhaps Essex's purpose was not to end the
war.

Furthermore, Elizabeth's comments concerning Essex's

"catalogue full of challenges" against the Privy Council
made it obvious that the Queen was believing the Privy
Council's interpretation of events.
Three days after writing her letter of September 14,
Elizabeth received Essex's journal and letter of September
8, describing the termination of the Ulster campaign and
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the prospect of a truce.

.

her final correspondence.

The Queen immediately sent off

71 The Queen initially expressed

surprise to "see a quick end made of a slow proceeding."
But Elizabeth was skeptical, and stated:

We never doubted but that Tyrone whensoever he

saw any force approach, either himself or any of
his principal partisans, would instantly offer a
parley, especially with our supreme Governor of'
that kingdom, having often done it to those who
had but subaltern authority.

Elizabeth was particularly distressed about Essex's private
conversation with Tyrone and commented:
••• it appeareth to us by your journal, that you
and the traitor spake together half an hour alone,
and without anybody's hearing: wherein, though we
trust you with our kingdom, are far from mistrusting with a traitor; yet both for comeliness, example, and for our own discharge, we marvel you
would c~rry it no better.

Regarding any truce terms which Essex might offer to
Tyrone, the Queen sarcastically noted:

11

•••

you have pros-

pered so ill for us by your warfare, as we cannot but be
very jealous lest you should be as well overtaken by the
treaty."

And she grimly observed:

••• if this parley shall not produce such a conclusion, as this intolerable charge may receive
present and large abatement, then hath the managing of our forces not only proved dishonorable
and wasteful, but that which .followeth is like
to prove perilous and contemptable.
In respect to any promises Tyrone might make, the

71 The following excerpts are taken from the Queen's

letter to Essex, dated September 17, 1599, found in Harrington's augae l> ntiqua~, 302-08. For the complete text
see Appendix E.
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Queen continued:
To trust this traitor upon oath, is to trust a
devil upon his religion. 1ro trust him upon pledges
is mere illusary, for what piety is there among
them that can tie them to rule of honesty for
itself, who are only bound to their own sensualities, and respect only private utility.
Therefore the terms which the Queen expected Essex to im-

.

pose were expressed as follows:
••• unless he [Tyrone] yield to have garrisons
planted in his country to master him, to deliver
O'Neils sons [as hostages], and to come over to
us personally here, we shall doubt you do but
piece up a hollow peace, and so the end prove
worse than the beginning.
The Quee.n then emphatically directed:
And therefore, as we well approve your own voluntary progession, (wherein you assure us that you
will conclude nothing till you have advertised us,
and heard our pleasure), so d.o we absolutt;l;y- co1lli.ilar.1.d
you to continue and perform that resolution.
Lastly, the Queen explained her reasons for taking such an
uncompromising position:
For whatever we do, ought to be well weighed in
such a time, when the world will suspect that
we are glad of anything out of weakness, or apt
to pardon him out of mistrust of our power to
take due revenge on him.

When Essex received the above letter, he immediately
appointed a temporary government in Ireland, and, in direct disobedience to the Queen's order through the Privy
Council, too several close companions and departed Ireland
on September 24, 1599, for Her .Majesty's Court at Nonsuch.7 2
Exactly why Essex left in such a manner is still a
(' P • Ireland, 1599-160Q, 156 •
72 0 • u.
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matter of speculation.

Perhaps it was to

e}..~lain

the terms

of the truce which the Queen would receive shortly, terms
which would :hardly meet her expectations.

Perhaps he was

apprehensive about Her Majesty's inference of treasonable
activities in her letter of September 14.
last two letters from

th~

Undoubtedly the

Queen had inflamed his passion-

ate disposition, and such a flamboyant, dramatic gesture
was certainly in keeping with his personality.

In any

event his departure from Dublin brought to a close one of
the most controversial campaigns in English history.

l

CHAPTER VIII
EPILOGUE
On September 28, 1599, four days after leaving Ire-

.

land, Essex arrived at the Court of Elizabeth and burst
into her bed chamber unannounced.
tial hasty

e~planation,

After making an ini-

he was dismissed until the after-

noon, when his conduct would be examined in detail.
Essex had brought a company of knights, captains and
other officers with him and they remained close to the
Earl throughout the long afternoon and evening. 1
If Essex had hoped to persuade Elizabeth to his way
of thinking, he was mistaken.

A court observer noted

that the Queen privately commented: "By God's Son I am no
Queen, that man is above me! 112

Elizabeth made no sudden,

rash decisions immediately upon Essex's arrival since
there was no way of knowing how many men he had brought
with him, and what his intentions were.

She may well have

recalle·d a statement made by Francis Bacon only nine days
before.

On September 15, when discussing Irish questions

and Essex'~actions, Bacon, still considered a friend by
. the unsuspecting Essex, offered the observation to the
1 Harrison, Elizabethan Journals II, 116-18.
2 Quoted in Bowen, Lion and Throne, 129.
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Queen, that if Her Majesty
••• had my Lord of Essex here with a white staff
in his hand, as my Lord of Leicester had, and
continued him still about for society to yourself,
and for an honour and ornament to your attendance
and Court in the eyes of your people and in the
eyes of foreign ambassadors, then were he in his
right element, for to discontent him as you do and
yet put arms and power into his hands, may be a
kind of temptation ~o make him prove cumbersome
and unruly.3
In any case, after a day of questioning, with Elizabeth now certainly aware that Essex had brought few followers, the Earl was turned over to the custody of the
Lord Keeper, Thomas Egerton, for confinement at York
House. 4

A

hearing of the Star Chamber was considered,

but its fines were ruinous, and apparently Elizabeth still
held Essex in affection.

Instead, he would be judged by

a private commission of peers headed by the Lord Keeper.5
The public reaction was one of disbelief and dismay.
Unaware of all the circumstances surrounding the Earl's
return, the people would remain stubbornly loyal to Essex
.throughout.
The official hearing regarding the Earl's conduct
during the Irish campaign took place in June 1600.

However,

preceding this an important meeting of the Star Chamber
3John Bruce (ed.), Correspondence of Kin5 James VI
of Scotland with Sir Robert Cecil and O'thers in '.EnglanO:
(Lonuon, 1830), 107-68.
4 Williams, Elizabeth, 33?.
5Bowen, Li~n and Throne, 129.
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had taken place in November 1599.

It was at this meeting

that the charges against the Earl were clarified and the
opinion of many otherwise neutral persons were swayed
against Essex.

Additionally, Essex's conduct during the

official hearing in June 1600 can be understood only by
examining the proceeding9 of the November Star Chamber
meeting.

It would be profitable, therefore, to consider

'these proceedings in detail.
The occasion for the Star Chamber meeting, which
Essex did not attend, was the end-of-term speech of Lord
Keeper Egerton.

Six members of the Privy Council used

this opportunity to speak out against treason in general
and the conduct of Essex in particular.

Though not charg-

ing Essex outright with sedition, the implication was
clear.
The first speaker was Lord Keeper Egerton, who began
by condemning certain libels and slanders leveled by
"wicked Traytors" against Her Majesty.

There.were rumors

that the Queen had not taken the affairs of Ireland with
as much "Care and Providence as was meet. 116

Yet, Her

Majesty had sent a splendidly equipped army, had forgiven
Essex fS,000 of his private debt, and had sent all the arms
and victuals which were needed.

Thus, "if this be no Care

and Providence in Her Majesty, I know not what Pains, what
Councel, what Foresight is required in a carefull and
6Bacon, The Earl of Essex's Vindication, 60.
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Provident Prince. n7
Lord Egerton then sought to determine the cause of
the failure in Ireland.

Essex had been instructed to go

north to Ulster; instead he had gone south and had wasted
his army.

Then, with his army weakened, he had engaged

in a private conference

~ith

Tyrone, had made a dishonor-

able truce, and had returned to England without permission.
The Lord Keeper concluded that the Earl should get the
punishment he deserved. 8
The next speaker was Lord Treasurer Buckhurst, responsible for supplying and financing the expedition.

He

cov€red the subject of support for the expedition, pointing out that Essex had the best equipped army ever sent.
All the men had been paid in advance and all supplies had
arrived generally as planned.

Therefore, no blame could

be placed on Her .Majesty for lack of support.9
Buckhurst was followed by Lord Admiral Howard, who
castigated Essex for going south into Munster after he,
Essex, had even rec.ognized the need to destroy Tyrone in
Ulster. 10

He further condemned the promise of religious

toleration Essex had granted in the truce with Tyrone.
Nottingham finished by stating that the ships to carry

?Ib:!£., 62.
8

Ibid. , 64.

9Ibid., 64-65.
10

C.S.P. Domestic,

1597-160~,

349.
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troops to the north had been ready to satl, but Essex's
weakened army had been in no condition to use them. 11
At this point, Sir Robert Cecil interrupted.

He

acknowledged Lord Egerton as being the "mouthpiece of
Her Majesty" and explained: "It goes against my Heart to
speak in this Cause, but·when my Sovereign's Honour is in
Question, I cannot be silent. 1112 He then launched out
against "these wicked Spirits," who were saying that the
Queen cared not for her soldiers.

Regarding Ireland, he

stated: "I have heard that my Lord of Essex said that if
he had had men and money, Ireland had not been lost, but
I do not think he would say so. 111 3

Furthermore, from the

time Essex's army first landed, it had never tried to defeat the main rebel army, but instead had gone south.
Essex, in going south, proceeded contrary to instructions,
:for the "Council here declared they never advised such a
course. 1114 Cecil reiterated the other charges against
Essex, ending by declaring that he had heard that the
insolent Irish, heartened by the easy terms Essex had
granted, were boasting o:f invading England itself. 1 5
The remaining speakers stated that they were not

11 Bacon, The Earl of Essex's Vindication, 65.
12 Ibid., 67.

13 C.S.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 353.
14""b'd

.:!::...2:._ • '
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l5Bacon, The Earl of Essex's Vindication, 66-72.
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present when Irish affairs were being discussed, therefore
they could make no statements on the specifics of the campaign.16

However, Chief Justice Fortiscue commented that

libelers and slanderers must be rooted out, or else there
would be chaos.

As for Ireland, all he knew was that the

island was now in worse condition than when Essex's army
first landed.

Lord Chamberlain Hunsdon, another neutral,

expressed complete bewilderment at the Irish debacle and
stated that with the army Essex had, he should have been
able to march through Spain itselr. 1 7
Cecil, Egerton, Buckhurst and Howard had presented
their declaration in such a way that Essex could not respond without seeming to attack the Queen herself.
final warning, the

Coun~il

As a

stated that anyone who per-

sisted in slanderous tales concerning the alleged lack of
care regarding the ·Irish expedition, would be subject to
severe punishment. 18
Essex and his followers quickly heard of the proceedings in the Star Chamber and recognized the vulnerability
of their position.

The next day Edward Reynolds, secre-

tary to the Earl of Essex, wrote to Henry Cuffe, another
Essex supporter, relating the details of the Star Chamber
proceedings.

Reynolds informed Cuffe that Essex wanted

a thorough check of the Irish records to answer the accusa-

16c.s.P. Domestic, 1,297:-J.60~, 351.
1 7E aeon, 'rh e ""
£;ar.1 o.f .....
J:Jssex ' s

v·ind 1.ca-r;1on,
·
··

66· •

18Harrison, Elizabethan Journals, II, 129-30.
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tions of the Council.

As for the present, Reynolds felt

that discretion was the better part of valor.

If the

Earl protested in his usual vociferous manner, he would
only antagonize the officials and make things worse.

Rey-

nolds concluded: "If he gets out of this bog, he may speak
home hereafter, and yet lose nothing now by a humble and
temperate proceeding. 111 9

As we shall.see, Essex followed

the advice of his friends when he attended the June hearing.
On December 1, 1599, the Lords of the Star Chamber

declared that because of his misgovernment in Ireland,
along with his other errors and faults, the household
staff of Essex, numbering 160 persons, was to be dispersed.
He would be· allowed to keep a few retainers in his new
residence, which was to be designated by Elizabeth.

Essex

was in no position to argue, particularly since he was
seriously ill from the effects of campaigning in Ireland.
By December

15, it seemed that he would die, so Elizabeth

sent her personal physician to look after him. 20

The peo-

ple were much aggrieved and prayed for Essex's recovery.
One of Cecil's supporters, Dr. Ed.ward Stanhope, complained
in a letter that sermons were being preached on behalf of
Essex, while puolic prayers were offered in his name. 21

19c.s.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 354.
20Harrison, Elizabethan Journals, II, 174.
21
.
.
C.S.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 365.
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With the coming of Spring, Es.sex recovered and appeared
before the Council for a formal hearing on June

5,

1600.

The session lasted for eleven hours, beginning at nine in
the morning.

The charges against him were those discussed

in the November meeting.

The only significant change was

that Francis Bacon openly joined the ranks of the witnesses against Essex.

The Earl was condemned for appointing

Southampton as General of the Horse, going souttito Munster
in Ireland contrary to his instructions, and returning
from Ireland without permission. 22
Throughout the long session, the Earl was the picture of humility, rarely speaking, and then only in barely
audible tones.

He began the hearing by voluntarily kneel-

ing at the feet of the Council.

As the session went on,

he was given permission to stand, then to lean, and finally to sit.

When the testimony ended, Essex offered no

excuses, not even to the insinuations of Sir Edward Coke
of the Earl's disloyalty.

All the Councilors condemned

Essex for "contemptuously offending so great a sovereign. 11
However, they could not agree on his punishment, suggestions about which ranged from loss of of fices to imprisonment in the Tower.

Finally, he was told to return to his
house to await the Queen's pleasure. 2 3
~'

Elizabeth was possibly impressed by Essex's new-found
22 Ibid., 159.
2 3Ibid., 160.
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humility and kept the sentence relatively light, sequestering all the major offices Essex had accumulated and
keeping him under house arrest.

In August, convinced of

his repentance, she decided to set him free.

This deci-

sion prompted controversy among the Court members, as Sir
Walter Raleigh warned:
His malice is fixed and will not evaporate by
any mild courses. Let the Queen hold him
while she has him for he will always be a danger. Princes are lost by security and preserved
by prevention: if he have his liberty then we
have seen the last of her good days and all
ours.24
Raleigh's advice notwithstanding, Essex was freed in late
August and publicly announced his intention to live a retired life.
Whether a man of Essex's temperament would have been
content to retire at the age of thirty-three seems doubtful.

\.Jhatever his plans, a new crisis emerged over the

issue of finances, the plague of king and commoner alike.
In an age when a teacher could expect to earn I;,5 a year,
and a good privateer
gering debts.
his debt of

~9

or

~10,

the Earl had run up stag-

As we have seen, Elizabeth had written off

f8,ooo

when he left for Ireland.

By September 1600, being over %,16,000 in d.ebt, he
wrote to Elizabeth regarding his financial status.

His

main source of income was from his lease to a monopoly on
i.nported sweet wines.

The ten-year lease would be up in

24Harrison, Elizabethan Journals, II, 174.
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October 1600 and the Earl begged the Queen to renew it,
to save him from his creditors. 2 5 Elizabeth made no deci-

1

I

sion until the very end of October, and then sent Essex
word that she had decided to keep the lease herself and
award it to no one. 26
Neville Williams, author of Elizabeth the Queen,
states that Her Majesty decided to hold it until Essex
would mend his ways. 2 7 A more plausible explanation lies
in a comment made by Sir Francis Bacon, who was present
when the Queen read Essex's letter, wTitten in his usual
flowery style.

Apparently Elizabeth still cared for Essex

and was deeply disappointed upon receiving this letter,
for "she took the letter to be the abundance of his heart,
she found it to be but a preparation for the renewing of
his farm on sweet wines. 1128

Thus, in her offended vanity,

she refused to allow Essex to keep his means of financial
support.
The news instantly threw Essex into a frenzy.

His

friends told him that the Queen, the Council and his other
adversaries intended to thrust him down to extreme poverty. 29

Sir John Harrington, who served with him in Ireland,

saw him shortly afterwards and wrote to a friend:
2 5williams, Elizabeth, 340.

26Harrison, Elizabethan Journals, II, 191.
27williams, Elizabeth, 340.
28 narrison, Elizabethan Journals, II, 186.
2 9rbid., i

95.
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His soul seemeth tossed to and fro like the waves
of a troubled sea. His speeches of the queene
becometh no man who has ~ens sana ~n corpore sano.
He uttered strange wordsbordering on such strange .
desygnes that made me hasten forth and leave his
presence. Thank heaven! I am safe at home.30
When .the Queen turned down his request for renewal of his
lease, the Earl committed himself to the idea of rebellion.
When one considers his dealings with James VI of
Scotland and Lord Mountjoy in Ireland, it would seem that
rebellion had been in the back of his mind for some time.
The Scottish King, who had long set_ his mind on succeeding
to the Crown of England, had had constant correspondence
with Essex, and there were many who advised James that
Essex was the man with whom he would have to deai.3 1
At the same time, Essex had been keeping in close
touch with Lord Hountjoy, his successor in Ireland, and
correspondence indicates that I1ountjoy and Essex had a
plan for an invasion of England from Ireland and Scotland.
Immediately after taking over the Irish army, Mountjoy
sent Henry Leigh, his personal emissary, to James VI, proposing that if James would mass troops on the border,
Mountjoy would invade England with four or five thousand
men, and under Essex, effect a coup, turning the Crown over
to James.3 2 James, as usual, was hesitant and unwilling
30Quoted in Bowen, Lion and Throne, 130.

31 Helen G. Stafford, James
. VI of Scotland and the
!_~r~ne of Enf:\lend (New York, 1940), 205.
32navid H. Wilson, James VI and I (New York, 1967),
150-51; Handover, The Second CeciI, ~Co.
.
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to take so drastic a step; thus negotiations stretched
throughout the summer of 1600.

At the same time, Mount-

joy was experiencing great success in Ireland and quickly
grew lukewarm to the idea of an armed invasion. 33

After

the sweet-wines incident, Essex attempted to push the invasion plot again, playing on James' fear of exclusion by
writing that Cecil was considering the establishment of
the Spanish Infanta on the throne of England.34 But James,
though alarmed, still would not risk offending Elizabeth,
while Lord Mountjoy no longer wished to risk his career,
and possibly his head, for Essex.
With or without James VI and Mountjoy, Essex was determined to act, and as later confessions indicated, the
outline of the plot was formed at the beginning of November 1600.

The conspirators, headed by Essex and the Earl

of Southampton, met at

Dr~y

House, where they decided to

capture the Tower of London first, then the Court, and
without harm to the Queen, to effect a change of government and thus rid the Queen of evil advisors.

For sup-

port, Essex's friends confidently assured him that he
could count on the people of London, and at least twentyone of the twenty-four aldermen.35
At the end of December Essex went to London, where
33Handover, The Second Cecil, 205.
34Ibid., 220.
35Bowen, Lion and Throne, 133, 137.
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his presence irrmiediatcly attracted the attention of the
entire city.

Throughout the month of January there were

almost daily gatherings at his house, while preachers
gave sermons on the power of superior magistrates to restrain even kings.

Discontented officers, Puritans· and
other malcontents also tbronged about his residence.3 6

Apparently by early February the conspirators were ready,
since on February 5, Essex's friends paid forty shillings
to have the play Richard II performed at the Globe Theater in London.37
Such obvious preparation could hardly be missed by
Cecil, and on February
to the Council.

?, he sent word for Essex to report

Essex refused, telling Cecil that he was

sick and confiding to his friends that he expected to be
murdered.

The next day Cecil sent a delegation, led by

the Lord Keeper and the Lord Chief Justice, to Essex's
house to take the Earl into custody.

Essex immediately

had them locked up, and with about two hundred followers
went into the London streets to start the rebellion.

The

crowds were both wary and confused as the greatest lord
in England rode through the streets calling them to arms
and warning of plots by Raleigh and others to kill him.38
Robert Cecil had been well prepared.

The day after

36 Harrison, Elizabethan Journals, II, 203, 205.
37Bowen,. Lion and Throne, 131.
38 Harrison, Elizabethan Journals
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the revolt, he wrote: "If the Queen had not put herself in
strength that morning and barricaded Charing Cross and
other places of the back parts of Westminster, the resolution was to have been at the court by noon."39

As Essex

passed through the streets, Robert Cecil's brother followed as a herald, procl~iming Essex a traitor. 40

The Lord

Mayor and the Lord Sheriff, whom Essex had thought might
provide 1000 men, refused to aid him, while the troops of
the Bishop of London fired on the rebels, killing three
men, the only fatalities of the rebellion. 41
With nowhere to go, Essex retreated back to his house,
ci t_izens and followers alike using the opportunity to
slink from his side.

Finding his prisoners gone, Essex

barricaded the house and awaited his fate. 42

It came in

the person of Lord Admiral Howard, who arrived with a
force of cavalry and called upon Es.sex and the conspirators to surrender, promising that their grievances would
be brought to the Queen.

At this, a contemporary writes,

"they seemed utterly to despair, Essex saying there was
none near the Queen that would be suffered to make a true
report of his action, or spea~ a good word for him. 114 3

39c.s.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 547.
40Handover, The Second Cecil,
41

237.

Harrison, Elizabethan Journals, II, 210-13.

42

Ibid.

4 3c.s.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 550.
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After more prompting, Essex came out, and the Lord Admiral
took him away.

The brief rebellion was over, undone, as

one contemporary observed, by the "providence and celerity
of the Secretary who foresaw before he was believed and
showed great dexterity and courage in ministering sudden
remedies. 1144
The immediate concern of both Elizabeth and Robert
Cecil was to discredit Essex with the people and to insure
that no outside force would attempt to complicate the issue.

The next day, Elizabeth set the tone, when she ex-

plained to the French Ambassador that "a senseless ingrate
had at last revealed what had long been in his mind. '.45
On

the same day, a proclamation drawn up by Robert Cecil

was sent to the people of London which stated that the
Earls of Essex, Southampton and Rutland had been discovered
in treasons in Ireland with Tyrone, and also in England.
Upon being discovered, the conspirators had imprisoned the
Lord Keeper and the Lord Chief Justice and then, pretending that their lives were threatened, had attempted to
lead a rebellion.

The culprits now had been apprehended,
and Her Majesty thanked Her, subjects for their loyalty. 46
The charge of an Essex-Tyrone conspiracy was the main
theme in the subsequent attempts to discredit Essex, since
44

Ibid., 555.

4 5Williams, Elizabeth, 340.
46
c.s.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 545.
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an invasion by half-civilized Irishmen, whose savagery
was well known to the masses through stories from returning veterans, was a particularly frightening prospect.
At Essex's trial, Sir Robert Cecil solemnly announced
that Essex had planned to have Tyrone land with 8000 Irish
barbarians and depose

th~

Queen, after which all would be

made "prey to Irish kerns. 1147
Sir Robert Cecil, who must have had a superlative intelligence network, apparently was aware of Essex's previous intrigues with Mountjoy in Ireland, as well as with
James VT in Scotland.

Now, Cecil wrote a letter to Lord

I1ountjoy to subtly inform the Viceroy that if he had any
thoughts of returning to save Essex he would be backing a
dead favorite.

After informing Mountjoy of the details of

the rebellion, Cecil concluded: "I shall only need to say
that I think by the time my letters arrive, both he (Essex)
0

and the Earl of Southampton with other principles, shall
have lost their heads. 1148

Cecil need not have troubled

himself about Mountjoy; things were going too well in IreAs for James VI of Scotland, when he heard the news

land.

of Essex's failure, he realized that for all practical pup.
poses, Cecil was the temporary ruler of England and immediately sought to solidify relations with the Secretary. 4 9

47 Ibid., 554.
48

4

C.S.P. Domestic, 1597-1601, 547.

9stafford, James VI, 21?.
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The trial, which began on February 19, 1601, was a
mere formality, since the issue was never in doubt.

Actu-

ally, in Tudor England, to be put on trial for treason
was tantamount to a death sentence.

From 1522 to 1589,

many noblemen were brought to trial, yet only one, Sir
Nicholas Throckmorton, managed to talk himself into an
acquittal.

Throckmorton's jury was immediately imprisoned,

and eight who re.fused to retract their "not guilty" verdict
were ruinously .fined.50
The rules for procedure were somewhat lax and were
definitely stacked against the accused.

At Essex's tria,l,

two eminent lawyers, Sir Edward Coke, who had both set up
the trial and selected the jury, and Chief Justice Popham,
who was the judge, gave testimony against Essex.

The jury

contained numerous persons of very doubtful objectivity,,
such as Lord Admiral Howard and Lord Grey.

However, the

trial proceeded as a model of Elizabethan jurisprudence
and the prosecutors, particularly Sir Edward Coke, presen•
ted an unanswerable case.

When the verdict was called

~or,

each juryman rose and stated in monotonous succession:
"Guilty, my Lord, of high treason, upon my honor. 11 51
On February 25, 1601, Robert Devereaux, second Earl
of Essex, ascended the scaffold to the executioner's block
in the Tower of London courtyard, to suffer the penalty

50Bowen, Lion and Throne, 142-43.
5libid., 141, 143, 159.
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for treason and rebcllioL.

Of his principal antagonists,

Sir Robert Cecil was nowhere to be seen, but Sir Walter
Raleigh accompanied Essex to the very steps of the platform, ostensibly to be in a position to reply to any final
accusations Essex might hurl at him.

Some said he came to
feed his eyes with the sight of the Earl's blood.5 2 The
Privy Council instructed the officials in charge of the
execution to insure that Essex, in his final remarks, in
no way attempted to discuss the particulars of his trial
or to justify himself.

Thus, the sentence was carried out

with scrupulous attention to ancient custom, ending with
the executioner lifting the severed head to the assembled
notables and crying: "God save the Queen. 11 53
After the execution, Robert Cecil still tried to
destroy the image of Essex.

Sir Francis Bacon was commis-

sioned to write a tract about the treason of the fallen
earl,54 while preachers were ordered to condemn him from
the pulpit.

The gist of the condemnation was that Essex

had plotted with Tyrone, had been reconciled to the Pope
and the King of Spain, and had sought to place himself on
the throne of England.

But the populace knew that most of

these outrageous charges had not been mentioned at the

52 camden, His~o~ie, 188.

53Q.S.P. ~omestic, 1597-1601, 595-96.
54Harrison, Elizabethan Journals, II, 241.
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arraignment,55 and in resentment they spoke of Cecil as
"Robin with the bloody heart" and "a Machiavelli with a
crooked back. 11 56
Elizabeth, for all her outward imperturbability, was
as grieved as the people at the death of Essex.

The Queen

slipped into a mental depression from which she never
really emerged.

Court observers wrote of how she suddenly

cared little for food, wore the same garments for days on
end, paced her privy chamber at all hours of the night, and
generally displayed annoyance at all things.57
In December 1602, Sir John Harrington, Elizabeth's
godson, visited the Court and found Elizabeth "in most
pitiable state. 11

Harrington, who had a reputation for his

lively poetry, tried to cheer her up by reading some of
his verses, but the Queen only replied: "When thou dost
feel creeping time at thy gate, these fooleries will please
thee less; I am past my relish for such ma t·ters. 11 58

During

the course of their conversation, Elizabeth casually asked
Harrington if he had ever seen Tyrone, whereupon Harrington said 'that he had seen Tyrone when he served with the
Earl of Essex.

At this remark, she suddenly looked up

55.Elizabeth M. Thomson, The Chamberlain Letters (New
York, 1965), 18.

56 \.Jilliams, 1~li zabeth, 342.

57H..arring
. t on, Tiugae Antiguae, 317-20 •
58Ibid., 323.
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with "much color and grief in her countenance," and her
eyes filled with tears.59

In this state of melancholia,

Elizabeth spent her remaining days, and she died on March
24, 1603.

The fate of Ireland.after the departure of the Lord
Lieutenant was similarly unhappy.

Essex had made a great

impression on the Irish in general, and Tyrone in particular.

After the Lord Lieutenant had gone back to England,

negotiations broke down, while reports kept coming in
that the rebels would surrender only to the Earl of EsTyrone himself wrote that Essex was the only Englishman in whom he had confidence. 61 However, by Novem-

sex. 60

ber, Tyrone began to doubt whether Essex would come back,
and in January 1600, the Irish leader b·egan his depradations anew. 62
Sir Charles Blount, Lord Mountjoy, was asked to take
command 0£ Essex's army in October 1599, shortly after
the Earl had returned from Ireland.

Lord Mountjoy at

first refused out of loyalty to Essex, a feeling no doubt
prompted in part by the fact that Mountjoy loved Essex's

59Ibi~., 322.
6 0Q_.S.P. Ireland 1599-l?OO, 201.
2

61 Ibid. , 240-41.
62 Ibid., 252.
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favorite sister, Penelope. 6 3

In February 1600, apparently

convinced that Essex's fortune was on a downward course,
Mountjoy suddenly accepted command of the army.
The new Lord Deputy arrived in Ireland at the end of
the month and, with an army of 14,000 foot and 1200 horse,
brought up to full strength by new drafts from the Queen, 64
began his work with efficiency and dedication.
task was to revise the victualing system.

His first

The old system

of supplying the Army's needs directly from England had
worked while the garrisons numbered only a few thousand;
it was threatened when the garrisons rose from 4000 to
7000 in 1595; and finally broke down altogether when Essex's great army of 17,300 sought to sustain itself.
Upon observing the disastrous effects on Essex's
army, Lord Mountjoy implemented a ruthless version of the
Netherlands system, whereby the householders in fortified
towns were required to store one year's supply of corn, and
if possible, butter, cheese and salt pork, which his army
could use as it passed by the area. 6 5

Mountjoy's system,

which he had three years to perfect, worked well for the
English, although it resulted in the Irish countryside
being scoured of footstuffs and left famine in the wake.
The Privy Council gave additional support by changing
6 3Handover, The Second Cecil, 200.
64Falls, Eliz.a beth's Irish War_§., 262.

6 5c.s.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 370.
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th,e system of shipping victuals from England.

Instead of

allowing the merchants to turn over supplies to the "commissaries of victuals" at the Irish ports, the merchants
were made utterly responsible for supplies, from initial
procurement to final distribution to the army units.

With-

out the ambiguities of responsibility which existed when
the "commissaries of victuals" were involved in the distribution process, the Privy Council was able to control
the system better and greatly reduce corruption. 66
Acceptable strides were also made in reforming the
problem of uniforms.

Essex's troops had had their uni-

forms rot off their bodies, and had been otherwise unsuitably dressed to conduct a campaign in the Irish climate
and terrain.

Essex had realized these deficiencies and

had suggested in July 1599 that the troops be outfitted
with Irish shoes and Irish mantles (large woolen coats)
which were ideally suited for the climate. 6 7 No action
was taken during Essex's lieutenancy, but in December

1599, Irish apparel., notably shoes and mantles, was·authorized for the army in Ireland. 68

As for the corruption

in supplying uniforms which had plagued Essex, Mountjoy
was ordered to investigate the matter and determine where
66 cruickshank, Elizabeth's Irish Wars, 85.
67 C.S.P. Ireland, 1599-1600, 93.
1

68~.b· ~

.:L.2:.£. ' 109-12 •
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the discrepancies la~. 6 9

Although :Mountjoy never deter-

mined the exact source of corruption, his investigation
apparently had some deterrent effect, since difficulties
about uniforms were only a minor problem in his army •.
The overall effect of reform in disbursing victuals
and uniforms was to

upgr~de

the health of :Mountjoy's army.

Additionally, while Essex's soldiers died in the streets
for want of appropriate medical care--despite Essex's
personal efforts--a massive government effort was ordered
for Mountjoy.

In January 1600, Lord Buckhurst, the

Trea~

surer, authorized money for the establishment of hospitals
in every province.in Ireland.70
The final area of reform concerned the rule that soldiers had to pay for their own gunpowder, even in battle.
As early as August 1598, Sir Robert Cecil in a memorandum
entitled "Some errors to be reformeQ. in the government of
Ireland" had discussed with understanding the problem of
ammunition--and, incidentally, the use of Irish mantles
and shoes.71

However, while Essex brought the problem of.

gunpowder to the attention of the Privy Council, it was
not until after his campaign that corrective action was , ,
taken.
The chief opponent against having the Crown pay a
69Ibid., 442.
?Oibid., 396.

7 1 c.s.P. Ireland, 1598-9~, 251-53.
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gunpowder allowance was the Treasurer, Lord Buckhurst, who
believed that if the soldiers did not pay for their own
ammunition, they would not care how much they fired off,
and how much of the Queen's resources were wasted.

On

January 16, 1600, Buckhurst reluctantly approved the new
rule of having the Crown.pay for gunpowder used in battle,
concluding, however, that the new system was "against all
re€ison, equity, good order and justice. 11 7 2

Later in the

year,, Mountjoy was authorized to issue gunpowder for training purposes as well as for active service,?3 while in
1601, the government decided that the ordinary soldier
should no longer be compelled to pay for weapons lost on
the battlefield.74
With a firm base of support at Dublin, and with the
enthusiastic cooperation of the Privy Council,

Mou_~tjoy

systematically began the subjugation of Tyrone.

A

new

series of mutually supporting garrisons were established
across the southern Ulster border at 'Mount Norris, Armagh,
the Blackwater fort, Breifne and Boyle abbey in

Connaught~

Corn and food supplies were destroyed throughout the
try, wherever they could not be protected.

coun~

Finally, on May

16, 1600, with the full coo¥eration of the English navy,
4000 men, commanded by Sir Henry Docwra, and all their
?2c • u"' .......
~ Ireland, 1599-1600, 380 •

?3Ibid.

74A.P.C. XXXII, 337.
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supplies, were landed at Lough Foyle.75
Lord Mountjoy was fortunate enough to have two outstanding subordinates, Sir George Carew and Sir Arthur
Chichester.

Sir George Carew took the place of the dead

Sir Thomas Norreys as President of Munster, and soon had
the province well in

han~.

An astute politician, as well

as an able soldier, Carew convinced an increasing number
of Irish rebels not only to stop fighting against the
English, but to join in the conflict against their former
associates in order to bring the devastating war to a
close.76 Sir Arthur Chichester, who would reach the pinnacle of his fame as Lord Deputy of Ireland under James I,
commanded the forces operating out of Carrickfergus in
Ulster.
Mountjoy opened the assault on Ulster with a threepronged attack: Docwra moving in from Lough Foyle; Sir
Arthur Chichester from

Car~ickfergus;

army coming up through the Mowry Pass.

and Mountjoy's field
To the horror of

the Irish, Mountjoy continued these attacks throughout the
winter of 1600-1601, a tactic which according to Fynes Morrison, "brake their hearts" and threatened to summarily
end the war.??
~.:'yrone,

However, before Mountjoy could finish

the long-awaited Spanish intervention took place.

?5Rayes-McCoy, "Strategy and Tactics in Irish Warfare," 269.
76Falls, Elizabeth's Irish War_§_, 255.
77Moryson, Itinerary, vol. 11, 270.

271

In October 1601, 4000 Spanish troops landed at Kinsa.le, on the southern coast of Munster, and Mountjoy had
to take his entire field army, some 5000 men, to meet the
threat.

Tyrone likewise brought all the forces he could

spare, over 6000 men, to Kinsale, where a climactic battle
ensued.

Mountjoy

besieg~d

the Spanish in Kinsale, while

Tyrone in turn surrounded !1ountjoy, and in this configuration, Tyrone elected to fight the one orthodox battle of
his career on Christmas Day 1601.
The Irish, attempting a night attack, became uncoordinated in executing their complicated maneuver and the
four sections of the Irish army were defeated in detail,
while the Spanish never kept their promise to emerge from
their fortifications to assist Tyrone.78 The Irish were
sent reeling northwards, while Mountjoy forced the Spanish to surrender.

The Lord Deputy and his subordinates,

·Docwra and Chichester, pursued Tyrone ruthlessly for the
rest of the winter.

In May 1601, Sir Arthur Chichester,

the most relentless of the pursuers, described his savage
progress in a letter to Mountjoy:
We have killed, burnt, and spoiled all along
the Lough within four miles of Dungannon, from
whence we returned hither yesterday ••• We spare
none of what quality or ·sex soever, and it hath
bred much terror in the people, who heard not a
drUr:J. or saw not a fire there of long time. The
last service was upon Patrick O'Quin, whose
house .and town was burnt, wife, son, children, and
people slain, himself (as is now reported to me)

78 Hayes-McCoy, "Strategy and Tactics in Irish Warfare," 269.
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dead of a hurt received in flying from his house,
and other gentleman which received blows in following us in our return to the boat; and Tyrone
himself lay within a mile of this place, but kept
himself safe, sending 100 shot to know the matter,
which he seemed to marvel at.79
Additionally, as Tyrone's allies gradually deserted
the Irish leader they were used to fight the remaining
rebels.

The English attitude was expressed by Chichester

who, upon hearing of a vicious battle between friendly
and hostile Irish, commented: "It was good service on
both sides; for never an honest man was slain. 1180
Tyrone was doomed, but stubbornly held out for another
murderous winter, by which time famine was in full fury.
Fynes Moryson tells of corpses lying in Ulster roads,
mouths stained green with the grass with which they had
tried to sustain theselves; and of a band of old women
who enticed children into their company and then killed
them for food. 81 With this note of misery and degradation, Tyrone's rebellion, the great rebellion, ended.
On Nary 30, 1603, Tyrone and his few remaining followers, now reduced to fugitives in their own land, proceeded to the Blackwater fort and surrendered to Mountjoy. 82

Ar' a final irony atrributable to the slowness of

?9 C.S.P.

Irela~nd,

1600-1601, 356.

SOib:Ld., 333.

81 Moryson, Itinerar1, vol. 111, 170.
82

Falls, Elizabeth's Irii:;h \·/ars, 333.
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communications, Tyrone had surrendered six days after
Elizabeth had diedt without knowing that his former secret
ally, James I of Scotland, had succeeded to the throne of
England.

CONCLUSION
The campaign against the Earl of Tyrone was the most
formidable undertaking of any English expeditionary force
up to that time.

If the army of Essex was the largest

ever sent, so were the

p~oblems

of supply and maintenance

the most difficult yet encountered.

Success depended on

whole-hearted backing from England.

Even with complete

c'ooperation, decision by military victory was a questionable thing, as seen by the campaign of Essex's successor,
Lord Mountjoy, who, being judged by many as a superior
soldier to Essex, and who received all the support which
ERsex <ltd not, still took three years to end the conflict.

Essex had enemies in key positions at home, principally Sir Robert Cecil, who had much to lose by a quick
and successfu1 campaign; and in the Earl's absence the
sixty-six year old Queen relied on his most bitter enemy
for guidance and advice.

The incredible lack of support,

I

as manifested by nonavailability of shipping, failure to
send draught horses, recall of Essex's subordinates, revoca~ion

of his permission to return, the lack of money, and

the belittling and misrepresentations of his actions to
the Ct,ueen all imply a conscious effort on the part of his
enemies to insure his failure.

In.those areas in which

the Privy Council did cooperate, widespread corruption
274
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added to Essex's problems and underrained his campaign.
The lack of support dictated the strategy Essex had
to employ.

Instead of following the best possible cour-

ses of action, which he himself recognized.and recommended, circumstances forced him to choose alternative courses of action which were.potentially disastrous.

The

primitive state of communications also forced Essex to
depend heavily on subordinates.

Instead of assisting his

effort, Essex's subordinates involved him in two crucial
defeats, over which he had no control, but for which he
·would be blamed.

In spite of these formidable stumbling

·blocks, Essex, by the force of his personality, succeeded
in bringing about a truce which had all the possibilities
of leading to a relatively inexpensive negotiated settlenie'nt.

The negotiations were wrecked by not allowing Essex

to return, the rebels being willing to deal only with him.
To attribute the collapse of the Irish campaign of

1599 to the Earl of Essex is to exhibit the same lack of
under~tanding

which Elizabeth reflected in her letters.

In all major strategic decisions Essex chose the best
possible alternatives.

Instead, the failure of the cam-

paign should be attributed to a panoply of factors includ-

ing: the inherent difficulties of Irish warfare; corruption; and, particularly, to the uncooperative and hostile
actions of those persons who actively sought the Earl's
downfall.
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APPENDIX A

A?~ENDIX

A:

Letter of Oueen Elizabeth to the Earl of
Essex, dated July 19, 1599.

We have perceived by your letters to our Council, brought
by Henry Carey, that you are arrived at Dublin after your
journey into Munster; where, though it seemeth, by the
words of your letter, that you had spent divers days in
taking an account of all things that have passed since
you left that place, yet have you in this dispatch given
us small light either when, or in what order, you intend
particularly to proceed to the northern action. Wherein,
if you compare the time that is run on, and the excessive
charges that is (sic) spent, with the effects of anything
wrought by this voyage (howsoever we may remain satisfied
with your own particular cares and travails of body and
mind), yet you must needs think that we, that hav·e the
eyes of foreign Princes upon our actions, and.have the
hearts of people to comfort and cherish, who groan under
the burden of continual levies and impositions, which are
occasioned by these late actions, can little please ourself hitherto with anything that has been effected. For
what can be more true (if things be rightly examined)
than that your two months' journey hath brought in never
a capital rebel, against whom i.t had been worthy to JJ.ave
adventured one thousand men. For of their two comi1lgs in,
that were brought unto you by Ormonde (namely, Mountgar- .
rett and Cahir), whereupon ensued the taking of Cab.ii'
Castle, full well do we know that you would long since
have scorned to have allowed it for any great matter in
others, to have taken an Irish hold from a rabble of
rogues, with such force as you had, and with the help of
the cannon, ·which was always able in Ireland to make his
passage where it pleased. And, therefore, more than that,
you have now learned, upon our expenses, by knowledge of
the country, that those things are true, which we have
heretofore told you, if you would have believed us, how
far different things would prove there from your expectation. '.!.'here is little public benefit made to us of any
things happened in this action, which the President, with
any convenient addition to his numbers by you, might not
have effected, either now or hereafter, in a time more
seasonable, when it should less have hindered the other
enterprise, on which depends our greatest expectation.
\/hereunto we will add this one thing, that doth more displease us than any charge or expense that happens, which
is, that it must be the Queen of England's fortune (who
hath held down the greatest enemy she had), to make a
base bush kern to be accounted so famous a rebel, as to
be a person against whom so many thousands of foot and
horse, besides the force of all the nobility of that
kingdom, must be thought too little to be employed. For
28'+
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we must now remember unto you, that our cousin of Ormonde,
by his· own relation when you arrived, assured us that he
had delivered you a charge of a kincdom, without either
town maritime, or island, or hold, possessed by the traitors. But we did ever think that Tyrone would please himself to see such a portion of our fair army, and led by
the person of our general, to be harassed out and adventured in encountering those· base rogues, who were no way
strengthened by foreign armies, but only by such of his
offal, as he was content to spare and let slip from himself; while he hath lived at his pleasure, hath spoiled
all where our army should come, and preserved for himself
what he thought necessary. Little do you know how he hath
blazed in foreign parts the defeats of regiments, the death
of Captains, and loss of men of quality in every corner;
and how little he .seemeth to value their power, who use
it so as it is likely to spend itself. It is, therefore,
apparent that all places require not one and the selfsame
knowledge, and that drafts and surprises would have found
better successes than public and notorious marches; though,
where the rebel attends you with greater forces, it is
necessary that you carry our army in the form you use.
But it doth sound hardly in the ears of the world,
that in a time when there is a question to save a kingdom,
and in a country where experience giveth so great advanta~
to all enterprises, regiments should be committed to young
gentlemen that rather desire .,,to do well than know how to
perform it. A matter wherein we must note that you have
made both us and our Council so great strangers, as to
, this day (but by reports) we knmv not who they be that
spend our treasure and carry places of note in our army.
Wherein you know we did by our instructions direct you as
soon as you should be arrived, seeing you used your reasons
why it could not be done so conveniently beforehand.
These things we would pass over, but that we see your pen
flatters you with phrases, that here you are defeated,
that you are disgraced from hence in your friends' fortune,
that poor Ireland suffers in you; still exclaiming against
the effects of your own causes. For if it be not enough
that you have all, and more than, that which was agreed
on before you went, concerning public service, but that
you must, by your voluntary actions there in particular
things (which you know full well are contrary to our will
and liking), raise an opinion that there is any person
that dare displease us, either by experience of our for~er
tolerations, or with a conceit to avoid blame by distinctions; then must we not hide from you (how much soever we
do esteem you, for thoGe good things which are in you),
but that our honour hath dwelt too long with us, to leave
that point now uncleared, that whosoever it be that you
do clad with any honours or places wherein the world may
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read the least suspicion of neglect or contempt of our
commandments, we will never make dainty to set on such
shadows, as shall quickly eclipse nny of those lustres.
And, therefore, although by your letter we found your
purpose .to go northward, on which depends the main good
of our service, and which we expected long since should
have been performed, yet because we do hear it bruited
(besides the words of your letter, written with your own
hand, which carries some such sense), that you who allege
such weakness in our army by being travailed with you,
and find so great and important affairs to digest at Dublin, will yet engage yourself personally into Offaly
(being our Lieutenant), when you have there so many inferiors able enough to victual a fort, or seek revenge of
those that have lately prospered against our forces; and
when we call to mind how far the sun hath run his course,
what dependeth upon the timely plantation of our garrisons in the north, and how great a scandal it would be to
our honour to leave that proud rebel unassailed, when we
have, with so great an expectation cf our enemies, engaged
ourself so far in the action, so as without that be done,
all these former courses will prove like via navis in mari;
besides that our power, which hitherto hath been dreaded
by potent enemies, will now be even held contemptible
amongst our rebels; we must now plainly charge you, according to the duty you owe us, so to unite soundness of judgment to the zeal you have to do us service, and with all
speed to pass thither in such order, as the axe may be put
to the root of that tree, which hath been the treasonable
stock from whence so many poisoned plants and grafts have
been derived. By which proceeding of yours, we may nei·cher
have cause to repent our employment of yourself for omitting those best opportunities to shorten the war, nor receive (in the eye of the world) imputation of too much
weakness in ourself to begin a work without better foresight. What would be the end of our excessive charge, the
adventure of our people's lives, and the holding up of our
own greatness, against a wretch whom we have raised from
the dust, and who could never prosper, if the charges we
have been put to were orderly employed?
For the matter of Southampton, it is strange to us
that his continuance or displacing should work so great an
alteration, either in yourself (valuing our commandments
as you ought), or in the disposition of our army, where
all the Commanders cannot be ignorant that we not only
not allowed of your desire for him, but did expressly forbid it; and being· such a one whose counsel can be of little, and experience of less use; yea, such a one [as1, were
he not lately fastened to yourself by an accident, ~erein,
for our usage of yours, we deserve thanks, you would have
used many of your old lively arguments against him for any
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such ability or commandment; it is, therefore, strange to
us that we (sic), knowing his worth by y0ur report, and
your own disposition from ourself in that point, will dare
thus to value your own pJ.easing in thinr;s unnecessary,
and think by your private arguments to carry for your own
glory a matter wherein our pleasure to the contrary is
made notorious. And where you say fUrther that divers,
or the most, of the voluntary gentlemen are so discouraged thereby, as they begin to desire passports, and prepare to return, we cannot as yet be persuaded but that
the love of our service,. and the duty which they owe us,
have been as strong motives to these their travails and
hazards as any affection to the Earl of Southampton, or
any other. If it prove otherwise (which we will not so
much wrong ourself as to suspect), we shall have the less
cause, either to acknowledge or reward it.

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B:

Letter of Queen Elizabeth to ·the Earl of Essex,
dated July 30, 1599.

We have seen your letters written to our Council, by
which we find many lacks represented; although, upon examination thereof, we find those things only wanting of that
which was resolved, by those accidental causes which accompany sea transportations. And yet we understand by our
Council that, upon calling to account the inferior ministers, to \-:hom those cares were left, that (sic) most of
those proportions of victuals, which were certified from
remote garrisons to the Comptrollers there to be unarrived
in Ireland, have long since been shipped here in several
ports, so as they do assure themselves that long before
this time they are in their appointed places. But of
these things, and of your demand of 2,000 Irish more to
be in charge for this present servfce, with enlargement
of our allowance for your concordatums, our Council shall
deliver you our pleasure, it being our purpose only now
to deliver you our conceit of the course already holden,
and what is our f her determination.
First, you know right well, when we yielded to this
excessive charge, it was upon no other foundation than
[that] to which yourself did ever advise us as much as
anyi which was, to assail the Northern Traitor, and to
plant garrisons in his country, it being ever your firm
opinion, amongst others of our Council, to conclude that
all that was done in other kind in Ireland, was but waste
and consumption.
If then you consider what month we are in, and what a
charge we have been ever at, since the first hour of your
arrival, even to the greatest proportion that was intended,
when the general prosecution should be made, and what is
done of effect in any other place (seeing every Province
must require so great numbers as by your letters is set
down), you may easily judge that it is far beyond our expectation to find you make new doubts of further proceeding into Ulster, without further increase of numbers, when
no cause can be conceived by us, that you should hold the
traitor's strength at ·higher rBte than when you departed;
except it be that by your unseasonable journey into Munster, and by the small effects thereof (in comparison of
that we hoped this great charge should have effected),
you have broken the heart of our best troops, and weakened
your strength upon inferior rebels, and run out the glass
of time which hardly can be recovered. li'or the present,
therefore, we do hereby let you know, that the state of
things standing as they do, and all tho circumstances
weighed, both of our honour and of the state of that kingdom, we must expect at your hands, without delay, the passing into the North, for accomplishment of those counsels
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which were resolved on at your departure, to the intent
that a:'i.l these six months' charges prove not fruitless,
and all future attempts there as little successful; especially when these base rebels shall see their golden calf
preserve himself without taint or loss, as safe as in his
sanctuary, and our treasure, time, and honour, spent and
engaged in other enterprises, which were always concluded
to be of no difficulty, till the capital Rebel had been
attempted.
In which respect, because we know that on your continuance there doth now C.epend the order and conduct of
this important affair, and by your return suddenly (till
the northern action be tried), many and great confusions
may follow our will and pleasure is, and so we do upon
your duty command you, that, notwithstanding our former
license provisionally given, whereby you have liberty to
return, and constitute some temporary Governor in your
absence, that you do now in no wise take that liberty,
nor adventure to leave that State in any person's govern-·
ment, but with our allowance first had of him, and our
pleasure first known unto you what order you shall leave
with him. After you shall have certified us to what form
you have reduced things in the north; what hath been the
success, and whom you and the Council could wish to leave
with that charge behind, that being done, you shall with
all speed receive our warrant, without which w~ clo cl.LEirge
you (as you tender our pleasure) that you adventure not to
come out of that kingdom, by virtue of any former license
whatsoever.
It seemed strange unto us that in none of your letters we could find any advertisement of the arrival of
the 2,000 last sent over, nor of your purpose to go into
Offaly, when the messenger you sent did deliver both of
them for certainty to divers that spake with him, which,
we must tell you, we did disdain to do ourself (his quality and his own conditions considered), and though in his
own presumption he desired it, as a matter which he pretended you desired, yet we cannot believe that you would
deliver any matter of importance to such a man's relation,
whom both our city and court know and speak to be unfit
to come into our presence.

APPE:tillIX C

APPENDIX C:

Letter of Queen Elizabeth to the Earl of Essex,
dated August 9, 1599

The letter which we have read this day from you of
that Council concerning your opinions for the northern
action, doth rather deserve reproof than much answer; and
therefore you shall hereby understand that when we examine
all parts of your writings, and lay them together, we see
nothing but insinuations to dissuade that which should be
done in that point of greatest consequence, because we
should not find the error of those former courtesies,
which have made it now of greater difficulty. A matter
which in you (whom we have held worthy to advise in the
causes of that kingdom) might seem much more strange unto
us than they do, if we could forget most of the examples
of your proceedings in former times, which (sic) the late
Deputies Russell and Fitzwilliams, even when~e prevention, or rather absolute cure, of all the maladies in that
kingdom was put into your hands. Of which if we had taken
~traight account in Russell's time, the expense, the danger, and the dishonour succeeding, would not thus have
multi~lied.
But we do see bitter effects of our long
sufferings, with which things we ·could as well in our own
natural dispense as any Prince that liveth, because we
presume that they proceed, not out of lack of duty, but
of circumspection. Yet may not our kingdoms, our honour,
and the lives of oui• subjects, both at home and abroad,
be still dallied withall. God hath given us those upon
other conditions, and whilst He vouchsafeth to continue
us over them, we will not be accusable for anything within
our power to perform.
Is it not enough for you o.f that Council to have been
the greatest causes of that corruption in matter of religion (whereof the contagion reigneth in that kingdom) by
your :former suffering (nay, favouring) Popery, and the
cause of many disasters to our people, by lack o.f discipline, order, and direction? but thEit you must, at the
landing of our Lieutenant, who came with no other purpose
but to do us service in the place of greatest peril, seek
to divert his course, when our army was in greatest strength,
by persuading so long a journey into :Munster, and leaving
that prosecution (for which we have been only drawn on by
you all to assent to send over so great forces), but that
even now, on the 7th of August, we must receive new arguments framed to keep an army out of the north, thereby to
increase the rebels' pride, and frustrate one whole year's
charges. Observe well what vrn have already wrj_tten, and
a,pply your counsels to that which may shorten, and not
prolong, the war, seeing never any o.f you was of other
Ol)inion ~ than that all other courses were but consumptions,
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except we went on with the northern prosecution. Do you
forge·t that, within these seven days, you made a hot demand of 2,000 men for this action, and now, before you have
answer, send us tidings that this huge charge must leave
Tyrone untouched? 'What would you have us believe, if we
did not think you loyal, but that either some of you rthe
Irish Councill cannot forget your old good wills to tnat
Traitor, or e!se are insensible of all things, save your
own particulars? For if these courses hitherto taken have
well settled any of those Provinces, where your advices
have carried our army (though contrary to the opinion of
you, our Lieutenant, at your first arrival), then seeing
this was also accounted your fittest time, what can be
the reason of your stay? If, otherwise, it hath abated
our strength, and given more means to the Traitor to fortify himself by all kinds of practice against our army,
then must you confess, that these difficulties are not
found, but made by yourselves. For we do know it, and must
believe it, till we see the contrary proved, that whatsoever was appointed by us .for this service hath been more
than fully completed. Lastly, for Lough Foyle, which still
you ring in our ears, to be the place that would most annoy
the rebel, we doubt not but to hear by the next that it is
begun, and not in question.
It remaineth now that we do return to your letter
(our Lieutenant) such answer as is convenient, conoide1:ing
the contents of the same, but also that you may know what
we resolve. First, it appeareth that all that Council
have united themselves to dissuade the northern journey,
after they had joined with you seven days before in a request for greater numbers. Secondly, yourself express
that you hold it nro bono augurio that we so much affect
the journey, and that you do desire it, and resolve it,
and yet demonstratively point at the danger in the consequence, seeking thereby to shew intention to do that out
of obedience, against which, in your ominous parenthesis,
you make direct protestations. But herein we would have
you know, that howsoever we do like obedience as the sacrifice which becometh all good subjects, yet such are,
and shall be ever, the rules of our directions in things
of this nature, as none that serveth us in that place you
do, shall even win honour by obedience, where our country
shall receive harm by our commandments. And where you
describe unto us how strangely our Presidents of Munster
and Connaught are mastered in those provinces without doing anything upon the rebels; th;;i. t Off ally with 1, 500
cannot save themselves; that the northern garrisons are
able to do nothing with 8,000 men; that within two miles
of Dublin there are daily stealths and incursions; if it
grow out of negligence of our Governors, it were fit to
know it; if otherwise, then we wish they had occupied
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fewer numbers, seeing they ran no worse fortune before
this great arriy arrived. And for the places which you
have taken, we conceive you will leave no great numbers
in them, seeing other provinces where they are seated
receive no better fruits of their plantation, nor that we
can hope of more success (by the Council's writing) than
to be able to keep our towns, that were never lost, and
some petty holds of small importance, with more than
three parts of our army; it being decreed for the head of
the rebellion (as it seems by them) that our forces shall
not find the way this ye~r to behold them. What despair
this will work in our subjects• minds, that had greater
hopes; what pride it will raise in the rebels, that had .
greater fears; and what dishonour it will do us in foreign
parts; we had rather you had prevented, than we had noted.
And surely when we fall in this calculation of the numbers
you write of, howsoever you seem to apportion the numbers
only of 4,750 foot and 340 horse for the journey of Ulster, yet ought you to reckon the greatest part o.f the
forces of Connaugh·t, as one of the portions always designed
to correspond that service, to which if you shall add
these 2,000, which we have granted you, with such extractions as upon better consideration you may draw both
from divers places, that serve rather for protections of
private men's countries and fortunes, than for the good
of the public cause, besides what you ma;y ca.t.'"-'.Y out of
the frontier northern garrisons, when you are so near his
country; you may not reckon under ten or eleven thousand
for that service. All which considered, although we will
not particularly enjoin you to this way or that course of
undertaking him, if the carriage of your own actions have
changed the reason of some former counsels; yet have we
thought it fit to make you see that out of your own letters we may sufficiently gather the small success of your
painful endeavours; wherein we confess our army hath lost
no honour under your person; and that out of our letters
you may collect some sufficient matter to prove that we
command you no impossibilities. Which being all that at
this time we think fit for this letter, we end.

APPEl'IDIX D

APPENDIX D: Letter of Queen Elizabeth to the Earl of Essex,
dated September 14, 1599
Having sufficiently declared unto you before this time
how little the manner of your proceedings hath answered
either our direction or the world's expectations, and finding now by your letters by Cuff a course more strange, if
strange may be, we are doubtful what to prescribe you at
any time, or what to build upon your writing unto us in
any thing. For we have clearly discerned of late, what
you have ever to this hour possessed us with expectation
(sic) that you would proceed as we have directed you; but
y"Oil'r actions always shows (sic) the contrary, though carried in such sort as we weresure to have no time to
countermand them. Before your departure, no man's counsel was held sound, which persuaded not presently the main
prosecution in Ulster; all was nothin~ without that; and
nothing was too much for that. This drew on the sudden
transportation of so many thousands, to be carried over
with you; and when you arrived, .we were charged with more
than the list on which we resolved, by the number of 300
horsemen above the thousand, which was assented to, which
were only to be in pay during service in Ulster. We have
been also put in charge ever since the first journey, the
pretence of which voyage (as) appeared by your letters,
was to do some present service in the interim, whiles that
grew more commodious the main prosecution. For ·which purpose you did importune with great earnestness that all
manner of provisions might be hastened to Dublin against
your return. Of this resolution to defer you going into
Ulster you may well think that we would have made stay,
if you had given us more time by warning; or if we could
have imagined, by the contents of your own writing, that
you would have spent nine weeks abroad, and your return
when the third part of July was spent; and that you had
u."'lderstood our mislike of your former course, and made
your excuse of undertaking it only in respect of your
conformity to the Council's opinions, with great protestations of haste to the north. Then we received another
letter ,of new reasons to suspend that journey yet awhile,
and to draw the army into Offally, the fruit whereof at
your home coming was nothing else but new relations of
further miseries of our army and greater difficulties to
perform the Ulster wars. Then followed from you and the
Council a new demand of two thousan~ men, to which if we
would assent, you would speedily undertake what we had so
often comnanded. When that was granted, and your going
onward, promised by divers letters, we received by this
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bearer new fresh (sic) advertisement, that all you can
do is to go to the frontiers, and that you have provided
only twenty days victuals. In which kind of proceeding
we must deal plain (sic) with you and that Council, that
it were more proper f'Or them to leave troubling themselves
with instructing us by what rules our power and their
obedience are limited and bethink them of the courses that
have been only derived from their counsel, and how to
answer this part of theirs, to train us into a new expense
for one end, and to employ it to another, to which we
never would have assented, if we could. have suspected it
should have been undertaken before we heard it was in
action; and therefore we do wond~r how it can be answered,
seeing your attempt is not in the capital traitor's country, that you have increased our listed.. But it is true
and we have often said, that we were ever won to expense
by little and little, and by protestation of great resolutions in generalities, till they come to particular
execution, of all which course whosoever shall examine
any of the arguments used for excuse, shall find that
your own proceedings beget the difficulties and that no
just causes do breed the alterations of lack of numbers.
If sickness of the army be the reason, why was there not
the action undertaken when the army was in better state?
If the spring were too soon, and the summer that followed
otherwise spent, if the harvest th.at succeeded were so
neglected as nothin3 hath been done, then surely we must
conclude that none of the four quarters of the year will
be in season for you and that Council to agree of Tyrone's
prosecution, for which all our charge is intended. Further, we require you to consider whether, we have not
great cause to thin.le that your purpose is not to end the
war, when yourself have often told us that all the petty
undertakings in Leix, Munster and Connaue;ht, are but loss
of time, consumption of treasure, and most of all (of)
our people, until Tyrone himself be first beaten, on whom
all the rest depend. Do not you see that if this course
be in all parts by his sinister seconding all places where
any attempts be offered, who do not see that if this
course be continued, that it is like to spend us and our
kingdom beyond all moderation, as well as the report of
their success in all parts hath blemished our honour,
encouraged others to no small presumption? We know you
cannot so much fail in judgement as not to understand
that all the world seeth how time is delayed, though you
thirL"l{: thnt the allowance of thnt Council.
qow often have you told us that others that preceded
you had no judgment to end tbc war, who often resolved us
(that) until Lough J?oyle and Ballyshannon were planted
there could be no hope of doing service upon the capital
rebels'? We must therefore let you know, as it cannot be
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ignorance so it cannot be want .of means; for you had your
asking, you had choice of times, you had power and authority more ample than ever any had or ever shall have. It
may well be judged with how little contentment we seek
this and other errors. But how should that be hid which
is so palpable?
And therefore to leave that which is past, and that
you may prepare to remedy matters of weight hereafter,
rather than to fill, your papers with impertinent arguments,
being in your general letters savouring still in many
points of humours that cpncern the private of you, our
Lord Lieutenant, we do tell you plainly, and you that
our Council, that we wonder at your indiscretion to subscribe to letters which concern our public service, when
they are mixed with many matters private, and directed
to our Council table, which is not wo:p:t to handle things
of so small importance.
To conclude, if you say that our army be in a list
nineteen thousands, (and) that you have not, we answer
then to you, our Treasurer, that we are evil served, and
that there needs not so frequent demands of full pay. If
you will say that the muster-master is to blame, we much
muse then, why he is not punished. We say to you, our
General, if we would .ex gure, proprio. ,judicari£, that i:i-11
defects by muster, yea t ough never in so remote garrisons, have been affirmed to us to deser-..re to be imputed
to the General. For the small proportion you say you
carry with you of 3,500 foot, when lately we augmented you
200 (sic; error for 2,000) more, it is past comprehension,
excep'f""it be that you have left too great numbers in unnecessary garrisons, which do increase our charge, and diminish our army; which we command you to reform, especially
since by your continual report of the state of every province, you describe them all to be in worse condition than
ever they were before you put foot in that kingdom. So
that whosoever shall write the story of this year's action,
must say that we were too great charge to hazard our kingdom, and you have taken great pains to prepare for many
purposes, which perish without undertaking. And therefore,
because w_e see now, by your own word, that the hope is
spent of this year's service upon Tyrone and O'Donnell,
we do command you and our Council to fall jointly into
present deliberation of the state which you have brought
our kingdom unto, and that by the effect which this journey hath produced, and why these garrisons which you will
plant so far within the land, in the Erenny and Monagham,
as others we have v.Titten, shall have the same difficulties. Secondly, we look to hear froc you and them jointly,
how you think fit that the remain of this year shall be
spent and employed, in what kind of war, and whose and
with what numbers; which being done and sent hither in
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writint; with all expedition, you shall then understand our
pleasure in all thinr;s fit for your service: until which
time we conmand you to be very careful to meot with all
inconveniences that may rise in the kingdom, where the
evil-affected will grow desperate, when they see the best
of our defendinc; them. He have seen a writing, in manner
of a catalogue full of challenges, that are impertinent,
and of comparisons, that are needless, such as hath not
been before this time presented to a State, except it be
done more with a hope to terrify all men from censuring
your proceedings. Had it not been enough to send us the
testimony of the Council, but that you must call so many
of those, that are of so slender judgement and none of our
Council, to such a form of subscription? Surely, howsoever you may have warranted them, we doubted not but to
let them know what belongs to us to you and them. And
thus, expecting your answer, we end at our manner of Nonsuch, the 14th of September, 1599.

APPENDIX E

AP:?BNDIX E: Letter of (1~ueen Elizabeth to the Ea.rl of Essex,
dated September 17, 1599.
Right trusty and well beloved cousin and chancellor, we
greet you well. By the letter and the journal which we
have received from you, we see a quick end made of a slow
proceeding, for anything which our forces shall undertake
in those quarters which you pretended to visit, and therefore doubt not but before this time you have ended the
charge of the last two thousand which we have yielded for
other purposes, and of the three hundred horse only destined for the Ulster service. It remaineth therefore that
we return you somewhat of our concept, upon this late accident of your interview with the rebels.
We never doubted but that 'I'yrone whensoever he saw
any force approach, either himself or any of his principal
partisans, would instantly offer a parley, especially with
our supreme Governor of that kingdom, having often done it
to those who had but subaltern authority, always seeking
these cessations with like words, like protestations, and
upon such contingents, as we gather these will prove, by
your advertisement of his purpose to go consult with O'Donnell. Herein, we must confess to you that we are doubtful
lest the success will be suitable with your own opiniOLJ.
heretofore, when the same rebels held like course with
others that preceeded you. And therefore to come to some
answer for the present, it appearcth to us by your journal,
that you and the traitor spake together half an hou:- alone,
and without anybody's hearing: wherein, ti1ough we trust
you with our kingdom, are far from mistrusting with a
traitor; yet, both for comeliness, example, and for our
own discharge, we marvel you would carry it no better,
especially when you have seemed in all things since your
arrival to be so precise to have good testimony for your
actions; as, whensoever there was anything to be done to
which our com.mandment tied you, it; seomed sufficient warrant for you if your fellow councellors allowed better of
other ways, though ·your own reason carried you to have
pursued our directions against their opinions; to whose
conduct if we had meant that Ireland (after all the calamities in which they have wrapped it) should still have
been abandoned, (to whose course never any could take
more exceptions .than yourself), then was it very superfluous to have sent over such a personage as you are, who
had deciphered so well the errors of their proceedings,
being ::;till a hand with us and of our secretest council,
as it had been one good rule for you amongst others, in
most things to have varied from. their resolutions, especially when you had our opinion and your own to boot.
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Furthermore, we cannot but muse that you should
recite that circumstances of his being sometime uncovered,
[Tyrone took his hat off to Essex at their meeting at the
stream] as if that were much in a rebel, when our person
is so represented, or that you can think that ever any
parley (as you call it) was upon less terms of inequality
. than this, when you came to him and he kept the depth of
the brook between him and you; in which sort he proceeded
not with other of our ministers, for he came over to them.
So as never could any man observe greater form of greatness than he hath done, nor more to our dishonor, that a
traitor must be so far from submission, as he must have a
cessation granted because he may have time to advise whether he should go further or no with us. And thus much
for form. For you have dealt so sparingly with us in substance, by advertising us only, at first, of the half
hours conference alone, but not what passed on either
side; by letting us also know you sent commissioners,
without showing what they had in charge; as we cannot tell
(but by divination) what to think may be the issue of
their :proceeding. Only this \1e are sure of, (for we see
it in effect). that you have prospered so ill for us by
your warfare, as we cannot but be very jealous lest you
should be as well overtaken by the treaty; - For either
they did not ill that had the like meetings before you, or
you have done ill to keep them company in their erro:r..·n;
for no actions can more resemble others, that have been
before condemned, then these proceedings of yours at this
time with the rebels. For you must consider that as we
sent you into Ireland, an extraordinary person, with an
army exceeding any that ever Has pa.zred there by any prince
for so long time out of this realm, and that you ever supposed that we were forced to all this .by the weak proceedings even in this point of the treaties and pacifications.
So, if this parley shall not produce such a conclusion,
as this i!;itolerable charge may receive present and large
abatement, then hath the managing of our forces not only
proved dishonorable and wasteful, but that which followeth
is like to prove uerilous and contemptable. Consider then
what is like to be the end, and what - vrill be fit to build
on. To trust tbis traitor upon oath, is to trust a devil
upon his religion. To trust him upon pledges is mere
illusa:r"y, for wha.t piety is there among them that can tie
them to rule of honesty for itself, who are only bound to
their own sensualities, and respect only private utility.
, And therefore, v-ki..a:tsoever order you shall take with him of
la;yin~~ aside of arDj.es, banishini:; of strangers, recognition of superiority to us, or renouncing of rule over our
rights, promising restitution of spoils, disclaiming from
Oneilship, or any other such like conditions, which were
tolerable before he was in his overc;rown pride, by his own
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success against our power, which of former times was terrible. to him: yet unless he yield to have garrisons planted in his own country to master him, to deliver O'Neil's
sons, (whereof the detaining is most dishonorable), and to
come over to us personally here, we shall doubt you do but
piece up a hollow peace, and so the end prove worse than
the beginning. And therefore, as we well approve your own
voluntary profession, (wherein you assure us that you will
conclude nothing till you have advertised us, and heard
our pleasure), so do we absolutely command you to continue
and perform that resolution. Allowi.ng well that you hear
him what he proffers, draw him as high as you can, and
advertise us what conditions you would advise us to afford
him, and what he is like to receive: yet not to pass your
word for his pardon, nor make any absolute contract for
his conditions, till you do so particularly advertise us
by writing, a.nd receive our pleasure hereafter for your
further warrant and authority in that behalf. For whatsoever we do, ought to be well weighed in such a time,
when the world will suspect that we are glad of anything
out of weakness, or apt to pardon him out of mistrust of
our power to take due revenge on him: considering that
all which now is yielded to on our part succeedeth his
victories a..~d our disasters. In our letters of the fourteenth of this month to you and that Council, we have
written those things that are .fit .fur thea tu answer· c::n1d
understand: and therefore we will expect that t:b.ey can say
to all the parts of that letter, with which our pleasure
is that they be fully acquainted, as well as for your discharge another time, if you vary from their opinions,
(when we direct otherwise), as also because we would be
glad to receive their answer as well as yours.
Given u.nder .our signature, at Nonsuch, the 17th day
of September, 1599, in the 4lst year of our reign.
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